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Preface
And you run and you run to catch up with the sun,
but it's sinking
And racing around to come up behind you again
The sun is the same in a relative way, but you're older.
Pink Floyd, `Time'.
Tracing this thesis back to its origin, I should probably start with a course on Semantics
of Programming Languages, that I took in the middle of the fall semester of 1989. The
hearty welcome that I received from John-Jules Meyer at that course gave me an im-
pression of him that proved accurate over the subsequent seven years. My acquaintance
with John-Jules was renewed during a course on Modal Logic, continued when writing
my Masters Thesis, and nally led to me doing a Ph.D. The results captured in this
thesis clearly reveal this past. The entire thesis is imbued with the things I learned
in the course on Modal Logic, Chapter 4 uses elements of the course on Semantics of
Programming Languages, and my Masters Thesis inuenced part of Chapter 5.
The subject of this thesis is quite easily explained: it's all about the modelling of
human and human-like behaviour. Models of this kind of behaviour can be used to obtain
a better understanding of the way humans act, but they can also serve as specications of
entities, e.g. robots, that should display human-like behaviour. Investigating formalisms
that could be used in this way has taken up the greater part of my time over the last
four years. A pleasant side-eect of doing research of this kind is that one is given the
opportunity to visit conferences and workshops to inform others of results that have been
achieved. These travels, and in particular the meeting of dierent people from dierent
cultures, provided not only a very pleasant, but also a very enriching experience.
It is a pleasure to thank all the people and institutions that contributed in one way
or the other to the writing of this thesis. First and foremost I would like to thank my
supervisors John-Jules Meyer and Wiebe van der Hoek. On many occasions John-Jules
was far more enthusiastic than I was about the things I did, whereas Wiebe, through his
sensible, Frisian, character made sure that we didn't get too enthusiastic. Not only did I
learn a lot from working with John-Jules and Wiebe, it was also good fun. Furthermore
my thanks go out to my co-authors, who are, in addition to John-Jules and Wiebe, Peter
i
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Bruza, Frank Dignum and Theo Huibers, for a very pleasant and fruitful cooperation.
I want to thank the members of my reading committee who are, in alphabetical order,
Prof. Dr Jan van Leeuwen, Prof. Dr Raymond Reiter, Dr Maarten de Rijke, Dr Pierre-
Yves Schobbens and Prof. Dr Jan Treur, for their careful proofreading of this thesis.
Thanks are also due to the members of the Theoretical Computer Science section of the
Vrije Universiteit and the Department of Computer Science of Utrecht University for
providing both a stimulating and a pleasant working environment. Visiting conferences
can be rather expensive. I am therefore very grateful to the Departments of Computer
Science of the Vrije Universiteit and of Utrecht University, to the Faculty of Information
Technology at the Queensland University of Technology, to the Esprit II BRA `Drums
II' and Esprit III BRWG `ModelAge' research projects, to NWO and to the Shell Travel
Fund for providing (partial) coverage of the expenses associated with attending and
speaking at conferences and workshops.
On a personal level I would like to thank some very good friends, who were always
there for life outside of Academia. In particular I thank the Gorinchem Gang, Bas,
Leonard, Ronald and Margriet cum suii, and the Nijmegen Nerds, Ton, Thomas and
Christ, for many a pleasant gathering. Special thanks go out to the three T's, Thomas,
Ton, and Theo. Thomas not only endured my moods during the week, but was also
still able to remain a friend both in and outside University. I've never met anybody as
cheerful and attentive as Thomas, which makes him the perfect oce mate and friend.
With Ton I exchanged over 3000 email messages, either with or without E. Weber, and
furthermore organised `Kronenberg-Puiijk-Ulm Treen', which provided lousy games
of chess and very deep conversations. Theo is not only a ne colleague, an enthusiastic
co-author and a good friend, but in addition is the most hospitable guy I have ever
met. Theo and Pio showed the true meaning of `Brabantse gastvrijheid'. Last, but
denitely not least, I would like to thank my sister, my father, and my mother for their
constant encouragement and interest in my activities. My sister kept me down to earth
by constantly telling me that computer scientists are nerds: there is no escaping from
that. My father taught me that there is nothing wrong with having ambitions and trying
to full them. My mother reminded me that doing your best is what matters most, and
that achieving specic ambitions is not everything.
It was a pleasure Bernd van Linder, Utrecht, April 1996.
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The idea of building this kind of functionality into
a computer until recently was a dream so far out of
reach that the concept was not taken seriously. This is
changing rapidly. Enough people now believe that such
`interface agents' are buildable. For this reason, this
backwater interest in intelligent agents has become the
most fashionable topic of research in human-computer
interface design. It has become obvious that people
want to delegate more functions and prefer to directly
manipulate computers less.
Nicholas Negroponte, `Being Digital'.
In this chapter we lay the foundations of this thesis. We present our personal view on
agents and agency, and indicate the importance of formal semantics when dealing with
(implementations of) rational agents. It is argued that modal logic provides a good
formal tool to model agency. Thereafter the scope of this thesis is delineated, and some
preliminary concepts are dened. The chapter is concluded with an overview of what is
still to come.
1.1 What's an agent, anyway?
The last ten years have witnessed an intense owering of interest in agents, both on a
theoretical and on a practical level. The ACM devoted a special issue of its `Commu-
nications' to intelligent agents [21], and Scientic American ranked intelligent software
agents among the key technologies for the 21st century [89]. Also various conferences and
workshops were initiated that specically address agents, their theories, languages, ar-
chitectures and applications [32, 58, 79, 130, 131]. Consequently, terms like agent-based
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computing, agent-based software engineering and agent-oriented programming have be-
come widely used in research on AI. Despite its wide use, there is no agreement on what
the term `agent' means. Riecken remarks that `at best, there appears to be a rich set
of emerging views' and that `the terminology is a bit messy' [114]. Existing denitions
range from `any entity whose state is viewed as consisting of mental objects ' [121] and
`any entity having the ability to pursue goals, to control its action and in some way
to communicate with other agents' [98], to `autonomous objects with the capacity to
learn, memorize and communicate' [33] and `systems whose behavior is neither casual
nor strictly causal, but teleonomic, goal-oriented toward a certain state of the world'
[16]. Other authors, and truly not the least, use the term `robot' instead of agent [78],
or take the commonsense denition of agents for granted [109]. In practical applications
agents are `personal assistent[s] who [are] collaborating with the user in the same work
environment' [88], or `computer programs that simulate a human relationship, by doing
something that another person could otherwise do for you' [119]; in applications deal-
ing with Virtual Reality so-called believable agents are seen as `intelligent, emotional,
behaving creatures [that] must respond to the user's rich variety of human behavior in
believable ways' [8].
The informal description of an agent in its most primitive form, which we distil from
the denitions given above and which the reader is kindly advised to keep at the back of
his/her mind throughout reading this thesis, is that of an entity which has the possibility
to execute certain actions, and is in the possession of certain information, which allows
it to reason about its own and other agents' actions and the motives underlying these
acts. In general, agents will not be this primitive, but will also be rational, both in their
behaviour and with respect to the information that they posses, autonomous, in that
they can to a certain extent make their own decisions on what to do next, social in their
behaviour with respect to other agents, and in addition have the capacity to acquire
new information and adapt their behaviour in the light of this new information. As we
see it, the concrete agents in which all of these aspects are embodied are either human
or highly sophisticated articial agents. The formalisation of this kind of agents is the
subject of this thesis.
1.2 The importance of formal methods
Currently several applications of agent-technology are in use. Among those listed by
Wooldridge & Jennings [129] are air-trac control systems, spacecraft control, telecom-
munications network management and particle acceleration control. Furthermore, in-
terface agents are used that for instance take care of email administration, as well as
information agents that deal with information management and retrieval. In all prob-
ability, these implemented agents will be rather complex. In addition, life-critical im-
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plementations like air-trac control systems and spacecraft control systems need to be
highly reliable. We agree with Butler & Finelli [12, 13, 128] that the only possible way
to guarantee reliability of such complex systems is by using formal methods in their
development. This guarantee of reliability can never be given by just performing tests
on the system. Besides these general reasons for using formal techniques in any branch
of AI and computer science, there is another reason when dealing with agents. These
agents will in general be equipped with features representing commonsense concepts as
knowledge, belief and ability. Since most people do have their own conception of these
concepts, it is very important to unambiguously establish what is meant by these con-
cepts when ascribed to some specic implemented agent. Formal specications allow for
such an unambiguous denition.
Very nice examples of the use and usability of formal methods when dealing with
rational agents are given by Jones [64] and by Krogh [74]. Jones showed, by rigorously
formalising some assumptions that were (implicitly) underlying a certain incarnation of
agent-oriented programming [120], the irrationality of the, supposedly rational, agents
that had been implemented. More in detail, Jones proved that, under the given as-
sumptions, any agent which cannot do something, believes that it can. In turn, Krogh
formally showed that another incarnation of agent-oriented programming [121] suered
from the problem that dierent agents were not allowed to have conicting obligations,
a property which is, though possibly desirable, intuitively highly unrealistic. And even
though it is quite possible that this irrational and unrealistic behaviour could also have
been noticed by testing the implemented agents, in both cases it actually was the use of
formal methods that did so.
1.2.1 Modal logics for agency
The formal tool that we propose to model agency is modal logic [19, 60, 61]. Originally
being the logic of Leibnizian necessity and possibility, modal logics have been used ex-
tensively in formalising intensional notions in analytical philosophy [35]. It is perhaps
even not too bold to say that modal logic has by now become the standard paradigm
for the formal analysis of this kind of notions in a philosophical context. Also in theo-
retical computer science modal logics are used to analyse, specify and verify all kinds of
computer programs and automated systems [30, 70].
Using modal logics oers a number of advantages. Firstly, using an intensional logic
like modal logic allows one to come up with an intuitively acceptable formalisation of
intensional notions with much less eort than it would take to do something similar using
full-edged rst-order logic. Secondly, the reducibility of modal logic to (fragments of)
rst-order logic ensures that methods and techniques developed for rst-order logic are
still applicable to modal logic. Lastly, using possible worlds models as originally proposed
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by Kripke [72], provides for a uniform, clear, intelligible, and intuitively acceptable means
to give mathematical meaning to a variety of modal operators.
1.3 What this thesis is about
In this thesis we study the usability of modal logic as a tool to formalise rational agents.
To this end we combine and extend various modal logics , viz. epistemic logic, the logic
of knowledge, doxastic logic, the logic of belief, and dynamic logic, the logic of action.
More in particular, we extend doxastic logic to account for dierent degrees of credibility
and reliability of beliefs, and we propose a new paradigm for dynamic logic that gener-
alises the standard one. In addition, we propose a formalisation of ability that allows
one to formally distinguish the notions of opportunity and ability, which are, according
to insights gained in the research on analytical philosophy, indeed essentially dierent.
The logics used in dening the formal system are subject of research in mathematics,
analytical philosophy and computer science, while the algorithmic character of the solu-
tions that solve the problems encountered in extending these logics clearly reveals their
roots in computer science. As such, the research captured in this thesis is situated at
the crossroads of various disciplines relevant to AI.
Our main aim in dening the formal system is to end up with a language that is
highly expressive yet intelligible and concise, with a clear and well-dened semantics,
which allows one to model very rich theories of agency. This system is to be used
by theorists to gain a better understanding and insight into the nature of agents and
agency. The resulting framework is a very exible one, which contains, in the form
as it is presented in this thesis, many personal, and possibly arguable, choices. Due
to its enormous exibility one is however not forced to maintain these choices when
applying the framework; it is easily tuned to anyone's personal preferences. As such the
contribution of this thesis is twofold: on the one hand we present a very exible formal
system that can be used to model all kinds of aspects of agency, on the other hand we
propose a personal instantiation of this system which clearly shows its usability.
1.3.1 What this thesis is not about
Throughout this thesis logic is treated as a useful formalisation and specication tool,
with no intrinsic interest of its own, which makes the research captured in this thesis to
belong to the eld of applied logic rather than pure logic. As such we do not extensively
deal with topics in pure logic like decidability, complexity, compactness and so on.
At the other side of the spectrum we do also not consider genuine practical issues.
Although we give examples of possible specications at various places throughout this
thesis, we do not put our formalism to the test of specifying existing (software) agents.
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The formal specication of this kind of agents should constitute the major part of future
research.
1.4 Guide to the reader
For the greater part this thesis is meant to be self-contained. Basically we only assume
the reader to be familiar with both (classical) propositional logic and (classical) rst-
order logic; for those who are not yet so, good introductions are given by Gamut [36, 37]
and Leblanc & Wisdom [76]. Furthermore, some familiarity with set theory is requested,
but this will not exceed the material given in standard textbooks. Knowledge of modal
logic is not a prerequisite, though on occasion it might come in handy.
Although this thesis is all about formalising notions, the original aim upon writing
it was to make it readable even for those with an aversion to formulae and formalisms.
Just by reading the text while skipping all formulae one should be able to at least get
a very good impression of what is going on. And armed with such an impression, on
second reading the formulae might turn out not to be too intimidating after all.
This thesis contains a considerable number of propositions, theorems, lemmas and
corollaries. Although all of these were meticulously proved, not all of these proofs are
actually given here. Some proofs are omitted for being too trivial to bother the reader
with, other omitted proofs are completely analogous to proofs that are given and are
therefore left out, and yet other proofs are too elaborate and space-consuming to be
spelled out
1
. Even though some proofs are left out, the reader should at all times be
aware that all claims made in this thesis are correct to the best of our knowledge and
have been proved to be so to the best of our capacities.
1.4.1 Formal preliminaries
As mentioned above, we assume the reader to be familiar with classical propositional
and rst-order logic. More in particular, we assume familiarity with both the syntax and
the semantics, as well as with the proof systems of these logics. All concepts additional
to these are introduced with ample explanation and as much care as possible. The only
formal concepts that are used in this thesis without explanation | because this would
either cause too much of an interruption or fall outside the scope of this thesis | are
the following ones. The symbol `,' denotes denitional equality and is used to dene
new expressions in terms of previously existing ones. The symbol `}' is used to denote
the power set of a given set; for V an arbitrary set, }(V) denotes the power set of V.
Analogously,  is used to denote the lift of a given set. For an arbitrary set V, the set
1
In this case, however, these proofs are given elsewhere, and exact pointers to their locations are
provided.
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(V), which is in general denoted by V

, is dened to be V[f;g. We furthermore assume
the truth-values 1 and 0, as well as the set bool containing these values, to be given. The
function Cn yields the set of consequences in classical propositional logic of a given set
of propositional formulae, i.e. if  is a set of propositional formulae then Cn() consists
of all propositional formulae that can be derived from  in classical propositional logic.
In reasoning at a meta-level about the properties of the formal systems presented in
this thesis, we use the symbol) to denote `only if',( to denote `if',, to denote `if and
only if', and & to denote `and'. Brackets will usually be dropped as much as possible
without causing confusion. To this end we will assume that any element from f!; ;$g
has a lower priority than one from f^;_g, and that the same holds for f);(;,g with
respect to f&,org.
1.4.2 Outline
This thesis contains, in addition to this prefatory one, six more chapters. Except for
the next one, each of these chapters contains the denitions that constitute one or more
formal systems, which focus on a particular aspect of agency. In the following chapter,
which is called Modelling rational agents, the philosophical foundations that we con-
sider fundamental to agency, viz. knowledge, ability, opportunity and result, are laid
out. Furthermore, a formalisation of these and other notions constituting the core of all
systems dened in subsequent chapters, is presented.
In the third chapter, A logic of capabilities, the rst two of the formal systems built
on the core dened in Chapter 2 are presented. These systems, belonging to the so-called
KARO-architecture, share a common language and class of models, but dier in their
interpretation of certain formulae. Using the primitive concepts of these systems we
dene the notion of practical possibility, which is not only philosophically interesting,
but also from the point of view of AI, since it can be used to formalise part of the
planning of agents. For validity in both systems a sound and complete axiomatisation
is presented, the most striking feature of which is the use of innitary proof rules, i.e.
rules with an innite number of premises.
The fourth chapter is calledUnravelling nondeterminism. In this chapter we investi-
gate, and present solutions to, the problems associated with nondeterminism of actions.
We consider two kinds of nondeterminism, viz. internal nondeterminism in which the
(nondeterministic) choice is up to the agent, and external nondeterminism where some
unspecied external environment decides which of two nondeterministically composed
actions is to be performed. The presence of ability as a primitive notion in the core of all
of our formal systems renders most of the standard approaches towards the formalisation
of nondeterminism useless; only for one of the systems dened in Chapter 3 in combi-
nation with one particular kind of nondeterminism, a more or less standard approach
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is applicable. To allow for other combinations of the systems of Chapter 3 and various
kinds of nondeterminism, we present some pragmatic, algorithmic denitions that indeed
full our purposes.
In the fth chapter, Intelligent information agents, we focus on the formalisation
of both the statics and dynamics of information from an agent-oriented perspective.
Concerning the statics, we present a formalisation of belief that allows for a classication
according to credibility. As to the dynamics, we consider various so-called informative
actions that model dierent ways of information acquisition open to an agent. More in
particular, we formalise observations, communication and the jumping to conclusions
that constitutes default reasoning, as actions to be executed by the agents. Dierent
ways of acquiring information result in dierent degrees of credibility attached to the
information, which is formalised using the credibility classication of the agents' beliefs.
To interpret informative actions, and in particular to ensure that execution of such an
action changes the beliefs of an agent in a correct way, we propose a generalisation of the
standard paradigm of dynamic logic. Employing this more general paradigm we indeed
succeed in coming up with an adequate formalisation.
The sixth chapter, which is called How to motivate your agents, is devoted to a
formalisation of motivational attitudes, the attitudes that explain why agents act the way
they do. The most remarkable aspect of this formalisation is the wide range of attitudes
that are considered. Not only do we deal both with attitudes that range over propositions,
viz. wishes and goals, and with attitudes that range over actions, viz. commitments, but
we also consider both the statics and dynamics of these attitudes. Basically, the idea is
that an agent's wishes constitute its primitive motivational attitudes, and that its goals
are selected among its unfullled yet implementable wishes. On the basis of its knowledge
of its goals and practical possibilities, an agent may make certain commitments. These
commitments are in general persistent, but as soon as one of its commitments is worn
out an agent has the possibility to undo it. The act of selecting wishes and those of
committing and undoing commitments are modelled according to the new paradigm for
dynamic logic as introduced in Chapter 5.
The thesis is concluded with a chapter in which we reect on the picture of agents as
emerging from this thesis. To show how the formal machinery presented in the Chapters 2
through 6 could be applied in practice, we sketchily specify an articial information agent.
Finally, we recapitulate the main achievements and conclusions, and indicate directions
for future research.
In the light of the interdependencies of the chapters, one is strongly advised to read
Chapter 2 before reading any other chapter. Furthermore, reading Chapter 3 should
precede reading Chapter 4, and before reading Chapter 6 both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
should be read. Finally, by its very nature, Chapter 7 is best read in the end.
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When I found so astonishing a power placed within my
hands, I hesitated a long time concerning the manner
in which I should employ it. Although I possessed the
capacity of bestowing animation, yet to prepare a frame
for the reception of it, with all its intricacies of bres,
muscles, and veins, still remained a work of inconceiv-
able diculty and labour. I doubted at rst whether I
should attempt the creation of a being like myself, or
one of simpler organisation; but my imagination was
too much exalted by my rst success to permit me to
doubt of my ability to give life to an animal as complex
and wonderful as man.
Mary Shelley, `Frankenstein'.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, an agent is an entity which has the possibility to perform
certain actions and is in the possession of certain information, which it may use to rea-
son about its acts. We start o this chapter by explaining the notions that we consider
fundamental to agency, viz. knowledge and actions. For this explanation we draw upon
insights acquired in analytic philosophy, without having the pretension that our account
provides the philosophical theory of knowledge and action. Its mere purpose is to provide
the reader with an intuitive grasp for the notions that we will formalise. The formali-
sation of the core notions that will form the foundation of all systems presented in this
thesis constitutes the rest of this chapter. We use the term `system' rather loosely to
describe the complex of language, models, interpretations and occasionally proof the-
ory. The elements of a system can roughly be classied as belonging to the syntax or
to the semantics. Whereas the syntax denes the well-formed formulae that constitute
the language, the semantics is concerned with giving mathematical meaning to these
formulae. In addition to the core syntax and semantics we present a uniform account
9
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of a variety of denitions that are used at various occasions throughout the rest of this
thesis. We conclude this chapter with a brief summary and some references to the |
mainly philosophical | literature.
2.1 Knowledge, action and events from a philosophical perspective
The most fundamental informational attitude that we equip our agents with is termed
knowledge. Knowledge is one of those commonsense terms that are intuitively under-
stood by virtually everybody, yet extremely hard to characterise, describe and analyse
1
.
Our use of the term knowledge complies with the common one in AI and computer sci-
ence [45, 96], i.e. knowledge is veridical information on which the agent has both positive
and negative introspection. Veridicality implies that only true formulae are known by
agents, positive introspection states that agents know that they know something when-
ever they know it, and negative introspection states that agents know that they do not
know something as soon as they do not know it. On occasion, viz. in Chapter 5, we will
think of the agents' knowledge as being a priori, i.e. belonging to pure reason. However,
for our purposes it is in general irrelevant whether one thinks of knowledge as being a
priori, or a posteriori, i.e. due to practical experience
2
.
To explain the concept of action, we rst have to spend some words on the ontology
of states of aairs that we presuppose. A state of aairs is assumed to be a description
of the world. This description may both be actual, i.e. pertaining to the real world, or
hypothetical, for example in the case of an agent which considers various descriptions
of the world possible on the basis of its knowledge. Actions are now considered to be
descriptions of causal processes, which upon execution by an agent may turn one state
of aairs into another one. As such our intuitive idea of actions corresponds to what Von
Wright calls the generic view on actions [133]. An event consists of the performance
of a particular action by a particular agent, and is as such related to Von Wright's
individual view on actions [133]. Given the ontology of actions and events as somehow
causing transitions between states of aairs, we deem two aspects of these notions to
be crucial: when is it possible for an agent to perform an action, and what are the
eects of the event consisting of the performance by a particular agent of a particular
action in a particular state of aairs? To investigate these questions we focus on three
aspects of actions and events that are in our opinion essential, viz. result, opportunity
and ability. Slightly simplifying ideas of Von Wright [132], we consider any aspect of the
state of aairs brought about by the occurrence of an event in some state of aairs to be
among the result of that particular event in that particular state of aairs. In adopting
1
Another example of such a term is intelligence, making knowledge representation in articial intel-
ligence to be among the most fascinating, interesting and inherently dicult areas of research.
2
Used in this way, the terms a priori and a posteriori are due to Kant [66].
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this description of results we abstract from all kinds of aspects of results that would
probably have to be dealt with in order to come up with an account that is completely
acceptable from a philosophical point of view, like for instance the question whether all
changes in a state of aairs have to be ascribed to the occurrence of some event, thereby
excluding the possibility of external factors inuencing these changes. However, it is
not our aim to provide a thorough and complete theory of results, but instead combine
results with other notions that are important for agency. From this point of view it
seems that our denition of results is suciently adequate to investigate the eects of
actions, and, given the complexity already associated with this simple denition, it does
not make much sense to pursue even more complex ones.
Just as that of the result of events, the notions of ability and opportunity are among
the most discussed and investigated in analytical philosophy. Ability plays an impor-
tant part in various philosophical theories, as for instance the theory of free will and
determinism, the theory of refraining and seeing-to-it, and deontic theories. Following
Kenny [68], we consider ability to be the complex of physical, mental and moral capaci-
ties, internal to an agent, and being a positive explanatory factor in accounting for the
agent performing an action. Opportunity on the other hand is best described as cir-
cumstantial possibility, i.e. possible by virtue of the circumstances. The opportunity to
perform some action is external to the agent and is often no more than the absence of cir-
cumstances that would prevent or interfere with the performance. Although essentially
dierent, abilities and opportunities are interconnected in that abilities can be exercised
only when opportunities for their exercise present themselves, and opportunities can be
taken only by those who have the appropriate abilities. From this point of view it is
important to remark that abilities are understood to be reliable (cf. [10]), i.e. having the
ability to perform a certain action suces to take the opportunity to perform the action
every time it presents itself. The combination of ability and opportunity determines
whether or not an agent has the (practical) possibility to perform an action.
2.2 Knowledge, action and events from a formal perspective
In formalising the notions discussed in the previous section, we will concentrate on some
rather precisely described aspects, thereby totally ignoring others. In our formalisation
of knowledge we will for instance leave | nonetheless important | aspects as logical
omniscience and bounded rationality out of consideration, and instead assume our agents
to be perfect logical reasoners. From our point of view, knowledge is mainly important
as formalising the information of agents on their abilities, opportunities and the results
of their actions, without too much intrinsic interest of its own. Therefore, the notion of
knowledge as described above suces for our purposes. Concerning the (regular) actions
of agents, we will in general not try to formalise what it means exactly to have the ability
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or opportunity to perform some action, but instead focus on the compositional behaviour
of actions, i.e. how does the ability or opportunity to perform some composite action
relate to the ability or opportunity for the components of this actions. In addition,
we introduce new, special actions that formalise commonsense acts as observing and
communicating, and single out the constituents of the opportunity, ability and result
of these actions. For the reasons already given in Chapter 1, we propose the use of a
propositional multi-modal language to formalise all of these aspects. In contrast with
most philosophical accounts, but rmly in the tradition of theoretical computer science,
this language is an exogenous one, i.e. actions are represented explicitly. Although it
is certainly possible to come up with accounts of action without representing actions
(see for instance [65, 104, 105, 118]), we are convinced that many problems that plague
these endogenous formalisations can be avoided in exogenous ones
3
. The core of each
class of actions considered in this thesis is built up from a set of atomic actions using a
variety of constructors. In our perception, one of the dening characteristics of atomic
actions is their determinism, i.e. there is at most one state of aairs brought about by
execution of an atomic action in some (other) state of aairs. The constructors that we
propose to build more complex actions out of the atomic ones, deviate somewhat from
the standard actions from dynamic logic [43, 46], but are both well-known from high-level
programming languages and somewhat closer to philosophical views on actions than the
standard constructors.
The multi-modal language that forms the core of all formalisations that are subse-
quently investigated in this thesis, contains modal operators to represent the knowledge
of agents as well as to represent the result and opportunity of events. The ability of
agents is formalised by a factually non-modal operator. Following the representation of
Hintikka [48] we use the operator K to refer to the agents' knowledge: K
i
' denotes
the fact that agent i knows ' to hold. To formalise results and opportunities we borrow
constructs from dynamic logic: hdo
i
()i' denotes that agent i has the opportunity to
perform the action  in such a way that ' will result from this performance. The abilities
of agents are formalised through the A operator: A
i
 states that agent i has the ability
to perform the action .
In subsequent chapters we dene various formal systems. To make explicit that the
system of this chapter is but the core of all the genuine, fully-edged systems presented
subsequently, we attach a generic variable X as a superscript to some of the notions de-
ned below. By either omitting X or instantiating in a suitable manner, we immediately
obtain the appropriate incarnation of these core notions.
The language L
0
(), which is the language of classical propositional logic, does not
3
Similar observations underly the (partial) shift from endogenous logics of agency [109] to exogenous
ones [107] in the work of Rao & George, and in Meyer's (exogenous) dynamic deontic logic [92], which
avoids much of the problems that plague (endogenous) deontic logics [3].
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depend on the system under consideration, and is therefore dened once and for all in
Denitions 2.1 and 2.3.
2.1. Definition. The propositional language L
0
() is founded on a set  of propositional
symbols. The alphabet of L
0
() contains the well-known connectives : and ^.
2.2. Definition. The language L
X
(;A;At) is founded on three denumerable, non-
empty sets, each of which is disjoint of the others:  is the set of propositional variables,
A  IN is the set of agents, and At is the set of atomic actions. The core alphabet
contains the well-known connectives : and ^, the epistemic operator K , the dynamic
operator hdo ( )i , the ability operator A , the action constructors confirm (conr-
mations), ; (sequential composition), if then else fi (conditional composition) and
while do od (repetitive composition).
2.3. Definition. The language L
0
() is the smallest superset of  such that
 if f 2 L
0
(); g 2 L
0
() then :f 2 L
0





(;A;At) is a superset of  such that
 if ' 2 L
X
(;A;At) and  2 L
X
(;A;At) then :' 2 L
X




 if ' 2 L
X
















where the class Ac
X
(At) of actions is a superset of At such that
 if ' 2 L
X




































 if ' 2 L
X
(;A;At),  2 Ac
X
(At) then while' do od 2 Ac
X
(At)
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The following letters, possibly marked, are used as typical elements:
 p; q; r for the elements of 
 i; j for the elements of A
 a; b; c for the elements of At
 f; g; h for the elements of L
0
()
 ';  ;  for the elements of L
X
(;A;At)
 ; ;  for the elements of Ac
X
(At)
Whenever the sets ;A;At are understood, which we assume to be the case unless














2.4. Definition. The clauses given above in the denition of the language L
X
(;A;At)
and the class Ac
X
of actions will be used in dening each of the languages considered in
the sequel of this thesis, and are therefore termed core clauses.
The elements of  and At denote (uninterpreted) propositional symbols | or atomic
formulae | and atomic actions, respectively. The elements of A are natural numbers
representing the agents under consideration. The constructs :;^;_;!;$ and >;?,
denoting negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence and the canoni-
cal tautology and contradiction, respectively, are all well-known from classical (proposi-









' is the dual of K
i
' and represents the epistemic possibility of '
for agent i, i.e. on the basis of its knowledge, i considers ' to be possible. The formula
[do
i
()]' is the dual of hdo
i
()i'; this formula is noncommittal about the opportunity
of agent i to perform the action  but states that if the opportunity to do  is present,
then ' would be among the results of do
i
(). The action constructors presented in Def-
inition 2.3 constitute the class of so-called strict programs (cf. [44, 46]). Their intuitive
















if ' holds and 
2
otherwise
while' do od  as long as ' holds
The action skip represents the void action, and fail denotes the abort action. The
action 
n
consists of sequentially doing  n times.
As is shown in the following example, solely using the constructs present in the core
language L
X
already allows one to formalise fairly elaborate, pseudo-realistic situations.
2.5. Example. Consider the following action: `If some software agent i knows that the
user u that it is assisting will feel better after being helped by i and i knows that it is
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able to do so, then it will help its user and otherwise it will do nothing'. Actions like
these could well be thought of as occurring in specications of software agents. Using
constructs from L
X
it is possible to formalise the situation that if u is feeling well before
i performs the aforementioned action, then u will still feel well or u will feel even better
after i has performed the action. Denoting `u better', `u well' and `help' by b, w and
h, respectively, and assuming that fw; bg  , i 2 A and h 2 At, this formalisation










h) then h else skip fi)](w _ b).
The vast majority of all interpretations proposed for modal languages is based on the
use of Kripke-style possible worlds models. In general, these models consist of a non-
empty set of possible worlds, which may be thought of as the formal counterparts of the
states of aairs already discussed in our description of action, a valuation on propositional
symbols indicating the truth value of atomic propositions in possible worlds, and various
accessibility relations between these worlds, of which the interpretation depends on the
actual area of application: for the standard modal logic of possibility and necessity,
this relation is thought of as expressing conceivability, for deontic logics it indicates
ideal worlds, for temporal logics the relation expresses an ordering in time, etc. The
models that we use to interpret formulae from L
X
contain a set S of possible worlds,
representing actual and hypothetical states of aairs, a valuation  on the elements of
, indicating which atomic propositions are true in which possible world, a relation R




dealing with (the result,
opportunity and ability for) atomic actions.
2.6. Definition. A modelM for L
X
is a tuple containing at least the following elements:
 a non-empty set S of possible worlds or states.
 a valuation  :  S! bool on propositional symbols.
 a function R : A ! }(S  S) indicating the epistemic alternatives of agents. This
function is demanded to be such that R(i) is an equivalence relation for all i 2 A.
 a function r
0
: A  At ! S ! S

indicating the state-transitions caused by the
execution of atomic actions.
 a function c
0
: AAt! S! bool determining the abilities of agents with regard to
atomic actions.




. The letterM, possibly marked,
denotes a typical model, and s; t; u, possibly marked, are used as typical elements of the
set of states.
The relation R(i) indicates which pairs of worlds are indistinguishable for agent i on
the basis of its knowledge: if (s; s
0
) 2 R(i) then whenever s is the description of the
actual world, s
0
might as well be for all agent i knows. To ensure that knowledge indeed
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has the properties sketched in the previous section, it is demanded that R(i) is an equiv-











. That this demand ensures that knowledge
behaves as desired is stated in Proposition 2.8 and explained in Proposition 2.16. The
function r
0
characterises occurrences of atomic events, i.e. events consisting of an agent
performing an atomic action: whenever s is some possible world, then r
0
(i; a)(s) repre-
sents the state of aairs following execution of the atomic action a in the possible world
s by the agent i. Since atomic actions are inherently deterministic, r
0
(i; a)(s) yields at





(i; a)(s) = ;, we will sometimes say that execution of a by i in s leads to the
(unique) counterfactual state of aairs, i.e. a state of aairs which is neither actual nor
hypothetical, but counterfactual. The function c
0
acts as a kind of valuation on atomic
actions, i.e. c
0
(i; a)(s) indicates whether agent i has the ability to perform the action a
in the possible world s.
Formulae from the language L
X
are interpreted on the possible worlds in the models
from M
X
. Due to the fact that interpretations of formulae concerning opportunities,
results and abilities dier with the class of actions that is considered, it is not possible to
give a uniform interpretation of these formulae that is suitable for all the systems dened
in this thesis. Formulae that are interpreted in exactly the same way in all the logical
systems that we present are called core formulae. Of these, propositional symbols are
directly interpreted using the valuation : a propositional symbol p is true in a state s
i (p; s) yields the value 1. Negations and conjunctions are interpreted as in classical
logic: a formula :' is true in a state s i ' is not true in s and '^ is true in s i both
' and  are true in s. The knowledge formulae K
i
' are interpreted using the epistemic
accessibility relation R(i): agent i knows that ' in s i ' is true in all the possible worlds
that the agent considers epistemically compatible with s.
2.7. Definition. The binary relation j=
X
between a formula and a pair M; s consisting
of a model M and a state s in M is for the core formulae dened by
M; s j=
X
p , (p; s) = 1 for p 2 
M; s j=
X





' ^  , M; s j=
X
















The formula ' is j=
X
-satisable in the model M i M; s j=
X
' for some s in M; ' is
j=
X
-valid in M, denoted by M j=
X
', i M; s j=
X





i ' is j=
X
-satisable in some M 2 M
X






The formulation of equivalence relations as being reexive and Euclidean is equivalent to the more
standard one of reexivity, transitivity and symmetry while providing some technical advantages.
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denoted by j=
X
', i ' is j=
X




is clear from the
context, we drop it as a prex and simply speak of a formula ' being satisable or valid









, fs 2 S j M; s j= 'g. Whenever the model M is clear from the context, the
latter notion is usually simplied to [[']].
When demanding the agents' epistemic accessibility relations to be equivalence rela-
tion, the modal operator K indeed formalises the notion of knowledge discussed in the
previous section.










































The rst two items of Proposition 2.8 formalise that K
i
is a normal modal operator:
K
i
satises both the K-axiom and the necessitation rule N (the names of these and other
modal axioms are according to the Chellas classication [19]). Furthermore, K
i
satises
the axioms of veridicality (the T-axiom), positive introspection (axiom 4) and negative
introspection (axiom 5).
2.3 A menagerie of denitions
In this section we present a uniform account of some denitions that will be used at
various places throughout the rest of this thesis.
2.3.1 Actions from a syntactical point of view
Given the inductive denition of actions, it may come as no surprise that composite
actions can be unravelled into the sequences of atomic actions and conrmations |
we will use the general term semi-atomic actions for actions that are either atomic or
conrmations| that constitute them. From the syntax of an action alone it is possible to
determine a set of sequences of semi-atomic actions, called nite computation sequences,
that may possibly occur in a halting execution of the action. Since the way in which
execution of an action evolves depends on the state of aairs in which the action is
performed, it is obvious that in general not all nite computation sequences of an action
will actually occur when the action is performed. However, it can easily be shown that
the sequence of semi-atomic actions that actually constitutes the execution of a composite
action is always a member of the set of nite computation sequences of the action.
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2.9. Definition. The class conrm(L
X





) , fconfirm' j ' 2 L
X
g. The class Ac
X
s




, At [ conrm(L
X
). The class Ac
X
b






closed under sequential composition.
2.10. Definition. The function CS
X
, yielding the set of nite computation sequences of































































(while' do od) [ fconfirm:'g
where for k  1
Seq
k

















) = (confirm  ; 
1
); : : : ; (confirm ; 
l
); confirm: 
On several occasions it turns out to be handy to have the possibility to manipulate
initial fragments of basic actions. To this end we introduce the binary relation Prex
X
,
which applies to pairs of basic actions such that the rst one is an initial fragment of
the second one. Dening semi-atomic actions to be of length 1, we dene the length
of a basic action to be the number of semi-atomic actions that constitute it. Using the
Prex
X
relation and the function j j
X
which determines the length of basic actions, we
can dene a function which yields the prex of a given length of a basic action.








is dened to be the smallest super-
set of f(; ) j  2 Ac
X
b
































2.12. Definition. The function j j
X
and the partial function j j
X
, yielding the length of a
basic action and the initial fragment of a basic action of a particular length, respectively,
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2.3.2 Schemas, frames and correspondences
To investigate properties of knowledge and actions, it will often prove useful to refer
to schemas, which are sets of formulae, usually of a particular form. Using schemas
one may abstract from particular agents and particular formulae, thereby having the
possibility to formulate certain qualities of knowledge and action in a very general way.
Due to the expressiveness of our multi-modal language, our denition of schema has
to be slightly more elaborate than the usual ones [19, 43], in the sense that we specify
explicitly on which parameters the elements of a schema are allowed to dier. Usually
when dening schemas there is only one possibility for this varying parameter.
2.13. Definition. If ' 2 L
X








consists of all formulae from L
X





. For example, for 3 2 A and q 2  the formula hdo
3
(a)iq is an element of
the schema hdo
i




; : : : ; x
m
are either understood or irrelevant
we simply refer to ' as a schema.
Where schemas are used to express general properties of knowledge and actions on the
syntactic level, frames can be used to do so on the semantic level. Informally speaking,
a frame can be seen as a model without a valuation. By leaving out the valuation one
may abstract from particular properties of knowledge and actions that are due to the
valuation rather than inherently due to the nature of knowledge and/or action itself.
Truth in a frame is dened in terms of truth in all models that can be constructed by
adding a valuation to the frame.
2.14. Definition. A frame F for a model M 2M
X
is a tuple consisting of the elements





. If F 2 F
X
is some frame then (F; ) denotes the model generated by the elements
of F and the valuation . For F 2 F
X





', (F; ) j=
X







' for all F 2 F
X
Since schemas are used to express general properties of knowledge and action syntac-
tically, and frames can be used to do this semantically, the question arises as to how these
notions relate. In particular, it is both interesting and important to try to single out
constraints on frames that exactly correspond to certain properties of knowledge and/or
action, expressed in the form of schemas. The area of research called correspondence
theory deals with nding relations | correspondences | between schemas and (rst-
order expressible) constraints on frames. A schema is said to correspond to a constraint
on frames if the schema is satised in a frame i the frame obeys the constraint.
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2.15. Definition. If ' is a schema and F 2 F
X
is some frame then F j=
X
' i F j=
X
 
for all formulae  that are in the schema '. If P is a formula in the rst-order language




and equality such that the free
variables of P are among x
1




P i F satises P for all x
1
; : : : ; x
m
. The
schema ' corresponds to the rst-order formula P , notation ' 
X







As already hinted at above, the properties that we demand knowledge to obey cor-
respond to constraints on the epistemic accessibility relations R(i). In Denition 2.6
we demanded these relations to be equivalence relations, and this demand indeed corre-
sponds to knowledge being veridical and satisfying the properties of positive and negative
introspection. The proof of the following proposition is standard and well-known from
the literature [61, 96].
2.16. Proposition. The following correspondences hold.
1. T 
X













) 2 R(i)) (s; s
00









) 2 R(i)& (s; s
00




) 2 R(i)), i.e. R(i) is Euclidean
On occasion it will turn out to be handy to single out subclasses of models that have
certain properties. These subclasses can be dened as the models that are generated by
a class of frames that satisfy certain constraints.
2.17. Definition. If P
1
; : : : ; P
m
are (the names of) rst-order expressible constraints on










contains all frames from F
X
that
satisfy the constraints P
k
1
; : : : ; P
k
l








contains all models that are









2.3.3 Additional properties of actions
The core of the formal languages considered in this thesis, as embodied by the language
L
X
, is already suciently expressive to formalise various properties of knowledge, actions
and their interplay. The rst of the properties that we consider here is accordance.
Informally speaking, accordant actions are known to behave according to plan, i.e. for
an accordant action it will be the case that things that an agent expects | on the basis
of its knowledge | to hold in the future state of aairs that will result from it executing
the action, are indeed known to be true by the agent when that future state of aairs has
been brought about. Accordance of actions may be an important property in the context
of agents planning to achieve certain goals. For if the agent knows (now) that performing
some accordant action will bring about some goal, then it will be satised after it has
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executed the action: the agent knows that the goal is brought about. From a formal point









in i 2 A and ' 2 L
X
.
The notion of determinism was already touched upon at the introduction of atomic
actions, where it was stated that having a unique outcome is an essential characteristic
of the `atomicness' of actions. With the exception of those introduced in Chapter 4, all
actions that we consider turn out to be deterministic. The notion of determinism of an




()]' in i 2 A and ' 2 L
X
.
Whenever an action is idempotent, consecutively executing the action twice | or in
general an arbitrary number of times | will have exactly the same results as performing
the action just once. In a sense, the state of aairs reached after the rst performance
of the action can be seen as a kind of xed-point of execution of the action. The most
simple idempotent action in our framework is the void action skip: performing it once,
twice or an arbitrary number of times will not aect the state of aairs in any way
whatsoever. Other examples of idempotent actions are the informative actions encoun-









()i', in i 2 A and ' 2 L
X
.
Agents always have the opportunity to perform realisable actions, regardless of the
circumstances, i.e. there never is an external factor that may prevent or interfere with the
performance of such an action. Realisable actions will in general not depend on, interfere
with, or aect the external environment of the performing agent, but instead have some
agent-internal eects, like contributing to the agent's information. The actions modelling
observations that we encounter in Chapter 5 turn out to be realisable. The property of
A-realisability relates ability and opportunity. For actions that are A-realisable, ability
implies opportunity, i.e. whenever an agent is able to perform the action it automatically
has the opportunity to perform it. Realisable actions are trivially A-realisable, and so
are actions that no agent is ever capable of performing, but it seems hard to think of
non-trivial examples of regular, mundane actions that an agent is able to execute and
therefore automatically has the opportunity to do so. One example of a special, non-
regular action that is A-realisable is the one that we introduce in Chapter 5 to model the
jumping to conclusions which constitutes default reasoning. Although we do not think
the property of A-realisability to be desirable in general, it seems to be a reasonable
option when one wants to correlate abilities and opportunities more stringently than is
done in our account. In any case it is far more reasonable to assume that ability implies
opportunity than the reverse, given the fact that `abilities are states that are acquired
with eort [whereas] opportunities are there for the taking until they pass' ([68], p.
133). Realisability of an action  is formalised through the schema hdo
i
()i> in i 2 A;




()i> as a schema in i 2 A.
The following denition summarises the properties discussed above in a formal way.
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2.18. Definition. Let  2 Ac
X
be some action and let F 2 F
X
. The right-hand side of
the following denitions is to be understood as a schema in i 2 A; ' 2 L
X
.





































If Prop is any of the properties dened above, we say that  has the property Prop in
F
X
i  has the property Prop in every F 2 F
X
.
2.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we presented the formal framework which constitutes the core of all formal
systems presented in this thesis. After a somewhat philosophical exposition on knowl-
edge, actions and events, we presented the core language L
X
. This language is a proposi-
tional, multi-modal, exogenous language, containing modalities representing knowledge,
opportunity and result, and an operator formalising ability. The models that are used to
interpret formulae from the language L
X
are Kripke-style possible worlds models. These
models interpret knowledge by means of an accessibility relation on worlds; opportu-
nity, result and ability are interpreted using designated functions. Having introduced
the basic formal framework, we presented a variety of denitions, among which those of
schemas, frames and correspondences, and functions to unravel actions. We furthermore
considered various properties of actions, which we formalised using schemas and frames.
2.4.1 Bibliographical notes
Since this chapter provides but the core of the formal frameworks presented in this thesis,
this is hardly the place for extensive bibliographical notes. However, we would like to
spend some words on our exogenous account of ability and its place in the literature. In
the literature on philosophical logic, several formalisations of ability have been proposed,
but few of these are exogenous. Approaches like those of Brown [10] and Elgesem [29] use
modal operators, ranging over formulae, to formalise ability: A
i
' is then to be read as
`agent i is able to bring about circumstances in which ' is true'. This reading of ability
seems a bit articial, and that in itself would be enough reason to pursue an exogenous
approach. Moreover, endogenous approaches may suer from the problems of logical
omniscience [31, 96] that are known to plague normal modal operators (in a slightly
dierent form we will encounter these problems in Chapter 6). The only formal system
that we know of in which it is hinted at an exogenous approach towards ability is the one
proposed by Penther [102]. Penther (independently) proposed a dynamic logic of action,
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which is a slightly rened version of the action fragment of our framework, and suggested
a formalisation of abilities. Conceptually, Penther's account is inspired by Kenny's ideas
on abilities and opportunities, and therefore seems very similar to the one that we present.
Penther claims that her main interest (just like ours) is in the compositional behaviour
of ability rather than its actual nature. It is therefore remarkable that in her formal
framework she restricts herself to abilities for atomic actions, and does not bother to
extend this to composite actions. For these atomic actions, Penther presupposes the
property of A-realisability (obviously without using this term), which in our opinion
binds the notions of ability and opportunity too tight.
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Chapter 3
A logic of capabilities
It seems that, when one is learning a new skill, be
it walking or driving a car, initially one must think
through each action in detail, and the cerebrum is in
control; but when the skill has been mastered | and
has become `second nature' | it is the cerebellum that
takes over. Moreover, it is a familiar experience that
if one thinks about one's actions in a skill that has
been so mastered, then one's easy control may be tem-
porarily lost. Thinking about it seems to involve the
reintroduction of cerebral control and, although a con-
sequent exibility of activity is thereby introduced, the
owing and precise cerebellar action is lost. No doubt
such descriptions are oversimplied, but they give a
reasonable avour of the cerebellum's role.
Roger Penrose, `The Emperor's New Mind'.
In this chapter we present the rst two of the formal systems built on the core dened
in the previous chapter. The language common to both systems dened here is built
up from the core clauses only, and the models used to interpret this language contain
nothing but the core elements. The two systems dier in their interpretation of dynamic
formulae hdo
i
()i' and ability formulae A
i
, and in particular on their treatment of
abilities in the counterfactual state of aairs. We show how some of the additional prop-
erties of action introduced in the previous chapter can be brought about by imposing
suitable constraints on the frames under consideration. Moreover, we consider the notion
of practical possibility, and formalise part of the reasoning of agents on the correctness
and feasibility of their actions. Two slightly dierent proof systems are presented that
are sound and complete with respect to the notions of validity associated with the two
interpretations. The most striking feature of these proof systems is the use of innitary
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proof rules, i.e. rules with an innite number of premises. We conclude this chapter with
the usual summary, discuss some alternative denitions of ability for sequential compo-
sitions, provide some bibliographical notes that put our work in the context of previous
research on formalisations of aspects of agency, and prove some selected propositions.
Among the proofs that are given is a fairly elaborate and complicated one showing the
soundness and completeness of the proof systems with respect to the appropriate notions
of validity.
3.1 The KARO-architecture
The two systems that we consider here are the most basic ones of those investigated in
this thesis. They share the same language and the same class of models, but dier in the
interpretation of dynamic and ability formulae, and as a consequence of this, also in their
proof systems. To emphasise the similarity between the two systems, we simply dene
one language L and one class M of models, without bothering to decorate them with
superscripts, while on the other hand we dene two dierent satisability relations and
proof systems. The systems thus dened are occasionally referred to as belonging to the
family of KARO-architectures, for Knowledge-Ability-Result-Opportunity-architecture
1
.
The language L and its associated class Ac of actions, which are common to the two
systems, are built up by the core clauses only.
3.1. Definition. The language L and the class Ac of actions are the smallest sets closed
under the core clauses.
The models that are used to interpret the formulae from L (in two dierent ways)
contain nothing but the core elements.





. The class of all these models is denoted by M.
To interpret the dynamic formulae hdo
i







are lifted from the level of atomic actions to the level of composite actions.
Informally, a formula hdo
i
()i' is true in some possible world s, if the extension of r
0
applied to i;  and s yields some successor state s
0
in which the formulae ' holds. A
formula A
i
 is true in a state s if the extension of c
0
yields the value 1 when applied




, we rst motivate the
choices underlying these extensions.
1
The term KARO-architecture is inspired by the BDI-architecture, for Belief-Desire-Intention, of Rao
& George [109].
3.1. The KARO-architecture 27
3.1.1 Results and opportunities for composite actions
The extension of the function r
0
as we present it is originally due to Halpern & Reif
[44]. Although Halpern & Reif's logic is meant to reason about computer programs
and not about agents performing actions, we argue that their denition is also adequate
for our purposes. Using this denition, actions confirm' are interpreted as genuine
conrmations: whenever the formula ' is true in a state s, s is its own do
i
(confirm')-
successor. If ' does not hold in a possible world s, then the confirm' action fails, and
no successor state results. In practice this implies that (all) agents have the opportunity
to conrm the truth of a certain formula i the formula holds. Execution of such an
action does not have any eects in the case that the formula that is conrmed holds, and
leads to the counterfactual state of aairs if the formula does not hold
2
.













equals the `sum' of the transition caused by 
1
and the one caused by 
2
in the state brought about by execution of 
1
. In the case that
execution of 
1





to an empty set: there is no escape from the counterfactual state of aairs. In practice




i it has the opportunity to do 
1
(now), and doing 
1
results in the agent having the
opportunity to do 
2















fi equals the one associated with 
1
in the case that
' holds and the one caused by execution of 
2
in the case that :' holds. This implies




fi if (it has
the opportunity to conrm that) ' holds and it has the opportunity to do 
1
, or (it has
the opportunity to conrm that) :' holds and the agent has the opportunity to do 
2
.




fi equals the result of 
1
in the case that
' holds and that of 
2
otherwise.
The denition of the extension of r
0
for the repetitive composition is based on the
2
Originally in dynamic logic [46, 70] these actions were referred to as tests instead of conrmations. As
long as one deals with the behaviour of computer programs, the term `test' is quite acceptable. However as
soon as formalisations of (human) agents are concerned, one should be careful with using this term. The
commonsense notion of test is that of an action, execution of which provides some kind of information.
For example dope-tests and eye-tests are performed in order to acquire information on whether some
athlete has been taking drugs, or whether someone's eyesight is adequate. The nature of this kind of tests
is not captured by the action which just checks for the truth of some proposition, without yielding any
information whatsoever. To avoid confusion we have chosen to refer to these latter kinds of actions as
conrmations. Based on similar arguments, Segerberg suggested in one of his lectures to use the term
`verication' rather than `test' when referring to actions that, like our conrmations, just check for the
truth of some proposition.
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idea that execution of the action while' do od comes down to sequentially testing
for the truth of ' and executing  until a state is reached in which :' holds. This
behaviour of the repetitive composition can be simulated by equating the transition
caused by execution of while' do od with the set of transitions caused by execution
of the computation sequences of while' do od, an equation well-known from dynamic





; confirm:') with k 2 IN, has an execution which does not
lead to the counterfactual state of aairs. Now if such an action 
k
exists, the resulting
state of execution of the while-loop is dened to be the state resulting from execution
of 
k
, and otherwise execution of the loop is taken to lead to the counterfactual state
of aairs. Using this denition implies that an agent has the opportunity to perform a
repetitive composition while' do od i it has the opportunity to perform some nite-




2 CS(), which results in :'
being true; the result of executing while' do od equals that of executing this sequence.
3.1.2 Abilities for composite actions
Whereas the extension of r
0
for composite actions is more or less standard, the extension
of c
0
as determining the abilities of agents for composite actions, is not. Since we are
(among) the rst to give a formal, exogenous account of ability, extending the function
c
0
to the class of all actions involves a couple of personal choices.
We start with motivating our denitions of ability for conrmations and conditional
compositions since neither of these is really controversial: the denition of ability for
conrmations is indisputable since it represents a highly personal choice (and there is
no accounting for tastes), and that of the ability for the conditional composition is too
obvious and natural to be questioned.
We have decided to let an agent have the ability to conrm any formula that is
actually true. Since conrmations do not correspond to any actions usually performed
by humans, this denition seems to be perfectly acceptable, or at least it is hard to come
up with any convincing counterarguments to it. Note that this denition implies that in
a situation where some proposition is true, (all) agents have both the opportunity and
the ability to conrm this proposition. In particular it is the case that conrmations are
A-realisable: an agent has the ability to conrm some proposition ' if and only if it has
the opportunity to do so.
Let us continue with dening abilities for conditionally composed actions. For these





fi i either it is able to conrm the condition ' and perform

1
afterwards, or it is able to conrm the negation of the condition and perform 
2
. In
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boils down to being able to do 
1
whenever ' holds and being able to do 
2
whenever '
does not hold. In our opinion this is the natural way to dene the ability for conditionally
composed actions; it's hard to think of alternatives.
Whereas the denitions of the ability for conrmations and conditional compositions
are easily explained and motivated, this is not the case for those describing the ability
for sequential and repetitive compositions, even though the basic ideas underlying these
denitions are perfectly clear.





dened as having the ability to do 
1
now, while being able to do 
2
as a result of having
done 
1
. In the case that the opportunity to perform 
1
exists, i.e. performing 
1
does not
result in the counterfactual state of aairs, there is no question concerning the intuitive
correctness of this denition, but things are dierent when this opportunity is absent. It
is not clear how the abilities of agents are to be determined in the counterfactual state
of aairs. Probably the most acceptable approach would be to declare the question on
whether the agent is able to perform an action in the counterfactual state of aairs to be
meaningless, which could be formalised by extending the set of truth-values to contain
an element representing undenedness of a proposition. Since this would necessitate
a considerable complication of our classical, two-valued approach, we have chosen not
to explore this avenue, which leaves us with the task of assigning a classical truth-
value to the agents' abilities in the counterfactual state of aairs. In general we see
two ways of doing this, the rst of which would be to treat all actions equally and
come up with a uniform truth value for the abilities of all agents to perform any action
in the counterfactual state of aairs. This approach is relatively simply to formalise,
and is in fact the one that we will pursue. The second approach would be to treat
each action individually, and determine the agents' abilities through other means, like
for instance assuming an agent to be in the possession of certain default, or typical,
abilities. This approach is further discussed at the end of this chapter. Coming back
to the rst approach, it is obvious that | given that there are exactly two truth-values
| two ways exist to treat all actions equally with respect to the agents' abilities in the
counterfactual state of aairs. The rst of these could be called an optimistic, or bold,
approach, and states that agents are omnipotent in the counterfactual state of aairs.
According to this approach, in situations where an agent does have the ability but not
the opportunity to perform an action 
1
it is concluded that the agent has the ability to




for arbitrary actions 
2
. The second approach
is a pessimistic, or careful one. In this approach agents are assumed to be nilpotent in
counterfactual situations. Thus, in situations were an agent does have the ability but
not the opportunity to perform an action 
1
it is concluded that the agent is unable






. Note that in the case that the
agent has the opportunity to do 
1
, optimistic and pessimistic approaches towards the
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coincide. Although there is a case for both denitions, neither
is completely acceptable. Consider the example of a lion in a cage, which is perfectly
well capable of eating a zebra, but ideally never has the opportunity to do so. Using
the rst denition we would have to conclude that the lion is capable of performing the
sequential composition `eat zebra; y to the moon', which hardly seems intuitive. Using
the second denition it follows that the lion is unable to perform the action `eat zebra;
do nothing', which seems equally counterintuitive. Fortunately, the problems associated
with these denitions are not really serious. For they occur only in situations where an
agent has the ability but not the opportunity to perform some action. And since it is
exactly the combination of opportunity and ability that is important, no unwarranted
conclusions can be drawn in these situations. Henceforth, we pursue both the optimistic
and the pessimistic approach; in Section 3.5 we suggest alternative approaches in which
the aforementioned counterintuitive situations do not occur.
Dening abilities for while-loops is even more hazardous than for sequential compo-
sitions. Intuitively it seems a good point of departure to let an agent be able to perform
a while-loop only if it is at any point during execution capable of performing the next
step. However, using this intuitive denition one has to be careful not to jump to un-
desired conclusions in the case of an action for which execution does not terminate. It
seems highly counterintuitive to declare an agent, be it articial or not, to have the
reliable ability to perform an action that goes on indenitely. For no agent is eternal:
human agents die, articial agents break down, and after all even the lifespan of the
earth and the universe is bounded. Hence agents should not be able to perform actions
that take innite time. Therefore it seems reasonable to equate the ability to perform a
while-loop with the ability to perform some nite-length sequence of conrmations and
actions constituting the body of the while-loop, which ends in a conrmation for the
negation of the condition of the loop, analogously to the equation used in extending the
function r
0
to while-loops. Accepting this equation, it is obvious that the discussion
concerning the ability of agents for sequentially composed actions also becomes rele-
vant for the repetitive composition, i.e. also with respect to abilities for while-loops a
distinction between optimistic and pessimistic agents can be made. In the case that
the while-loop terminates, optimistic and pessimistic approaches coincide, but in the
case that execution of the action leads to the counterfactual state of aairs, they dier.
Consider the situation of an agent that up to a certain point during the execution of
an action while' do od has been able to perform the conrmation for ' followed by
, and now nds itself in a state where ' holds, it is able to do  but does not have
the opportunity for . An optimistic agent concludes that it would have been able to
nish the nite-length sequence constituting the while-loop after the (counterfactual)
execution of , and therefore considers itself to be capable of performing the while-loop.
A pessimistic agent considers itself unable to nish the sequence, and thus is unable to
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perform the while-loop. The demand for niteness of execution of the while-loop and the
pessimistic view on abilities provide for a very interesting combination. For in order for
an agent to be able to perform an action while' do od it has to have the opportunity
to perform all the steps in the execution of while' do od, possibly except for the last
one. Furthermore, as as result of performing the last but one step in the execution the
agent should obtain the ability to perform the last one, which is a conrmation for :'.
Since ability and opportunity coincide for conrmations this implies that the agent has
the opportunity to conrm :', i.e. the agent has the opportunity to perform the last
step in the execution of while' do od. But then the agent has the opportunity to
perform all the steps in the execution of the while-loop, and thus has the opportunity
to perform the while-loop. Hence in the pessimistic approach the ability to perform a
while-loop implies the opportunity, i.e. while-loops are A-realisable!
3.1.3 Interpreting results, opportunities and abilities





from M are extended to deal with composite, i.e. non-atomic actions. To
account for the dierence between the optimistic and the pessimistic outlook on the
agents' abilities, we dene two dierent extensions of c
0
, and thereby also two dierent
interpretations. The optimistic and the pessimistic approach coincide in their extension
of r
0
, but dier in the extension of c
0
for sequentially composed actions, and hence also in
their treatment of ability for repetitive compositions. The following denition presents




. Here functions with the superscript 1 correspond to the
optimistic view, and those with the superscript 0 to the pessimistic view on the agents'
abilities in the counterfactual state of aairs.
3.3. Definition. For b 2 bool we inductively dene the binary relation j=
b
between a
formula from L and a pair M; s consisting of a model M for L and a state s in M for the
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for some k 2 IN
c
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(i; )(;) = b
By considering the last clause of c
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also aects the other notions.
3.4. Example. Consider the language L(;A;At) where  is arbitrary, i is an element
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, the compositional behaviour of actions with respect to
opportunities and results is identical in the two interpretations.





































































Proposition 3.5 is in fact nothing but a formalisation of the intuitive ideas on results
and opportunities for composite actions as expressed above. The rst item states that
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agents have the opportunity to conrm exactly the formulae that are true, and that
no state-transition takes place as the result of such a conrmation. The second item
deals with the separation of the sequential composition into its elements: an agent has




i it has the opportunity to do 
1
(now) and it has the




has been performed. The third item states that a con-
ditionally composed action equals its `then'-part in the case that the condition holds,
and its `else'-part if the condition does not hold. The fourth item formalises a sort of
xed-point equation for execution of while-loops: if an agent has the opportunity to
perform a while-loop then it keeps this opportunity under execution of the body of the
loop as long as the condition holds. The result of performing a while-loop is also xed
under executions of the body of the loop in states where ' holds, and is determined by
the propositions that are true in the rst state where :' holds. Note that a validity
like this one does not suce to axiomatise the repetitive composition: although it cap-
tures the idea of while-loops representing xed-points, it fails to force termination, i.e.
this formula on its own does not guarantee that agents do not have the opportunity to
bring an innitely non-terminating while-loop to its end. In the proof systems that we
present in Section 3.4 this problem is solved by including suitable proof rules guiding
the repetitive composition. The last two items state the normality of [do
i
()].




become visible, in particular for sequential and repetitive compositions.

























































































The rst and the fourth item of Proposition 3.6 deal with the actions for which abili-
ties are dened in a straightforward manner: agents are able to conrm exactly the true
formulae, and having the ability to perform a conditional composition comes down to
having the `right' ability, dependent on the truth or falsity of the condition. The dier-
ences between the optimistic and the pessimistic outlook on abilities in the counterfactual
state of aairs are clearly visible in the other items of Proposition 3.6. Optimistic agents
are assumed to be omnipotent in counterfactual situations, and therefore it suces for
the agent to be able to do 
2
as a conditional result of doing 
1
. A pessimistic agent
needs certainty, and therefore demands to have the opportunity to do 
1
before conclud-
ing anything on its abilities following execution of 
1
. This behaviour of optimistic and
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pessimistic agents is formalised in the second and the third item, respectively. The fth
and sixth item formalise an analogous behaviour for repetitive compositions: optimistic
agents are satised with conditional results (item 5) whereas pessimistic agents demand
certainty (item 6). A consequence of this demand for certainty is the A-realisability
of while-loops as long as the pessimistic view is taken. This property is formalised in
the last item of the following proposition. The other items of Proposition 3.7 deal with
the properties of conrmations. It turns out that conrmations are idempotent and A-
realisable. Although these properties are not universally satised by all actions, it may
not be too surprising that the confirm action, being a kind of an outsider, does have
these properties.
3.7. Proposition. For b 2 bool we nd the following to be true. Here the formulae




















while' do od! hdo
i
(while' do od)i>
The compositional behaviour of sequential and repetitive compositions diers for
the two interpretations only in situations where an agent lacks opportunities. If all
appropriate opportunities are present, there is no dierence for the two interpretations,
a property which is formalised in the following corollary.
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3.2 Additional properties of actions in the KARO-architecture
At the end of the previous chapter we dened various properties of actions in terms of
our framework. Here we show how these properties can be brought about to hold for all





On the level of atomic actions, the properties introduced at the end of the previous





tion 3.10 we present the correspondences for the properties of accordance, determinism,
idempotence, realisability and A-realisability, respectively. Since we have dened two




, for schemas from L in frames from F we have
to be precise on the meaning of these correspondences.
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3.9. Definition. For b 2 bool we dene the schema ' to correspond to the rst-order
formula P given the interpretation j=
b





3.10. Proposition. For atomic actions a 2 At, the following correspondences hold
in the class F of frames for M both for b = 1 and b = 0. The left-hand side of
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and have no existence on their own, it is not possible to prove correspondences
like those of Proposition 3.10 for non-atomic actions. There simply is no semantic entity
to correspond the syntactic schemas with. This implies that it is in general not possible
to ensure that arbitrary actions satisfy a certain property. However, it turns out that
some of the properties considered above straightforwardly extend from the atomic level
to the level of arbitrary actions, regardless of the interpretation that is used. This is in
particular the case for the properties of A-realisability and determinism.
3.11. Proposition. The following lifting results hold for all F 2 F and b 2 bool:
 8a 2 At(a is A-realisable for j=
b
in F)) 8 2 Ac( is A-realisable for j=
b
in F)
 8a 2 At(a is deterministic for j=
b




Since the range of the function r
0
is the set S

, it follows directly that atomic actions
are deterministic in F: for if a 2 At, i 2 A and s a state in some model, then r
0
(i; a)(s)
is either the empty set, or a single state from S, and hence the frame condition for
determinism as given in Proposition 3.10 is satised. Using the lifting result obtained in
Proposition 3.11 one may then conclude that all actions are deterministic in F.





Thus two of the properties formalised in Denition 2.18 can be ensured to hold for
arbitrary actions by imposing suitable constraints on the frames for M. For the other
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three properties, viz. accordance, idempotence and realisability, constraining the function
r
0
for atomic actions does not suce, since this does not conservatively extend to the
class of all actions. That realisability may not be lifted is easily seen by considering
the action fail. Independent of the realisability of atomic actions, fail will never be
realisable: the formula :hdo
i





examples show why accordance and idempotence are in general not to be lifted.
3.13. Example. Consider the language L(;A;At) with  = fp; qg, i 2 A and At ar-
bitrary. Let F 2 F be a frame such that the set S of states in F contains at least two
elements, say s and t, on which the relation R(i) is dened to be universal, and the
rst-order property corresponding with accordance of atomic actions is met. Let  be
a valuation such that (p; s) = (q; s) = 1; (p; t) = (q; t) = 0. Then we have that























q, which provides a counterexam-
ple to the lifting of accordance.





















































































: A S! bool is arbitrary




are idempotent in F. However, it is not the case
that all actions that can be built on At are idempotent in F. For it holds for arbitrary


















)]p. To see this take M = (F; )
where (p; s
2
) 6= (p; s
4



































































Although we showed in Example 3.13 that accordance is not to be lifted from atomic
actions to general ones, we can prove a restricted form of lifting for accordance. That is,
if we leave conrmations out of consideration, we can prove that accordance is lifted.
3.15. Proposition. Let Ac
 
be the conrmation-free fragment of Ac, i.e. the frag-
ment built from atomic actions through sequential, conditional or repetitive com-
position. Then we have for all F 2 F and for all b 2 bool:
8a 2 At(a is accordant for j=
b
in F)) 8 2 Ac
 
( is accordant for j=
b
in F)
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The properties of idempotence and (A-)realisability are in general undesirable ones.
If all actions were idempotent, it would be impossible to walk the roads by taking one
step at a time. Realisability would render the notion of opportunity meaningless and
A-realisability would tie ability and opportunity in a way that we feel is unacceptable.
Therefore we consider neither the lifting result for A-realisability to be very important,
nor the absence of such a result for idempotence and realisability. And even though the
property of accordance is, or may be, important, it is not one that typically holds in the
lively world of human agents. Therefore we consider this property to be an exceptional
one, that holds for selected actions only. Hence also for accordance the absence of a
lifting result is not taken too seriously.
3.3 Correctness and feasibility of actions: practical possibility
Within the KARO-architecture, several notions concerning agency may be formalised
that are interesting not only from a philosophical point of view, but also when analysing
agents in planning systems. The most important one of these notions formalises the
knowledge that agents have on their practical possibilities. We consider the notion of
practical possibility as pertaining to a pair, consisting of an action and a proposition:
agents may have the practical possibility to bring about (truth of) the proposition by
performing the action. We think of practical possibility as consisting of two parts, viz.
correctness and feasibility. Correctness implies that no external factors will prevent the
agent from performing the action and thereby making the proposition true. As such,
correctness is dened in terms of opportunity and result: an action is correct for some
agent to bring about some proposition i the agent has the opportunity to perform the
action in such a way that its performance results in the proposition being true. Feasibility
captures the internal aspect of practical possibility. It states that it is within the agent's
capacities to perform the action, and as such is nothing but a reformulation of ability.
Together, correctness and feasibility constitute practical possibility.
3.16. Definition. For  2 Ac, i 2 A and ' 2 L we dene:
 Correct
i










(; ') , Correct
i
(; ') ^ Feasible
i

The counterintuitive situations that occurred with respect to the ability of agents
as described on page 30 do not take root for practical possibility. That is, a lion that
has the ability but not the opportunity to eat a zebra will neither have the practical
possibility to eat a zebra rst and thereafter y to the moon nor will it have the practical
possibility to eat a zebra and rest on its laurels afterwards. Thus even though the
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notion of ability suers from problems like these, the more important notion of practical
possibility does not. The importance of practical possibility manifests itself particularly
when ascribing | from the outside | certain qualities to an agent. It seems that for the
agent itself practical possibilities are relevant in so far as the agent has knowledge on these
possibilities. For one may not expect an agent to act on its practical possibilities, like for
instance adopt some action as its plan, if the agent does not know of this possibilities.
To formalise this kind of knowledge, we introduce the Can-predicate and the Cannot-
predicate. The rst of these predicates concerns the knowledge of agents on their practical
possibilities, the latter predicate does the same for their practical impossibilities.
3.17. Definition. For  2 Ac, i 2 A and ' 2 L we dene:
 Can
i












The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate integrate knowledge, ability, opportu-
nity and result, and seem to formalise one of the most important notions of agency. In
fact it is probably not too bold to say that knowledge like that formalised through the
Can-predicate, although perhaps in a weaker form by taking aspects of uncertainty into
account, underlies all acts performed by rational agents, including humans. For rational
agents act only if they have some information on both the possibility to perform the
act, and its possible outcome. It therefore seems worthwhile to take a closer look at
both the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. The following proposition focuses on
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Proposition 3.18 does not only serve to support the appropriateness of the Can-
predicate and Cannot-predicate as formalising knowledge of practical possibilities, but
furthermore provides additional proof that agents are indeed rational. In particular
items 6 through 9 and item 14 are genuine indications of the rationality of the agents
that we formalised. Consider for example item 7. This item states that whenever an










holds, it also knows that performing the else-part of the conditional composition provides
the practical possibility to achieve  . Conversely, if agent i knows that it has the practical
possibility to bring about  by performing 
2
while at the same time knowing that the





fi would also bring about  , regardless of 
1
. For since it knows
that :' holds, it knows that this compositional composition comes down to the else-part

2
. Items 4 and 11 explicitly use the accordance of actions. For it is exactly this property
of accordance that causes the agent's knowledge on its practical possibilities to persist
under execution of the rst part of the sequential composition in item 4 and the body
of the while-loop in item 11.
In the following proposition we characterise the relation between the Can-predicate
and the Cannot-predicate. Furthermore some properties are presented that concern the
end-part of these predicates, i.e. the ' in Can
i
(; ') and Cannot
i
(; ').
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Even more than Proposition 3.18 does Proposition 3.19 make out a case for the
rationality of agents. Take for example item 3, which states that whenever an agent
knows that it has the practical possibility to achieve ' by performing  it also knows
that  does not provide for a means to achieve :'. Items 4 through 7 deal with the
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decomposition of the end-part of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate, which
behaves as desired. Note that the reverse implication of item 5 is not valid: it is quite
possible that even though an agent knows that  is not correct to bring about ' ^  
it might still be that it knows that  is correct for either ' or  . An analogous line
of reasoning shows the invalidity of the reverse implication of item 6. Items 8 and 9
formalise that agents can extend their knowledge on their practical (im)possibilities by
combining it with their knowledge on the (conditional) results of actions.
3.4 Proof theory
Here we present a proof theory for the semantic framework dened in the previous
section. In general the purpose of a proof theory is to provide a syntactic counterpart of
the semantic notion of validity for a given interpretation and a given class of models. The
idea is to dene a predicate denoting deducibility, which holds for a given formula i the
formula is valid. This predicate is to be dened purely syntactical, i.e. it should depend
only on the syntactic structure of formulae, without making any reference to semantic










The denition of these predicates is based on a set of axioms and proof rules, which
together constitute a proof system. The proof systems that we dene deviate somewhat
from the ones that are common in (modal) logics, the most notable dierence being the
use of innitary proof rules. Given the relative rarity of this kind of rules, we feel that
some explanation is justied.
3.4.1 Innitary proof rules
The proof rules that are commonly employed in proof systems, are sentences of the form
P
1
; : : : ;P
m
=C, where the premises P
1
; : : : ;P
m
and the conclusion C are elements of the
language under consideration. Informally, a rule like this denotes that one may deduce C
as soon as P
1
; : : : ;P
m
have been deduced. An innitary
3
proof rule is a rule containing an
innite number of premises. Although not very common, innitary proof rules have been
used in a number of proof systems: Hilbert used an innitary proof rule in axiomatising
number theory [47], Schutte uses innitary proof rules in a number of systems [117],
Gabbay proposes the use of an innitary rule to characterise the notion of irreexivity
prooftheoretically [34], and both Kroger [73] and Goldblatt [41, 42] use innitary proof
rules in logics of action.
3
We decided to follow the terminology of Goldblatt [41, 42] and refer to these rules as being innitary.
Other authors call these rules innite [73, 117].
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In nitary proof systems proofs can be carried out completely within the formal
system. A proof is usually taken to be a nite-length sequence of formulae that are
either axioms of the proof system or conclusions of proof rules applied to formulae that
appear earlier in the sequence. Since nitary proof rules can be applied as soon as all
of their nitely many premises have been deduced, there is no need to step outside of
the formal system. In order to apply an innitary rule, a meta-logical investigation on
the deducibility of the (innitely many) premises needs to be carried out, which makes
it in general impossible to carry out proofs completely within the proof system. As
such, proofs are no longer `schematically' constructed, and theorems are not recursively
enumerable. However, there is also a number of advantages associated with the use of
innitary proof rules. The rst of these is that for some systems strong completeness can
be achieved using innitary proof rules, whereas this is not possible using nitary proof
rules (cf. [41, 117]). The notion of strong completeness implies that fewer sets of formulae
are consistent, and in particular that sets of formulae that are seen to be inconsistent
can also be proved to be so. After the presentation of the proof systems, we will return
to the property of strong completeness in the presence of innitary rules. Besides the
possibility to achieve strong completeness when using innitary proof rules, there are
two other arguments that inuenced our choice to use this kind of rules. The rst of
these is the intuitive acceptability of this kind of rules. In particular when dealing with
notions with an innitary character, like for instance while-loops, innitary proof rules
provide a much better formalisation of human intuition on the nature of these notions
than do nitary proof rules. The second, perhaps less convincing but certainly more
compelling, argument is given by the fact that our attempts to come up with nitary
axiomatisations remained unavailing.
3.4.2 Logics of capabilities
Before presenting the actual axiomatisations, we rst make some notions precise that
were already informally discussed above. An axiom is a schema in L. A proof rule is a








; : : : ;  are schemas in L. A proof system
is a pair consisting of a set of axioms and a set of proof rules. As mentioned above,
the presence of innitary proof rules forces us to adopt a more abstract approach to the
notions of deducibility and theorem than the one commonly employed in nitary proof
systems. Usually, a formula ' is dened to be a theorem of some proof system if there
exist a nite-length sequence of formulae of which ' is the last element and such that
each formula in the sequence is either an instance of an axiom or the conclusion of a
proof rule applied to earlier members of the sequence. An alternative formulation, which
is equally usable in nitary and in innitary proof systems, is to dene ' to be a theorem
of a proof system i it belongs to the smallest subset of L containing all (instances of all)
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axioms and closed under the proof rules. This latter notion of deducibility is actually
the one that we will employ here. We dene a logic for a given proof system to be a
subset of L containing all instances of the axioms of the proof system and closed under
its proof rules. A formula is a theorem for a given proof system i it is an element of
the smallest logic for the proof system. These notions are formalised in Denitions 3.23
through 3.25.
To axiomatise the behaviour of while-loops we propose two innitary rules. Both
these rules are based on the idea to equate an action while' do od with the innite set
CS(while' do od) of nite computation sequences. The two proof rules take as their
premises an innite set of formulae built around the set CS(while' do od) and have as
their conclusion a formula built around while' do od. To make this idea of `building
formulae around actions' explicit, we introduce the concept of admissible forms. The
notion of admissible forms as given in Denition 3.20 is an extension of that used by
Goldblatt in his language of program schemata [41]. In his investigation of innitary
proof rules, Kroger found that, in order to prove completeness, he needed rules in which
the context of the while-loop and its set of computation sequences is taken into account
[73]. The concept of admissible forms provides an abstract generalisation of this idea of
taking contexts into account.
3.20. Definition. The set of admissible forms for L, denoted by Afm(L), is dened by
the following BNF.




 j  ! 
where i 2 A;  2 Ac and  2 L. We use the letter  as a typical element of Afm(L).
Usually `admissible form' is abbreviated to `afm'. By denition, each afm has a
unique occurrence of the special symbol #. By instantiating this symbol with a formula
from L, afms are turned into genuine formula. If  is an afm and  2 L is some formula
we denote by ( ) the formula that is obtained by replacing (the unique occurrence of)
# in  by  .
The following denition introduces two abbreviations that will be used in formulating
the innitary rules.
3.21. Definition. For all  ; ' 2 L, i 2 A,  2 Ac and l 2 IN we dene:
  
l












The formulae introduced in Denition 3.21 are used to dene the premises of the
innitary rules. The rule formalising the behaviour of while-loops with respect to results
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and opportunities has an innite set of premises of the form ( 
l
(i; '; )) with l 2 IN
and  2 Afm(L). The conclusion of this rule is the formula ([do
i
(while' do od)] ).
Leaving the context provided by  out of consideration, this rules intuitively states
that if it is deducible that  holds after executing any of the nite computation se-
quences that possibly constitute while' do od, it is also deducible that  holds after
executing while' do od. The rule used in formalising the ability of agents for while-
loops has as its premises the set (:('
l
(i; ))) for l 2 IN;  2 Afm(L), and a conclusion
(:A
i
while' do od). This rule states that whenever it is deducible that an agent i
is not capable of performing any of the nite computation sequences that syntactically
constitute the while-loop, it is also deducible that the agent is incapable of perform-
ing the while-loop itself. Or read in its contrapositive form, that an agent is able to
perform a while-loop only if it is able to perform some nite-length sequence of con-
rmations and actions constituting the while-loop. As such, this rule is easily seen to
be the proof-theoretic counterpart of the negated version of the (semantic) denition
of c
b
for while-loops. For read in its negative form this semantic denition states that
c
b




(i; ))(s) = 0 for all l 2 IN.
The axioms that are used to build the two proof systems are formulated using the
necessity operator for actions, i.e. [do ( )] , rather than its dual hdo ( )i . The reason for
this is essentially one of convenience: in proving completeness of the axiomatisations it
turns out to be useful to deal with two necessity operators, viz. K and [do ( )] , to allow
proofs by analogy. Since [do ( )] and hdo ( )i are interdenable this does not make up
for essential dierences.
3.22. Definition. The following axioms and proof rules are used to constitute the two
proof systems that we consider here. Both the axioms as well as the premises and





Ac. The  occurring in the two innitary rules 
I and 
IA is taken to be a meta-variable
ranging over Afm(L).
A1. All propositional tautologies and their epistemic and dynamic instances
A2. K
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)) all l 2 IN = ([do
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))) all l 2 IN = 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R5. ' = [do
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()]' AN
Most of the axioms are fairly obvious, in particular given the discussion on the validi-
ties presented in Section 3.1.3. Rule R1, the Omega Iteration rule, is adopted from the
axiomatisations given by Goldblatt [41, 42]. Both 
I and rule R2, which is the Omega
Iteration rule for Ability, were already discussed above. Rule R3 is the rule of Modus
Ponens, well known from, and used in, both classical and modal logics. R4 and R5 are
both instances of the rule of necessitation, which is known to hold for necessity oper-
ators. These rules state that whenever some formula is deducible, it is also deducible
that an arbitrary agent knows the formula, and that all events have this formula among
their conditional results, respectively. Axioms A2 and A6, and the rules R4 and R5 indi-
cate that both knowledge and conditional results are formalised through normal modal
operators.
The axioms and proof rules given above are used to dene two dierent proof systems.
One of these proof systems embodies the optimistic view on abilities in the counterfactual
state of aairs, the other employs a pessimistic view.
3.23. Definition. The proof system 
1





and the proof rules R1 through R5. The proof system 
0
contains the axioms




and the proof rules R1 through R5.
As mentioned above, a logic for a given proof system is a set encompassing the proof
system.
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3.24. Definition. A b-logic is a set  that contains all the instances of the axioms of

b
and is closed under the proof rules of 
b
. The intersection of all b-logics, which is
itself a b-logic, viz. the smallest one, is denoted by LCap
b
. Whenever the underlying
proof system is either irrelevant or clear from the context, we refer to a b-logic simply
as a logic.
Deducibility in a given proof system is now dened as being an element of the smallest
logic for the proof system.
3.25. Definition. For  some logic, the unary predicate `

 L is dened by: `

' ,








we say that ' is deducible in  or alternatively that ' is a theorem of .















Besides the notion of deducibility per se, it is also interesting to look at deducibility
from a set of premises. In modal logics one may distinguish two notions of deducibility
from premises. In the rst of these, the premises are considered to be additional axioms,
on which also rules of necessitation may be applied. The second notion of deducibility
allows necessitation only on the axioms of the proof system, and not on the premises.
This latter notion of deducibility is perhaps the more natural one, and is in fact the
one that we will concentrate on. A thorough discussion on the relation between the two
notions of deducibility is to be found elsewhere [56, 95].
To account for deducibility from premises with respect to the alternative notion of
deducibility as being element of some set of formulae, we introduce the notion of a theory
of a logic. Corresponding to the idea that the rules of necessitation are not to be applied
on premises, a theory is not demanded to be closed under these rules. A formula is now
dened to be deducible from some set of premises i it is contained in every theory that
encompasses the set of premises.
3.27. Definition. For  some logic, we dene a -theory to be any subset  of L that
contains  and is closed under the rules 
I, 
IA, and MP.
3.28. Definition. Let  be some logic and  [ f'g  L. The binary relation `







f   L j     and   is a -theoryg
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Whenever  `

' we say that ' is deducible from  in . A set   L is called
-inconsistent i  `

?, and -consistent i it is not -inconsistent.
Given the `overloading' of the symbol `

as representing both deducibility per se
and deducibility from premises, it is highly desirable that the two uses of this symbol
coincide in the case that the set of premises is empty: deducibility from an empty set of
premises should not dier from deducibility per se.





As already mentioned before, using innitary rules to describe the behaviour of while-
loops allows one to achieve strong completeness, the notion which states that every
consistent set of formulae is simultaneously satisable. Achieving strong completeness
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(while p do a od)i>g. It is obvious that 
 is not satisable.






)]p for all k 2 IN then execution of while p do a od does not
terminate, and hence M; s 6j= hdo
i
(while p do a od)i>. However, when using just nitary
rules to describe while-loops (like for instance the well-known Hoare rule [49]), the set

 will be consistent. For when restricting oneself to nitary rules, consistency of an
innite set of formula corresponds to consistency of each of its nite subsets. And in
every axiomatisation that is to be sound, all nite subsets of 
 should be consistent, and
therefore 





? is deducible from 
, i.e. 
 is inconsistent. More in general, the property of strong









are strongly complete, i.e. every





Just as deducibility per se is the proof theoretic counterpart of the semantic notion of
validity, there is also a semantic counterpart to the notion of deducibility from premises.








' i M; s j=
b
 implies M; s j=
b
' for all M 2M with state s.
In the light of the strong completeness property, Proposition 3.31 is not very surpris-
ing. In fact, the left-to-right implication is a direct consequence of the strong complete-
ness property. The right-to-left implication follows from the observation that the set of
formulae that is satised in some world forms a theory.
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3.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we presented the rst two of the formal systems considered in this thesis,
which are all built on the core framework developed in the previous chapter. As far as the
syntax and the models are concerned, these rst formal systems equal the core framework.
We explained our intuition on the composite behaviour of results, opportunities and
abilities, and presented two formal interpretations that comply with this intuition. These
interpretations dier in their treatment of abilities of agents for sequentially composed
actions. We showed how some of the additional properties of actions that were proposed
at the end of the previous chapter can be brought about by imposing suitable constraints
on the models. In particular it holds for the properties of determinism and A-realisability
that constraints imposed on atomic actions inherit to all actions. Using the various
modalities present in the framework, we proposed a formalisation of the knowledge of
agents on their practical possibilities, a notion which captures an important aspect of
agency, particularly in the context of planning agents. We presented two proof systems
that syntactically characterise the notion of validity in the two interpretations that we
dened. The most remarkable aspect of these proof systems is the use of innitary proof
rules, which on the one hand allows for a better correspondence between the semantic
notion of validity and its syntactic counterpart, on the other hand forces one to generalise
the usual notions of proof and theorem.
3.5.1 Possible extensions
In the KARO-architecture we proposed two denitions for the ability of agents to exe-




in cases where execution of 
1
leads to the
counterfactual state of aairs. The simplicity of these denitions, both at a conceptual
and at a technical level, may lead to counterintuitive situations. Recall that using the
so-called optimistic approach it is possible that an agent is considered to be capable of
performing ; fail, whereas in the pessimistic approaches agents are declared unable
to perform ; skip, for  2 Ac. A more realistic approach would be not to treat all
actions equally, but instead to determine for each action individually whether it makes
sense to declare an agent (un)able to perform the action in the counterfactual state of
aairs. One way to formalise this consists of extending the models from M with an ad-
ditional function t : AAc! S! S which is such that t(i; )(s) = r(i; )(s) whenever
r(i; )(s) 6= ;. Hence in the case that r(i; )(s) 6= ;, t(i; )(s) equals r(i; )(s) and in
other cases t(i; )(s) is denitely not empty. The ability for the sequential composition
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)i> is true. A special instantiation of
this approach corresponds to the idea that abilities of agents do not tend to change.
Therefore it could seem reasonable to assume that agents retain their abilities when
ending up in the counterfactual state of aairs. Formally this can be brought about by
demanding t(i; )(s) to equate s in cases where r(i; )(s) = ;. Since this is but a special
case of the general idea discussed above, it also avoids the counterintuitive situations
where agents are declared to be able to do ; fail or unable to do ; skip.
Another possible extension of the framework presented in this chapter concerns the
introduction of actions with typical, as opposed to certain, eects. Intuitively, the exe-
cution of such an action will typically lead to a particular eect, but unexpected events
may prevent this from happening. Actions like these are supposed to be better formali-
sations of human acts, which in general indeed have uncertain eects. A rst proposal to
formalise actions with typical eects in the KARO-architecture is due to Dunin-Keplicz
& Radzikowska [28].
3.5.2 Bibliographical notes
The formal framework presented in this chapter is a revised and considerably extended
version of the one presented in [54], to which some elements of [57] are added. In [54]
we presented a genuinely modal version of the framework dened by Moore [99, 100].
Although he combines knowledge and action in a modal way, Moore uses the rst-order
correspondences to reason with. Without going into detail too much, we would like to
point out some characteristic features of Moore's framework, especially when compared to
the one we presented above. First of all, the developments in research on modal logic that
followed Moore's work, make this rst system look a little bit outdated now: the notation
seems unnecessarily complex, and the system is altogether rather dicult to understand.
By using well-known and established concepts from epistemic and dynamic logic we hope
to have overcome this problem. Secondly, whereas we treat abilities in their own right,
Moore strives to dene ability in terms of knowledge on actions. Hence, whereas we are
mainly interested in how the ability to perform a composite action depends on the ability
to perform its components, Moore is more interested in the nature of ability. Lastly,
since Moore is reasoning with rst-order correspondences, he does not bother to provide
a (modal) proof theory for his framework, but instead uses classical rst-order logic. The
proof theory as we present it in Section 3.4 is inspired by the one given by Goldblatt
in his account of so called program logic [41]. Together with Kroger [73], Goldblatt is
one of the very few to use innitary proof rules in a logic of action. The motivation for
both Kroger and Goldblatt to use innitary rules is twofold. In addition to having the
possibility to achieve strong completeness, they furthermore feel that innitary actions
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like while-loops should be axiomatised using innitary rules.
Two other inuential formalisations of agency in AI that we would like to mention
explicitly, are the one of Cohen & Levesque [20] and that of Rao & George [108, 109,
110]. Both these formalisations are based on modal logics and employ Kripke-style
possible worlds models, but that is as far as the similarity goes. Cohen & Levesque's
main aim is to provide a formalisation of motivational attitudes which complies with the
philosophical criteria proposed by Bratman [9]. For this they use four primary modalities:
one representing the beliefs of an agent, one representing the agents' goals, one modality
indicating that some action will happen next, and one indicating that some action has
just happened. The motivational attitudes of intention and commitment are dened in
terms of these primary modalities. Whereas we are interested in informational attitudes
and actions in their own right, Cohen & Levesque consider these only as a basis to
dene motivational attitudes. In our treatment of motivational attitudes (Chapter 6) we
elaborate on the system of Cohen & Levesque. The system of Rao & George is based on
three primitive modalities: beliefs, desires, and intentions. Semantically their formalism
is based on a branching model of time, in which belief-, desire- and intention-accessible
worlds are themselves branching time structures. The emphasis of their approach lies
within formalising the revision of intentions, beliefs, and goals. Other systems besides
those of Cohen & Levesque and Rao & George can be found in the overview article
of Wooldridge & Jennings [129] and in the proceedings of several workshops on agents
[32, 58, 79, 130, 131].
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Proof: All items are relatively straightforwardly proved. By way of illustration, we show




2 Ac and ' 2 L be arbitrary, and let
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3.10. Proposition. For atomic actions a 2 At, the following correspondences hold
in the class F of frames for M both for b = 1 and b = 0. The left-hand side of




























































































(i; a)(s) = 1) r
0
(i; a)(s) 6= ;)
Proof: We show the rst and the last item; the other items are less interesting and




i be an arbitrary frame from F. We have to
show for the correspondences given above that F j=
b
', where ' is the schema given
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at the left-hand side, i F satises the rst-order property given at the right-hand side.
Both items are shown by proving two implications, the latter of which is shown in its
contrapositive form.





























))). Now let  :   S ! bool and s
0
2 S be























2 S. Then some
s
3



























(F; ); s j=
b








; s) 2 R(i), for some s
0
2 S.

















which was to be shown.














































) 2 R(i) and for all s
3











). Now let  :   S ! bool be such that 8s 2 S((p; s) =
0 , s = s
2




























From cases `(' and `)' as given above we conclude that the rst item of Proposition 3.10
indeed holds.
`(' Suppose that 8s 2 S(c
0
(i; a)(s) = 1 ) r
0
(i; a)(s) 6= ;). Let  :   S ! bool




a. Then by denition,
c
0
(i; a)(s) = 1, and hence r
0




(a)i>, which was to
be shown.
`)' Suppose not for all s 2 S holds that c
0
(i; a)(s) = 1 ) r
0
(i; a)(s) 6= ;, i.e. some
s 2 S exists such that c
0
(i; a)(s) = 1 and r
0
(i; a)(s) = ;. For this s it holds that













It follows that the last item of Proposition 3.10 also holds.

3.11. Proposition. The following lifting results hold for all F 2 F and b 2 bool:
 8a 2 At(a is A-realisable for j=
b
in F)) 8 2 Ac( is A-realisable for j=
b
in F)
 8a 2 At(a is deterministic for j=
b




Proof: Both cases are relatively easy shown by induction on the structure of actions.

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3.6.1 A proof of soundness and completeness





inM. As far as we know, this is one of the very few proofs of completeness that concerns
a proof system in which both knowledge and actions are dealt with, and it is probably
the very rst in which abilities are also taken into consideration.
Rather than restricting ourselves to LCap
b
we will for the greater part consider general
logics, cumulating in a very general and rather powerful result from which the soundness
and completeness proof for LCap
b
can be derived as a corollary. Globally, the proof given
below can be split into three parts. In the rst part of the proof, canonical models are




. The possible worlds
of these canonical models are given by so-called maximal theories. In the second part, the
truth-theorem is proved, which states that truth in a possible world of a canonical model
corresponds to being an element of the maximal theory that constitutes the possible
world. In the last, and almost trivial, part of the proof it is shown how the general
truth-theorem implies soundness and completeness of LCap
b
for b-validity in M.
The denition of canonical models as we give it is, as far as actions and dynamic
constructs are concerned, based on the construction given by Goldblatt [41]. The proof of
the truth-theorem is inspired by the one given by Spruit [123] to show completeness of the
Segerberg axiomatisation for propositional dynamic logic. Due to the fact that formulae
and actions are strongly related, the subformula or subaction relation is not adequate
to apply induction upon in the proof of the truth-theorem. Instead a fairly complex
ordering is used, well-foundedness of which is proved using some very powerful (and
partly automated) techniques that are well-known from the theory of Term Rewriting
Systems [24, 69].
Some preliminary denitions, propositions and lemmas are needed before the canon-
ical models can be constructed.
3.32. Proposition. For all M 2 M with state s and all i 2 A,  2 Ac, ' 2 L and
 2 Afm(L) we have:


















Proof: We prove both items by induction on the structure of .
 Let M 2M with state s, and i 2 A, ';  2 L and  2 Ac be arbitrary.





(while' do od)] 
, M; t j=
b
 for all t 2 S such that t = r
b
(i; while' do od)(s)
, M; t j=
b
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for all l 2 IN






; confirm:')] for all l 2 IN




(i; '; ) for all l 2 IN













(while' do od)] )








(while' do od)] ))






(while' do od)] ) for all t 2 S such that (s; t) 2 R(i)






(i; ; ')) for all l 2 IN,
for all t 2 S such that (s; t) 2 R(i) (by induction hypothesis)








(i; ; ')) for all l 2 IN








(i; ; ')) for all l 2 IN














 Let again M 2M with state s, i 2 A, ' 2 L and  2 Ac be arbitrary.















; confirm:')(s) = 1))




; confirm:')(s) = 1))









































while' do od) for all t 2 S such that t = r
b
(i; )(s)


















(i; )))) for all l 2 IN








(i; ))) for all l 2 IN



















L j M j=
b
'g is a b-logic.
Proof: We need to check for a given model M 2 M that the axioms of 
b
are valid in
M and that M is validity-preserving for the proof rules of 
b
. The validity of the axioms
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A1{A9 and A12{A14 is easily checked. Axiom A10 follows from the determinism of all
actions as stated in Corollary 3.12. Axiom A15
1
is shown in Proposition 3.6, and A15
0
is shown analogously. The validity-preservingness of M for the rules R1 and R2 follows
from Proposition 3.32; M is easily seen to be validity-preserving for the other rules. As





(while' do od)] 
, M; t j=
b
 for all t 2 S such that t = r
b
(i; while' do od)(s)
, M; t j=
b





 for all t 2 S such that t = r
b
(i; (confirm';); while' do od)(s)









((confirm';); while' do od)] 









(while' do od)] 

3.34. Proposition. Let  be a logic. The following properties are shared by all
-theories  , for all ';  2 L, i 2 A,  2 Ac and all  2 Afm(L):
1. > 2  
2. if   `

' then ' 2  
3. if `

('!  ) and ' 2   then  2  
4.   is -consistent i ? 62   i   6= L
5. (' ^  ) 2   i ' 2   and  2  
6. if ' 2   or  2   then (' _  ) 2  
7. ([do
i
(while' do od)] ) 2   i f( 
l
(i; '; )) j l 2 INg   
8. (:A
i
while' do od) 2   i f(:('
l
(i; ))) j l 2 INg   
Proof: The items 1 to 6 are fairly standard, and are proved by Goldblatt [41]. The cases







3.35. Definition. Let  be a logic. A maximal -theory is a consistent -theory   such
that ' 2   or :' 2   for all ' 2 L.
3.36. Proposition. The following properties are shared by all maximal -theories
 , for  some logic, and ';  2 L.
1. ? 62  
2. exactly one of ' and :' belongs to  , for all ' 2 L
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3. (' _  ) 2   i ' 2   or  2  
3.37. Proposition. For  a logic and all ';  2 L, ;	  L, i 2 A,  2 Ac and
 2 Afm(L) we have:
1. if ' 2  then  `

'
2. if  `






' i ; `

'
4. if  `

('!  ) and  `

' then  `

 








(while' do od)] )









3.38. Theorem (The deduction theorem). For  some logic and all ';  2 L and
  L we have that  [ f'g `

 i  `

('!  ).
Proof: We will prove the `i' by proving two implications:
`(' This case follows directly from items 1, 2, and 4 of Proposition 3.37.
`)' Assume that  [ f'g `

 . Let   , f 2 L j  `

(' ! )g. We have to show
that  2  . For this it suces to show that   is a -theory containing  [ f'g.
We show here that   is closed under 
IA; the proof of the other properties is easy
and left to the reader. Assume that f(:('
0
l




















do od) 2  . Thus   is closed under 
IA.

3.39. Corollary. For  some logic and all ' 2 L and   L we have:
  [ f'g is -consistent i  6`

:'
  [ f:'g is -consistent i  6`

'
3.40. Definition. For   L, i 2 A and  2 Ac we dene:
 =K
i







' 2 L j ' 2 g
 =[do
i







()]' 2 L j ' 2 g
3.41. Proposition. For  some logic and all ' 2 L, i 2 A and   L we have:
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Proof: We show the rst case; the second case is completely analogous. So let   be a
-theory such that K
i
   . We need to show that K
i









1.   : If  2 , then K
i
 2   and hence  2 .
2.  contains : If `





 and, since   is a -theory, thenK
i
 2  ,
which implies  2 .
3.  is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA.
 MP: If  2  and ( !  
1
) 2 , then K
i
 2   and K
i
( !  
1
) 2  . Since  


















; )) j l 2 INg   . Applying














































do od) 2 .
It follows that  is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA.
Since  contains  and is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA it follows that  is a -theory.

3.42. Corollary. Let  be some logic. For all -theories  , and for i 2 A,  2 Ac
and ' 2 L we have:
 K
i












3.43. Proposition. Let  be some logic. For all maximal -theories   we have that
if  =[do
i
()] is -consistent then  =[do
i
()] is a maximal -theory.
Proof: Suppose that  =[do
i
()] is -consistent. We show that  =[do
i
()] is a -theory
and that for all ' 2 L, either ' 2  =[do
i
()] or :' 2  =[do
i
()]. Since by assumption
 =[do
i
()] is consistent, this suces to conclude that  =[do
i
()] is a maximal -theory.
1.  =[do
i
()] contains : If `





()]', and, since   is a -theory,
[do
i





()] is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA:
 MP: Assume that (' !  ) 2  =[do
i





 ) 2   and [do
i
()]' 2  , which implies, since   contains A6 and is closed under
MP, that [do
i




I: If f( 
l






(j; '; )) j l 2 INg 
 . Applying 




(j; '; )) j l 2 INg, yields that





(while' do  od)] ) 2  , and hence ([do
j













(j; ))) j l 2
INg   . Applying 









while' do  od) 2  . Hence (:A
j
while' do od) 2  =[do
i
()].




()]:' for all i;  and
'. Since   is maximal, [do
i
()]' 2   or [do
i
()]:' 2   for all i;  and '. But this
implies that ' 2  =[do
i
()] or :' 2  =[do
i
()], for all ' 2 L.
By items 1, 2, and 3 it follows that  =[do
i





3.44. Definition. For  some logic, the set S

is dened by S

, f   L j   is a
maximal -theoryg.
3.45. Proposition. For  some logic and all   L and ' 2 L we have:
  `

' i for all   2 S

such that     holds that ' 2  
 `

' i for all   2 S

holds that ' 2  
Proof: The second item follows by instantiating the rst item with  = ; and using
item 3 of Proposition 3.37. We show the rst item by proving two implications.
`)' By denition of  `

'.
`(' We show: if  6`

' then some   2 S

exists such that     and ' 62  . We con-





; : : : of the formulae of L. Using this enumeration, the increasing sequence of
sets  
l
 L is for l 2 IN inductively dened as follows:
1.  
0
=  [ f:'g
2. Assume that  
k
has been dened. The set  
k+1
is dened by the following algo-
















is of the form ([do
i







(i; '; ))g [ f:
k
g,







(this j exists since otherwise application of 


















(i; )))g [ f:
k
g,







(this j exists since otherwise application of 
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. We show that   is a maximal -theory.
3.46. Lemma. The set  
l
is -consistent for all l 2 IN.
Proof:We prove the lemma by induction on l. Since  6`

', we have that[f:'g =
 
0
is -consistent by Corollary 3.39. Now assume that  
k
is consistent. Consider









, then, since  
k


















(i; '; ))g [ f:
k
































(i; '; ))g is -inconsistent. But



















(i; )))g [ f:
k



























































g is -consistent by Corollary 3.39.

3.47. Lemma. The set   as constructed above is maximal, i.e. for all ' 2 L,
exactly one of ' and :' is an element of  .
Proof: Let  2 L be arbitrary, then  = 
k









, hence either  2   or : 2  . Suppose both  and
: in  . Then for some k 2 IN, f ;: g   
k
, which would make  
k
inconsistent.
Since this contradicts the result of Lemma 3.46 given above, it follows that  and
: are not both in  .

3.48. Lemma. The set   as constructed above is a -theory.
Proof: We need to show that   contains  and is closed under MP, 
I, and 
IA. So
let ';  2 L, i 2 A and  2 Ac be arbitrary.
1.   contains : If `

', where ' = 
k












2. Closure under MP, 
I, and 
IA:
 MP: Suppose that '; '!  2  . If  62  , then : 2  , since   is maximal
by Lemma 3.47. Hence f'; ' !  ;: g 2  
k
for some k 2 IN, which would
make  
k
-inconsistent. This leads to a contradiction with Lemma 3.46, hence
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 2  .
 
I: Suppose f( 
l
(i; '; )) j l 2 INg   . Let ([do
i
(while' do od)] ) = 
k
,
for some k 2 IN. If 
k






, and, by case 2 of the construction of
 
k+1
, this implies that :( 
j
(i; '; )) 2  
k+1







(i; '; )). Hence :( 
j
(i; '; )) 2  , and by Lemma 3.47,
( 
j
(i; '; )) 62  , which contradicts the assumption that f( 
l
(i; '; )) j l 2
INg   . Hence ([do
i




(i; ))) j l 2 INg   . Let (:A
i
while' do od) = 
k
,
for some k 2 IN. If 
k






, and by case 2 of the construction of
 
k+1
, this implies that :((:'
j
(i; ))) 2  
k+1







(i; ))). Hence :(:('
j
(i; ))) 2  , and (:('
j
(i; ))) 62  ,
which contradicts the assumption that f(:('
l
(i; ))) j l 2 INg   . Hence
(:A
i
while' do od) 2  .
We conclude that   is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA.
Since   contains  and is closed under MP, 
I and 
IA, we conclude that   is a
-theory.

Now if   is -inconsistent, then   `

?. Since, by Lemma 3.48,   is a -theory,
it follows by Proposition 3.34(2) that ? 2  . Then ? 2  
k
for some k 2 IN, which
contradicts the -consistency of  
k
which was shown in Lemma 3.46. Hence   is a
-theory (Lemma 3.48) which is maximal (Lemma 3.47) and -consistent, thus  
is a maximal -theory. Note that by construction of  ,     and :' 2  , which
suces to conclude the right-to-left implication.

3.49. Definition. Let  be some logic. The canonical model M

















is the set of maximal -theories
2. 

(p; s) = 1 i p 2 s, for p 2  and s 2 S





 t, for s; t 2 S

and i 2 A
4. t = r

(i; a)(s) i s=do
i




(i; a)(s) = 1 if A
i
a 2 s and c

(i; a)(s) = 0 if A
i
a 62 s for i 2 A, a 2 At and s 2 S

3.50. Proposition. Let  be some logic. The canonical model M

for  as dened
above is a well-dened model from M.
Proof: Let  be some logic. In order to show that M

is a well-dened model from M
we have to show that the demands determining well-denedness of models are met by
M







are well-dened, which leaves to show that R

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and r

are. To prove that R(i) is an equivalence relation, assume that i 2 A and that
fs; t; ug  S

. We show:
1. (s; s) 2 R(i), i.e. R(i) is reexive.
2. if (s; t) 2 R(i) and (s; u) 2 R(i) then (t; u) 2 R(i), i.e. R(i) is Euclidean.
To show the reexivity of R(i), note that (s; t) 2 R(i) i s=K
i
 t. Now since s contains
axiom A3: K
i




' 2 s and hence ' 2 s by MP. Thus
s=K
i










' 62 s. Since s is a maximal -theory this implies that :K
i
' 2 s, and since s















' 2 t. But then K
i
' 2 t and :K
i
' 2 t which contradicts the consistency
of t. Thus R(i) is Euclidean, and, combined with the reexivity, this ensures that R(i)
is an equivalence relation.
To show that r

is well-dened, it needs to be shown that for all i 2 A, a 2 At and
s 2 S

it holds that r





(i; a)(s) = ;. To this end it suces to show for
arbitrary i 2 A, a 2 At and s; t; u 2 S

that if t = r

(i; a)(s) and u = r

(i; a)(s) then
t = u. By denition it follows that s=[do
i
(a)]  t and s=[do
i
(a)]  u if both t = r

(i; a)(s)
and u = r

(i; a)(s). Since both t and u are maximal -theories, both t and u are -
consistent, and hence s=[do
i
(a)] is -consistent. But then, by Proposition 3.43, s=[do
i
(a)]
is a maximal -theory, which is properly contained only in L. Hence s=[do
i
(a)] = t and
s=[do
i








were dealt with identically, i.e. in none
of the denitions or propositions given above one needs to distinguish the proof systems
or the logics based on these proof systems. From this point on, however, we need to
treat the two systems, and thereby the logics, dierently. We start with nishing the
proof of soundness and completeness for 1-logics, and indicate thereafter how this proof
needs to be modied to end up with one for 0-logics.
The presence of the conrmation action, which tightly links actions and formulae,
makes that the subformula- or subaction-relation is not adequate to apply induction
upon in the proof of the truth-theorem, the theorem which links satisability in a state
of the canonical model to being an element of the maximal theory which constitutes the
state. Instead we need a more elaborate relation, which is dened below.
3.51. Definition. The relation  is the smallest relation on f0; 1g L that satises for




2 Ac the following constraints:
1. (0; ')  (0; ' _  )
2. (0;  )  (0; ' _  )
3. (0; ')  (0;:')
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4. (0; ')  (0;K
i
')
























































11. (1;  
l
(i; '; ))  (1; [do
i
(while' do od)] ) for all l 2 IN





































































(i; ))  (1;A
i
while' do od) for all l 2 IN
20. (0; ')  (1;A
i
confirm')
3.52. Definition. The ordering < is dened as the transitive closure of , and  is
dened as the reexive closure of <.
3.53. Proposition. The ordering < is well-founded.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is quite elaborate; it can be found in [52] where it
takes over three pages. Basically, the idea is to use a powerful technique well-known from
the theory of Term Rewriting Systems, viz. the lexicographic path ordering. Using this
technique it suces to select an appropriate well-founded precedence on the function
symbols of the language in order to conclude that the ordering  is well-founded. Since
the actual proof is not only rather elaborate but also contains many details that are
completely outside the scope of this thesis, it is omitted here; those who are interested
can nd all details in [52].

Having proved that the ordering < is well-founded, we can use it in the proof of the
truth-theorem.
3.54. Theorem (The truth-theorem). Let  be some 1-logic. For any ' 2 L, and






' i ' 2 s.
Proof: We prove the theorem by proving the following (stronger) properties for all
';  2 L, i 2 A,  2 Ac, and s 2 S

:
62 Chapter 3. A logic of capabilities




 i  2 s
2. For all (1; [do
i
()] ) < (0; ') we have:





(b) if t = r
1
(i; )(s) and [do
i
()] 2 s then  2 t
3. For all (1;A
i
) < (0; ') we have: c
1











in the way described in Deni-
tion 3.3. The theorem then follows from the rst item, since (0; ')  (0; '). So let ' 2 L
be some xed formula. We start by proving the rst property. Let  2 L be such that
(0;  )  (0; '). Consider the various cases for  :
  = p, for p 2 . By denition of 

we have that 

(p; s) = 1 i p 2 s.




. Since (0;  
1




) and (0;  
2

























) i  
1
2 s and  
2
2 s (by




2 s (since s is a (maximal) theory).
  = : 
1
. Since (0;  
1
) < (0;: 
1















2 s) (by induction on (1)) i : 
1
2 s since s is (a) maximal (theory).













2 t for all t such that
(s; t) 2 R



































. Now if for t 2 S
















), we have by induction on (1) that  
1
2 t, for all t 2
S

with (s; t) 2 R

(i). This implies that  
1
belongs to every maximal theory
containing s=K
i





















2 s. Let t = r
1









we nd by induction on (2b) that  
1
2 t. Since (0;  
1











, if t = r
1
























if t = r
1
(i; )(s).
Since (0;  
1




) we have by induction on (1) that  
1
2 t if t =
r
1








), we conclude by induction




















(i; )(s) = 1 i A
i
 2 s.
Next we prove (2a). Let (1; [do
i
()] ) < (0; '). Consider the various possibilities for .
  = a, for a 2 At. Assume that  2 t if t = r

(i; a)(s). By denition of r

this
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By Corollary 3.42 we conclude that [do
i
(a)] 2 s.
  = confirm 
1
. Assume that  2 t for t = r
1









have that s = t, by denition of r
1
. Then  2 s, and, since s is a theory, this implies
: 
1





































)(s). By denition of r
1
this



















































Since s is closed under the axioms of 
1

























































)] 2 s, and, since s







  = while' do od. Assume that  2 t for t = r
1
(i; while' do od)(s). Since
r
1






; confirm:')(s), it follows that









; confirm:')] ) < (1; [do
i
(while' do od)] ) for all k 2 IN
we have by induction on (2a) that  
k
(i; '; ) 2 s for all k 2 IN, and since s is closed
under 
A this implies that [do
i
(while' do od)] 2 s.
We continue with proving (2b). So let again (1; [do
i
()] ) < (0; '), and consider the
various possibilities for .
  = a, for a 2 At. If t = r

(i; a)(s) and [do
i
(a)] 2 s, then by denition of r

,  2 t.
  = confirm 
1

















and s = t. Since (0;  
1
) < (0;: 
1





we nd by induction on (1) that  
1





implies that : 
1
_  2 s, and, since s is maximal, we conclude that  2 s.
















)] 2 s. Then, by denition of r
1
,




)(u) for some u 2 S





)(s). Since s is
closed under the axioms and proof rules of 
1
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fi)] 2 s,then, since s is
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fi)] ) we have by induc-
tion on (2b) that  2 t.
  = while' do od. Let t = r
1
(i; while' do od)(s) and [do
i
(while' do od)] 2
s. Since s is a theory, we have that  
l
(i; '; ) 2 s, for all l 2 IN. By denition of r
1
,




; confirm:')(s) for some k 2 IN. Now since
(1;  
l
(i; '; )) < (1; [do
i
(while' do od)] ) for all l 2 IN, we conclude by induction
on (2b) that  2 t.
Finally we come to the proof of item (3). Let (1;A
i
) < (0; '). Consider the various
cases for .
  = a, where a 2 At. Now c

(i; a)(s) = 1 i A
i
a 2 s, by denition of c

.
  = confirm 
1























in s, since s is a theory.




. We prove two implications:

































)(s) = 1. Now


















), we 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), we conclude by induction














































2 s. But then, since s is a theory,
































































since s is a theory.
  = while' do od. We prove two implications:
`(' Let A
i
while' do od 2 s. Then, since s is maximal, :A
i
while' do od 62 s,
and, since s is closed under 
IA, this implies that :('
k
(i; )) 62 s, for some
k 2 IN, and, again due to the maximality of s, '
k
(i; ) 2 s. Since (1; '
l
(i; )) <
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(1;A
i










(i; while' do od)(s) = 1.
`)' If c
1






; confirm:')(s) = 1
for some k 2 IN. Since (1; '
l
(i; )) < (1;A
i
while' do od) for all l 2 IN, this im-
plies by induction on (3) that '
k
(i; ) 2 s. Then, since s is a theory, :('
k
(i; )) 62
s, and, by item 7 of Proposition 3.34, it follows that :A
i
while' do od 62 s. Now
since s is maximal it follows that A
i
while' do od 2 s.
Having proved the items (1), (2) and (3) suces to conclude that the truth-theorem
holds.

The proof of the truth-theorem for 0-logics is almost identical to the one given for
Theorem 3.54. One just needs to change one clause in the denition of the -relation,
used to apply induction upon, and modify the proof of the truth-theorem accordingly.
3.55. Definition. The ordering <
0
is dened as the transitive closure of the smallest
relation on f0; 1gL satisfying the constraints 1 through 15 and 17 through 20 as given


















is dened to be the reexive closure of <
0
.
The only modication to the proof of the truth-theorem for 1-logics that is sucient
to end up with a proof of a truth-theorem for 0-logics concerns the proof of property (3)





















(0; '). We will show this by proving two implications:




















































), we nd by induction on (2b), read in its con-
trapositive form, that for some t 2 S









62 t. Now since


































































) we have by









































And, rephrasing (2b) to `if t = r
0
(i; )(s) and  62 t then [do
i
()] 62 s', we conclude








62 s. Since s is maximal it follows that





















2 s, which, since s is a






2 s, which was to be shown.
Having proved the truth-theorem both for 1-logics and for 0-logics, we can prove that
deducibility for a logic  corresponds with validity in the canonical model M

.







Proof: Let ' 2 L be arbitrary. Then we have:
`















Using the propositions and theorems shown above, we can now prove those given in
Section 3.4. Note that Proposition 3.29 is already shown as the third item of Proposi-
tion 3.37.











' for allM 2M. SinceM
LCap
b











' and let M 2M. By Proposition 3.33 we have that f 2 L j M j=
b
 g
is a b-logic. Since LCap
b
is the smallest b-logic, it follows that whenever ' 2 LCap
b
also ' 2 f 2 L j M j=
b
 g, and hence M j=
b
'. Since M is arbitrary, it follows that
M j=
b
' for all M 2M and thus j=
b
', which was to be shown.





are strongly complete, i.e. every





Proof: The proposition follows, for arbitrary logics, directly from the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.45. For if  is -consistent, then by the procedure given in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.45 one constructs a maximal -theory   that contains . This   appears as a state
in the canonical model for , and by the truth-theorems, all formulae from   | and
hence from  | are satised at this state. Hence every -consistent set  is satised at
some state of the canonical model for , and since this canonical model is a well-dened




The grey of evening lls the room,
There's no need to look outside,
To see or feel the rain.
Genesis, `In The Glow Of The Light'.
In this chapter we dene various formal systems in which nondeterministic action con-
structors are considered. We deal with both internal and external nondeterminism. In
the rst kind of nondeterminism the agent makes the choice as to which action to take,
in the latter some unspecied external environment does. It is assumed that the agent
displays an angelic behaviour, whereas the external environment may display a demonic
one. This means that the agent itself chooses the correct, desired action whenever possi-
ble, while it has to expect the external environment, which is completely unpredictable
from the agent's point of view, to pick the incorrect, undesirable one if given that pos-
sibility. The presence of abilities in our system forces one to reconsider the common
approaches towards nondeterminism. It turns out that the combination of internal non-
determinism and abilities cannot be formalised using (obvious extensions of) standard
approaches. In the case of external nondeterminism one has to distinguish between opti-
mistic and pessimistic agents as described in the previous chapter. For optimistic agents
it is not possible to use any of the well-known approaches towards external nondeter-
minism (or concurrency), whereas for pessimistic agents an extension of the semantics
for Concurrent Propositional Dynamic Logic as proposed by Peleg [101] may be used.
For internal nondeterminism and external nondeterminism in the presence of optimistic
agents we pursue an approach in which the (nondeterministic) actions are unravelled into
the sequences of atomic actions and conrmations that constitute them. Based on this
unravelling we present separate semantics for both internal and external nondetermin-
ism that formalise an intuitively acceptable behaviour of agents with nondeterministic
actions at their disposal. In particular, the validities describing the agents' abilities for
67
68 Chapter 4. Unravelling nondeterminism
composite actions, containing nondeterministic action constructors, meet all intuitive
requirements. It turns out that the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate, as for-
malising known practical (im)possibility, have to be reconsidered in the light of both
internal and external nondeterminism, which leads to new denitions of these predicates
in some cases. As usual, we conclude this chapter with a brief summary, ideas for possible
extensions, references to the relevant literature, and proofs of selected propositions.
4.1 Internal versus external nondeterminism
Terms referring to nondeterministic actions are frequently used in common parlance.
Statements like `to see or feel the rain', `take it or leave it, I don't care' or `mail the let-
ter or burn it, do as you like' (implicitly) refer to nondeterministic actions. In essence,
nondeterminism of an action accounts to nothing but the outcome of execution of the
action not being determined, i.e. execution of a nondeterministic action may have more
than one possible outcome. The nondeterminism that we consider here originates from
combining two actions into a composite action, representing the nondeterministic choice
between the two actions. As remarked by Hoare [50], this choice can be made in two
dierent ways: either the agent itself makes the choice, or something else does. In general
we think of this `something else' as some unspecied external environment, surround-
ing the agent but strictly separated from it. Dependent on who makes the choice, i.e.
the agent or the external environment, two essentially dierent nondeterministic actions
result. Following the terminology of Meyer [93], we refer to actions in which the nonde-
terministic choice is to be made by the agent as being internal, while actions in which
the external environment chooses are termed external. We assume the agent to act in
its own interest. This means that in situations in which a nondeterministic action can
be performed both in a `right' and in a `wrong' way, the agent will choose to perform
the action in the right way. Therefore the internal nondeterministic action displays a
so-called angelic (cf. [11]) behaviour. The external environment on the other hand is
completely out of the control of the agent, and therefore completely unpredictable from
the agent's perspective. In particular, this implies that whenever there is the possibility
of making a wrong choice, the agent has to take into account that the external environ-
ment makes this wrong choice. As such, from the agent's point of view, the behaviour
of the external environment is to be considered demonic (again cf. [11]). This dier-
ence between angelic and demonic behaviour will be visible throughout the denitions
formalising the internal and the external nondeterministic choice.





 in the presence of nondeterministic actions. For the deterministic
actions built up using the core action constructors, hdo
i
()i' was intuitively interpreted
as stating that agent i has the opportunity to do action , and that ' result from i's exe-
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cution of . FormulaeA
i
 were interpreted as stating that agent i has the reliable ability
to perform action . The intuitive interpretation of A
i
 takes on also for nondeterminis-
tic actions, where it is important to stress that the agent's ability has to be reliable, i.e.
no matter how the opportunity presents itself, agent i is able to take it. The intuitive
interpretation of hdo
i
()i' that we propose for possibly nondeterministic actions , is
that agent i has the opportunity to perform  in such a way that ' is certain to result
from this performance, or phrased dierently, that agent i has the reliable opportunity
to bring about ' by executing . From this point of view the intuitive interpretation of
the dual [do
i
()]' is that the agent does not have the reliable opportunity to perform
 in such a way that ' is avoided, or phrased dierently, that every possible way of
performing  open to the agent, i.e. for which the agent has the opportunity, results in
' being true. Note that for deterministic actions this interpretation coincides with the
one used in Chapter 2.
4.2 Internal nondeterminism
As in the representation of Meyer [93], we denote the internal nondeterministic combi-

















, where the choice is up to the
agent. Besides the action constructor , the language L

furthermore contains primi-
tive operators representing the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. The reasons for
declaring these predicates primitive, rather than introducing them through abbreviation
as we did in the previous chapter, will be made clear later on.
4.1. Definition. To dene the language L

, the alphabet is extended with the action
constructor  , representing the internal nondeterministic choice operator, and the
predicates Can ( ; ) and Cannot ( ; ). The language L

is the smallest superset of 
closed under the core clauses. The class Ac

of actions is the smallest superset of At















It is obvious that the language L

as dened above is a genuine extension of the
language L as dened in the previous chapter.
As for the core action constructors, we have to decide how to interpret and dene the
ability, opportunity and result for internal nondeterministic actions. Given the fact that
the agent, which decides what action to take, displays an angelic behaviour, it seems





such a way that ' results i it either has the reliable opportunity to do 
1
such that
' results or it has the reliable opportunity to perform 
2
in such a way that execution
leads to '. From a formal point of view this corresponds to the equivalence





















analogous argument as for the opportunity can be given. Since the agent itself chooses,









. Conversely, it is








, since it has to choose one of these actions.





















one could attempt to straightforwardly incorporate these in the framework of the previous
chapter. However, this straightforward approach leads to undesirable, i.e. intuitively
unacceptable, situations for the agent's ability with respect to sequentially composed
















. This equivalence does however not come about when pursuing the straightforward
approach, as can be seen in the following example.






























2 At. That is, the agent has both
the ability and the opportunity to do a
1
, and the opportunity but not the ability to do
a
2
, where doing a
2





in the optimistic and in the pessimistic approach of the previous chapter, i is neither








. However, using the equivalences (y) and (z) as given



































holds, which both in the optimistic and


























), a conclusion which is clearly unacceptable.
Example 4.2 shows that the straightforward approach, embodied in the combination
of the equivalences (y) and (z) and the equivalences for sequential composition derived in















. To solve this clash between formalism
and intuition, we propose an approach in which an action is equated with the more







is also formally | and not just intuitively | equated with
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. In particular, it is the case that an agent is able















. To formalise this idea of decomposing actions into their
more elementary constituents, we use the unravel function CS

, already discussed in
Chapter 2. Using the function CS

we have the possibility to look at actions from a
reductionistic point of view, i.e. in terms of their elementary constituents, the nite
computation sequences.







) is for the non-core action construc-















The presence of nondeterministic action constructors in the language does not neces-
sitate the incorporation of new semantic constructs in the models for L

: these models
consist of nothing but the core elements.
4.4. Definition. A model M for the language L

is a tuple consisting of the core ele-
ments. The class of all models for L

is denoted by M

.
The fundamental idea underlying the denition of j=

is to treat an action as it were
the existentially quantied union of all its nite computation sequences.
4.5. Definition. The binary relation j=

between a formula from L

and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L























































































































(i; )(;) = 1
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4.6. Remark. In Denition 4.5 we formalise only the optimistic approach towards the
agents' abilities for sequentially composed actions. By replacing c

(i; )(;) = 1 by
c

(i; )(;) = 0 one directly formalises the pessimistic approach, i.e. these approaches
are completely orthogonal. In light of this orthogonality, we have decided to restrict
ourselves to optimistic agents.
According to Denition 4.5, an agent has the ability to perform some action  i it
has the ability to perform some nite computation sequence constituting . It has the
opportunity to perform  such that ' results i it has the opportunity to perform some
nite computation sequence of  in such a way that ' results.
Even though the actions from Ac

are possibly nondeterministic, the nite compu-
tation sequences that constitute such an action are still deterministic.
4.7. Proposition. All actions from Ac

b
are deterministic in F

.
The nondeterministic action constructor  indeed behaves as desired, both for op-
portunity and result, as for ability.











































The validities that were found in Proposition 3.5 to characterise the compositional
behaviour of actions with respect to opportunities and results do also hold for j=

.
Furthermore, the operator [do
i
()], with i 2 A and  2 Ac

is still normal.









































































With regard to abilities, the behaviour of the sequential composition and the repet-
itive composition with respect to j=

diers from the behaviour with respect to j=; for










and ' 2 L

we have:
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 od$ :' _ (' ^A
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; while' do od)
6. A
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while' do od) is not for all ' 2 L















while' do od))! A
i
while' do od


















is true, it is no longer necessary. This is
obviously one of the desiderata as they follow from the observations made in Example 4.2.
The same can be said for the items 3 and 4: the formal unravelling of actions indeed
results in the intuitively desirable equivalences. Item 5 concerns an equivalence that is
also valid for j=, and that may be seen as a slightly weakened variant of the formulae
considered in the items 6 and 7. The invalidity formalised in item 6 is related to the
invalidity given in item 1, and is in fact a direct consequence of the combination of item
1 and item 5.
4.2.1 Practical possibility and free choice
In the previous chapter we dened the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate to model
the knowledge of agents on their practical (im)possibilities. The intuitive idea underlying
the denition of these predicates is that practical possibility is stated in terms of the
correctness and feasibility to bring about some proposition by performing some action.
In Chapter 3 we propose to formalise correctness through the formula hdo
i
()i', which
expresses that  is correct for agent i to bring about '. Feasibility is formalised through
the formulaA
i
, which states that  is feasible for agent i, i.e. within its capabilities. The
notion of practical possibility is then formalised by PracPoss
i












(; ') and Cannot
i




(; '), respectively. Although
these denitions are intuitively perfectly acceptable when only deterministic actions are
considered, they are no longer so when nondeterminism is involved.
4.12. Example. Suppose that the author of this thesis knows that he is given the oppor-
tunity to reach the top of K2 since somebody placed him at the foot of this mountain.
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Although he knows that he has the opportunity, he also knows that he is not able to take
it, because it is certainly not within his capabilities to climb K2. This situation may be





(climb K2)itop reached ^ :A
b
climb K2)

















hold, which implies that Can
b
(skip  climb K2; top reached) holds, i.e. the author of
this thesis knows that he somehow has the practical possibility to reach the top of K2!
The situation observed in the example above resembles the one observed in Exam-
ple 4.2, and could be taken as another sign that straightforward approaches towards
nondeterminism do not work when both opportunities and abilities are involved. From
Example 4.12 we learn the same lesson as from Example 4.2, namely that nondetermin-
istic actions are to be unravelled, also when dening known practical (im)possibilities.
One has to ensure that whenever the formula Can
i
(; ') holds, some nite computation
sequence 
0
of  exists which is such that i has the reliable opportunity to perform 
0
such that ' results, while it also has the reliable ability to do 
0
. We bring this about
by dening the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as independent, primitive en-
tities with their own semantics. In this semantics, which is based on the unravelling of




 does still represent practical possibility for nite
computation sequences, which after all are deterministic actions.
4.13. Definition. The binary relation j=

between a formula from L

and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L















































(; ') is dened as in Chapter 3, i.e.PracPoss
i





Interpreting the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as in Denition 4.13 indeed
solves the counterintuitive situation encountered in Example 4.12. For not only does
Can
b
(skipclimb K2; top reached) no longer hold, it is even the case that the stronger
formula Cannot
b
(skip  climb K2; top reached) holds, i.e. the author of this thesis
knows that he does not have the practical possibility to reach the top of K2 by choosing
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freely between doing nothing and climbing the mountain. More in general, the Can-
predicate and the Cannot-predicate indeed show an intuitively acceptable behaviour
when ranging over nondeterministic actions.











































Proposition 4.14 clearly expresses the idea that the agent knows that it is in control
when performing an internal nondeterministic action: the agent knows that an internal
nondeterministic choice between two actions is correct and feasible if and only if one of
the actions to be chosen is. Since the choice is completely free to the agent, this is what
one intuitively would expect.
Since the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as formalised in Denition 4.13
are essentially dierent from the predicates formalised in Section 3.3, it is both interest-
ing and important to look at the dierences and similarities between the two kinds of
denitions. To this end we reconsider the validities found in Section 3.3 to characterise
the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. In general one can say that the validities
concerning conrmations or conditional compositions as found in Proposition 3.18 do
also hold for j=

when dening the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as above.
For the sequential composition and the repetitive composition we have the following.






















































(while' do od)i ^A
i





(while' do od;  ) ^K
i
'
The non-validities stated in Proposition 4.15 essentially follow from the fact that for




 does not represent practical
possibility. That is, even though it states that the agent has the reliable opportunity to
perform  in such a way that ' results while it also has the reliable ability to perform
, it fails to tie this opportunity and ability together: the agent may have the reliable
opportunity to do  in some way while not having the ability to do  in the same way
(but in another way). A similar observation underlies Example 4.12.
With respect to the end-part of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate it turns
out that most of the formulae given in Proposition 3.19 are also valid for j=

. The most
important exceptions are the following ones.
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-satisable for certain  2 Ac







(;  )! Can
i
(; '^ ) is not for all  2 Ac






The items of Proposition 4.16 nicely indicate both the nondeterministic character of
the actions from Ac

and the fact that the agent itself is in control. The rst item states
that it is possible that an agent knows that it has both the practical possibility to perform
 in such a way that ' results as well as the practical possibility to perform  in such
a way that :' results. Since the agent itself decides how an internal nondeterministic
action is performed, satisability of this formula seems to make sense. Note that it is





satisable. The invalidity of the second item follows directly from the satisability of
the rst item: even though Can
i
(; ') ^ Can
i
(;:') may hold, Can
i
(; ' ^ :') will
never be true.
4.3 External nondeterminism
In this section we propose two possible approaches towards a formalisation of external
nondeterministic actions. In the rst of these it is assumed that the agents are optimistic
in the sense of the previous chapter, i.e. agents are omnipotent in the counterfactual state
of aairs. This formalisation of external nondeterminism for optimistic agents, though
slightly more complex, resembles the one given for internal nondeterminism in the pre-
vious section. In particular, this semantics is also based on the unravelling of actions,
though in a more elaborate and subtle way. When introducing external nondeterminism
for pessimistic agents, i.e. for agents that are assumed to be nilpotent in the counterfac-
tual state of aairs, it is not necessary to unravel actions in order to come up with an
adequate semantics. Instead we propose a semantics that is inspired by, and uses ele-
ments of, the one presented by Peleg [101] for Concurrent Propositional Dynamic Logic
(CPDL).


















where the external environment decides which action to perform.
4.17. Definition. To dene the language L
+
, the alphabet is extended with the action
constructor + , representing the external nondeterministic choice operator. The lan-
guage L
+
is the smallest superset of  closed under the core clauses. The class Ac
+
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Just as the language L

dened in the previous section, L
+
is easily seen to be a
genuine extension of the language L dened in the previous chapter.
To treat actions containing the constructor + as fully-edged ones, we have to decide
on how to interpret and formalise the ability, opportunity and result for external nonde-
terministic actions, given the intuitive idea that the external environment, which makes
the choice as to what action to perform, may display a demonic behaviour. Starting
from this principle, it seems reasonable to declare an agent to have the opportunity to




in such a way that ' is certain to result i it has both the
reliable opportunity to do 
1
such that ' results and it has the reliable opportunity to
perform 
2
in such a way that execution leads to '. For the agent has to expect the
worst from the external environment, and therefore should be prepared both to having
to execute 
1
and to having to execute 
2
































is also valid. By a similar argument one comes to the conclusion that an agent is reliably




i it is both reliably capable of performing 
1
and it is reliably capable of performing 
2

















being valid. Just as we did for internal nondeterminism, we investigate the consequences
of combining these equivalences with the ones describing the optimistic and the pes-
simistic approach formalised in the previous chapter. It turns out that in the optimistic
approach counterintuitive situations arise. Whereas one intuitively expects having the















, this equivalence does not come about when
combining () and () given above according to the optimistic approach of Chapter 3.


























2 At. In the optimistic approach of the
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To deal with the problems observed in Example 4.18, we propose an approach similar
to the one used to solve the problems that occur with the internal nondeterministic
choice, i.e. an approach based on the unravelling of actions.
It turns out that straightforwardly adding the equivalences () and () to the ones
describing the pessimistic approach of Chapter 3 does not lead to counterintuitive situ-
ations. For instance, assuming the equivalences () and () to be valid, it can be shown





















). Thus, dening a semantics that respects the validities of Chapter 3 for the
pessimistic approach in combination with () and () constitutes the main part of our
formalisation of the external nondeterministic choice for pessimistic agents.
4.3.1 External nondeterminism and optimistic agents
The semantics used to interpret external nondeterministic actions for optimistic agents
is also based on the idea of unravelling an action into the nite-length sequences of semi-
atomic actions that constitute it. Although the unravelling of external nondeterministic
actions is a little more involved than that of internal nondeterministic actions, it is
still the case that also the former kind of unravelling is based on the unravel function
introduced in Chapter 2.







) is for the non-core action con-















The models for L
+
, just as those for L

, need not interpret other primitive operators
besides the core ones, and therefore contain nothing but the core elements.
4.20. Definition. A model M for the language L
+
is a tuple consisting of the core
elements. The class of all models for L
+
is denoted by M
+
.
Inspired by the formalisation of internal nondeterministic actions as presented in
Section 4.2, one could be tempted to interpret non-core formulae containing external











































, respectively. However, as shown in the follow-
ing example, adopting a semantics based on (?) and (??) may lead to counterintuitive
situations.
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4.21. Example. Consider the action  , if> then skip else fail fi. Given the intu-
itive meaning of the conditional composition, one expects  to behave as the action skip.
However, the equivalences (?) and (??) as given above are not adequate to ensure this.
For confirm:>; fail is an element of CS
+





satisable according to (?) and (??).
Example 4.21 clearly shows the problems associated with using (?) and (??) to inter-
pret the non-core formulae. The function CS
+
is in fact not suciently discriminating
to dene the nite sequences of semi-atomic actions that constitute the execution of a
given action. Even though the sequences that do constitute the execution of an action 




, this set furthermore contains some sequences that will
in certain circumstances not occur in the halting execution of  and therefore should
be left out of consideration. Since these sequences do not constitute the execution of
the action, it is highly unreasonable to demand the agent to have the opportunity or
ability to perform these sequences in order for it to have the opportunity or ability
to perform the action. For example, the only relevant computation sequence of the
action if> then skip else fail fi considered in Example 4.21 is confirm>; skip, since
confirm:>; fail will never occur in an execution of if> then skip else fail fi. Hence
it should be both necessary and sucient that an agent has the opportunity or ability
to do confirm>; skip in order to conclude that it has the opportunity or ability to per-
form if> then skip else fail fi. Analogously, in states where some formula ' holds,




fi are contained in
those of 
1
; the nite computation sequences of 
2
are not relevant in these states.
To single out the nite computation sequences that are relevant given an agent and
a state of a model, we introduce the notion of nite computation runs. The nite
computation runs of an action , for an agent i in a state s, are exactly those nite
computation sequences of  that jointly constitute  for i in s, i.e. i has the opportunity
or ability to do  i it has the opportunity or ability to do any of the nite computation
runs of .
As we already mentioned in Chapter 3, no agent is assumed to have the ability to
perform an action for which execution does not terminate, i.e. executing the action would
take innite time. There is another source of non-termination, in which execution of an
action does not even begin and therefore does also not terminate. For the purposes of
this chapter, we refer to the rst kind of non-termination as innite non-termination.
A typical example of an innitely non-terminating event is do
i
(while> do skip od). The
second kind of non-termination is called void non-termination; a typical example of a
1
This is exactly the reason why the use of CS

in Denition 4.5 does not give any problems. For the
relevant sequences which are indeed present in CS

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voidly non-terminating event is do
i
(fail). Note that it is possible that optimistic agents
are able to perform actions that would lead to voidly non-terminating events; hence it
is possible that actions resulting in a state s for an agent i in voidly non-terminating
events still are relevant. In dening the function computing the nite computation runs
of actions we therefore have to discriminate between innitely and voidly non-terminating
events. With respect to the former, the denition of nite computation runs is such that
if some computation sequence of an action  results, for a given agent i in a given state
s, in an innitely non-terminating event, the set of nite computation runs of  for the
agent and the state is dened to be equal to the singleton set ffailg. If none of the
nite computation sequences of action  results in an innitely non-terminating event
for i in s, the set of nite computation runs of  is dened inductively. In this inductive
denition it is taken into account that, depending on the truth or falsity of the condition,
only some of the nite computation sequences of a conditional or a repetitive composition
are nite computation runs. Note in particular that the set of nite computation runs
of an action is a situated notion, dependent on the agent executing the action and the
state in which it is executed, which is, in contrast with the set of nite computation
sequences, no longer determined by syntax alone. The set of nite computation runs of




To check whether an action , for a given agent i and a state s, can be executed in
such a way that an innitely non-terminating event results, the termination predicate
Ter
M
is used. The denition of this predicate is a rather straightforward formalisation
of the idea that innite events result in innitely many state-transitions. If we assume
that execution of semi-atomic actions takes one execution cycle, then execution of an
action that results in an innitely non-terminating event takes more than k execution
cycles, for all k 2 IN. To be able to deal with innite while-loops, we incorporate the
prex relation in the denition of the Ter
M
predicate. If we consider for instance the
action  , while> do skip od in a given state s for a given agent i, it is obvious that
execution of  by i results in innitely many state-transitions from s to s. However, the
set of nite computation sequences of  fails to express this: since all nite computation
sequences of  are of the form 
0
; confirm?, all of these computation sequences result in
voidly non-terminating events! The denition of Ter
M
as we give it, i.e. using the prex
relation, can cope with the situation sketched above: it expresses that for all natural
numbers k a natural number l  k exists such that for some nite computation sequence

0
2 CS(while> do skip od) the prex of 
0
of length l results in l state-transitions from
s to s, and hence the event do
i
(while> do skip od) is innitely non-terminating in all
states s, for all agents i.
After this, hopefully explanatory, introduction the actual denitions of the various
predicates can be given.
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4.22. Definition. The binary relation j=
+
between a formula from L
+
and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L
+






























































(i; ; s) = ffailg if Ter
M
(i; ; s) = 0
else if Ter
M


































































































































































































































(i; )(;) = 1
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Note that the denition of Ter
M
as given above is correct only since the nondetermin-
ism that is considered here is bounded, i.e. no innite branching inside a nondeterministic
choice is possible (cf. [2]). It is not hard to see that for bounded nondeterminism it in-
deed holds that Ter
M
(i; ; s) = 0 implies that do
i
() is innitely non-terminating in
s. For nondeterminism which is not bounded this implication is in general not valid
2
.
Note furthermore that the case distinction on Ter
M




(i; ; s) in Denition 4.22: if Ter
M
(i; ; s) = 0 then CR
+
M
(i; ; s) equals the well-
dened set ffailg, and if Ter
M




is indeed correct. As a last remark, note that the denition of CR
+
M
(i; ; ;) is some-
what arbitrary: replacing CS
+
() by for instance Ac
+
b
or by fskipg would not aect
the j=
+
-relation. However, the denition as it is given is such that some interesting and
intuitively desirable relations exist between the set of nite computation runs and the
set of nite computation sequences. Some of these relations are given in the following
proposition, which furthermore summarises some properties of the Ter
M
predicate.






























































; s) = 1
3. Ter
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; s) = 1
5. CS
+
() 6= ; and CR
+
M
(i; ; s) 6= ;
6. Ter
M
(i; ; s) = 1) CR
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M





























































The rst four items of Proposition 4.23 show that the termination predicate behaves
as desired for composite actions. That is, a sequentially composed action terminates only
if the rst part of the sequence terminates and the second part terminates no matter
how the rst part has been performed, a conditional composition terminates only if
conrming the condition followed by the then-part terminates and so does conrming
2




















+ : : :.
Even though the event do
i
() is not nitely non-terminating in s, it still holds that Ter
M
(i; ; s) = 0.
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the negation of the condition followed by the else-part, and an external nondeterministic
choice terminates only if both constituents of the choice terminate. Finally, a repetitive
composition terminates only if execution of the body of the while-loop terminates in all
points during execution of the loop. The last four items of Proposition 4.23 compare and
relate the set of nite computation sequences to the set of nite computation runs of a
given action. The fth item states that both sets are nonempty, for each action . With
respect to the set of nite computation runs this result could be interpreted as stating
that for every action at least one relevant nite computation sequence exists, which
implies that the universal quantication over the set of computation runs as it occurs in
the denition of j=
+
for the non-core formulae is never trivialised to that over an empty
set. The sixth item states that for terminating events, the set of nite computation runs
is contained in the set of nite computation sequences. In the case of non-termination,
the set of nite computation runs is equated with the singleton set ffailg. This latter
equation provides for an easy way to ensure that agents have neither the opportunity nor
the ability to successfully perform actions for which execution would take innite time.
The seventh item states that for an action  constituting a terminating event, the set
of successor states reached by execution of the nite computation runs of  equals that
reached by execution of the nite computation sequences of . The eighth item states an
analogous result with respect to abilities: the set of nite computation runs of which the
agent is capable of performing equals that of the nite computation sequences for which
the agent has the ability. The combination of the seventh and the eighth item indicates
that we (at least partially) succeeded in singling out the set of relevant computation
sequences in our denition of nite computation runs.
When interpreting the nondeterministic action constructor + as formalised in De-
nition 4.22 and explained above, it indeed behaves as desired.











































The validities that were found to characterise the ability, opportunity and result for
conrmations and conditionally composed actions both in Chapter 3 and in Section 4.2,
do also hold for j=
+
. In addition, with regard to opportunity and result the sequential
and repetitive composition behave as usual.


















































































()]-operator is not normal when  is allowed to contain external nondeter-
ministic actions. In particular, [do
i
()], while still preserving truth of the N-rule, no
longer validates the K-axiom. The non-normality of [do
i
()] is due to the fact that this
modality is no longer interpreted as a genuine necessity operator. In the interpretation
of a formula [do
i
()]' this is visible in the presence of an existential, rather than a
universal, quantication over the nite computation runs of .
4.26. Proposition. For i 2 A we have:
 [do
i




()] ) is not for all  2 Ac
+












()] holds for all  2 Ac
+
,  2 L
+
As expected and desired, in particular given the observations of Example 4.18, the
validities found to characterise the agents' abilities for sequential and repetitive compo-
sitions for j=
+
dier from those found to characterise these abilities for j=.












































































































while' do od$ :' _ (' ^A
i


















while' do od)! A
i








For most of the items of Proposition 4.27 an analogous explanation can be given
as the one provided for the corresponding items of Proposition 4.11. Items 1 through
4 formalise the (non-)validities that were explained to be desirable in Example 4.18.
Item 5 concerns the universal characterisation of ability for repetitive composition: the
equivalence given in this item is also valid for both j= and j=

. Items 6 and 7 are again
related to items 1 and 2.
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4.3.2 External nondeterminism and pessimistic agents
At the beginning of Section 4.3 it was explained that for agents with a pessimistic
view on their abilities for sequentially composed actions, the introduction of external
nondeterministic actions would not necessarily have to lead to a complete change of the
semantics for the non-core formulae. In particular it is no longer necessary to unravel
actions in order to come up with an adequate semantics. The purpose of this section is to
dene a semantics for the language L
+
that is essentially a more or less straightforward
extension of the semantics given for L. To this end we use elements of the semantics for
Concurrent Propositional Dynamic Logic (CPDL) as it was given by Peleg [101].
In CPDL the class of actions of regular PDL is extended with an action constructor









in parallel'. The semantics that Peleg proposes to interpret the extended class of














)i') comes out valid. Re-
placing \ by + this is exactly the equivalence () which was assumed to characterise
external nondeterminism as far as results and opportunities are concerned
3
. Our idea
therefore is on the one hand to adapt the semantics given by Peleg to make it suitable
for our class of actions (which diers from the class of actions considered in regular
PDL), and on the other hand to extend this semantics in order to interpret abilities in
such a way that equivalence () is validated. From a technical point of view there is no
reason to propose an alternative to the semantics presented for external nondeterminism
and optimistic agents. That is, a slight modication of the function c
+
would suce to
formalise external nondeterminism and pessimistic agents. The main reason for propos-
ing another semantics here is that this alternative semantics is an elegant one, which
is furthermore based on an approved one, viz. the semantics for CPDL as proposed by
Peleg. The fundamental idea underlying Peleg's semantics is that actions are no longer
seen as state-transitions but as transitions between states and sets of states. An event
do
i
() corresponds to a set of pairs (s; U) with the intuitive interpretation that  can be
executed by i in s, in parallel, to reach all states from U . In our interpretation of actions,
the resulting set U of states formalises all states of aairs that an agent has to consider
as possibly resulting from it executing . The formula hdo
i
()i' is now true in a state
s of a model M if there is some set U  S such that execution of  in s by i leads to the
set U , which is such that ' holds in all the states that are in U
4
. For technical reasons
3
The resemblance between the concurrency operator \ and our external nondeterministic operator +,
as far as opportunities and results are concerned, is not very surprising if one considers that Peleg explicitly
states that in his approach concurrency is viewed as the dual notion of nondeterminism, where Peleg's
notion of nondeterminism is identical to internal nondeterminism in our approach.
4
Conceptually this interpretation of hdo
i
()i' is highly similar to that of the belief formula B
i
' in
the local reasoning approach of Fagin & Halpern [31]. The basic idea underlying the local reasoning
approach is that of an agent of which the beliefs are spread out over various frames of reference. Formally
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this set U is not dened to be the result of application of some function applied to i; 
and s, but as the second element of a pair (s; U) for which a certain relation holds, i.e.
we switch from a functional denition to a relational one. Abilities are still interpreted
by a function applied to an action, an agent and a state and yielding a truth value.
4.28. Definition. The binary relation j=
+;0
between a formula from L
+
and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L
+






































































































































































(i; while' do od)(s) = 1 i 9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0










































































(i; confirm:') [ r
+;0
(i; confirm';)  T
and LFP yields the least xed point of a function
this amounts to the agent considering various sets U of states, corresponding to its frames of reference,
doxastically possible, while believing a formula if it is true in all the states of at least one such U .
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The denition of r
+;0
for atomic actions, conrmations and conditional compositions
is as usual and does not need any explanation; the same holds for the denition of c
+;0























































for while-loops is a little more elaborate than the corresponding denition
of r as given in Chapter 3. The reason for this is that an action while' do od may
no longer be equated with its set of computation sequences, since this would force all




od to be of the same length,
which leads to undesirable consequences.
























 M; t j=
+;0






:p for k = 1; 21; 22






















; confirm:'), we do












od). Due to the fact that the possible






























The counterintuitive situation encountered in Example 4.29 does not occur when
employing the denition using xed points as presented in 4.28. Since the operator  is

















monotone, for every ';  and i. By the Knaster-Tarski theorem [23, 124] this ensures
that the least xed point of F
(i;confirm ';)
exists. Without further proof we state that






















for a limit ordinal 








































for all k > 2
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Thus r
+;0



















od), which is as intuitively desired.


































The denition of c
+;0
for both the sequential composition and the repetitive com-
position makes an essential use of the pessimistic view of agents on their abilities. In






it is demanded that execution of 
1
by agent i ter-





in all the states that together constitute the set of result states of execution of 
1
by i it has to be the case that i has the ability to perform 
2











), in which it is taken
into account that execution of 
1
by i may lead to a set of result states rather than
a single state. The denition of c
+;0
(i; while' do od) is based on the idea that in
the pessimistic approach while-loops are A-realisable. Hence for an agent to be able
to perform the action while' do od in a state s it has to be the case that some
set U exists with (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; while' do od). Now the agent has to be able to
execute all of the nite computation sequences of while' do od of which execution
leads to a state that is in U . For instance, in Example 4.29 it is indeed the case




od by i in s terminates. The set of nite compu-
tation sequences 
0













2 U are (confirm p; a
1
); confirm:p, (confirm p; a
2
); (confirm p; a
1
); confirm:p
and (confirm p; a
2
); (confirm p; a
2
); confirm:p. Hence agent i is capable of performing




od i it is able to perform all these three actions, which is indeed as
intuitively desired.
As shown in Denition 4.28, it is perfectly possible to incorporate a formalisation of
ability when using Peleg's approach as long as pessimistic agents are involved. However,
it is hard to see how the same could be done for optimistic agents. As mentioned above,
both in the denition of c
+;0
for sequential compositions and for repetitive compositions
we essentially use some properties that are inherently due to the pessimistic view on
ability, and these denitions are not easily adapted to an optimistic view on ability.
In the following proposition the semantics given in Denition 4.28 above is related to








sets of states in M.




in M we have:
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) for some s
0
2 U))
3. (s; U) 2 r
+;0













where jU j denotes the cardinality of U .
The rst item of Proposition 4.30 formalises the idea that every state s
0
in the set
of states resulting from i executing an action  in s is reachable, and has in fact been
reached, by i executing a particular nite computation sequence of . The second item
states that the notion of ability as formalised through the c
+;0
function may, under certain
conditions, be seen as dened in terms of ability over nite computation sequences. The
third item states two properties of the function r
+;0
, the rst of these being the fact that
result sets of states are not empty. This property is essential for the denition of j=
+;0
for dynamic formulae to be correct. For if a result set is allowed to be empty, this could
lead to the formula hdo
i
(fail)i> being satisable. The second property formalised in
the third item states that all actions  are, as Peleg calls it, nitely branched. This
niteness of branching is a consequence of the boundedness of the nondeterminism that
we consider.
The semantics dened through the j=
+;0
relation indeed combines the validities de-
rived for the pessimistic approach in Chapter 3 with the equivalences () and () that
characterise external nondeterminism. The following three propositions, the explanation
of which has been given previously, summarise the various (in)validities that characterise
results, opportunities and abilities for composite actions in the pessimistic approach.










































































4.32. Proposition. For i 2 A we have:
 [do
i




()] ) is not for all  2 Ac
+












()] holds for all  2 Ac
+
,  2 L
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4.3.3 Practical possibility and forced choice
The problems that occurred with dening the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate
in the presence of internal nondeterminism, do not arise in the presence of external




is such that the aforementioned
predicates display an intuitively acceptable behaviour when dened by the syntactical
abbreviations proposed in Chapter 3.
4.34. Definition. For  2 Ac
+
























That the behaviour of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate is indeed intu-
itively acceptable when dened as above, is shown in the following proposition.











































































In Proposition 4.35 it is expressed in a nice way that the external choice is completely
out of the control of the agent. In particular the fact that the implication in the last item
of Proposition 4.35 is not valid seems reasonable: for should the agent conclude from the




is either incorrect or infeasible to bring about ', that it




is incorrect or infeasible to bring about ', it seems to have
some knowledge concerning the choice that the external environment makes or is going to
make. But this would ercely contradict our intuitive ideas on external nondeterminism
as formulated in Section 4.1.
Using the Propositions 4.25 and 4.27, it is easily checked which of the validities given
in Propositions 3.18 and 3.19 in Chapter 3 do also hold for j=
+
. Since in Propositions 4.31
and 4.33 the same validities are found to hold for j=
+;0
that were found to hold for j=
0
, the
validities given in Section 3.3 to characterise the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate
do also hold for j=
+;0
.
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4.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we dealt with both internal and external nondeterminism, by extending
the class of action constructors with two new constructors, viz.  , representing the
internal nondeterministic combination of two actions, and + , denoting the external
nondeterministic combination of two actions. When performing an internal nondeter-
ministic action, the agent itself makes the (angelic) choice as to which action to perform,
whereas when performing an external nondeterministic choice some unspecied external
environment makes the (possibly demonic) choice. Due to the presence of abilities in
our formal system the common approaches towards nondeterminism as they have been
proposed in the literature, can not always and not straightforwardly be used. To deal
with internal nondeterminism we proposed a semantics in which actions are unravelled
into their elementary constituents. This semantics is applicable both for optimistic and
pessimistic agents. The denitions of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as
proposed in the previous chapter to model the practical possibilities of agents, have to
be reconsidered in the presence of internal nondeterminism. When formalising external
nondeterminism we distinguished between optimistic and pessimistic agents. For op-
timistic agents we proposed a semantics based on an elaborate and subtle unravelling
of actions whereas for pessimistic agents we dened a semantics which extends the one
proposed by Peleg to model concurrency in propositional dynamic logic. It turns out
that the denition of known practical (im)possibility as proposed in the previous chapter
is also applicable when external nondeterministic actions are considered.
4.4.1 Possible extensions
The most obvious and desirable extension of the formalisms presented in this chapter is a
semantics in which internal nondeterminism and external nondeterminism are combined.
Examples 4.2 and 4.18 indicate that the presence of abilities in our framework makes that
the common approaches towards combinations of internal and external nondeterminism,
some of which are mentioned below, cannot straightforwardly be applied. We feel that,
although perhaps some clues may be found when combining the results of this chapter
with some of the results found in the literature, a lot of research is necessary to come
up with an adequate and intuitively acceptable account in which external and internal
nondeterminism are combined in the presence of abilities, results and opportunities.
4.4.2 Bibliographical notes
The semantics based on unravelling given in this chapter was originally presented in
[55]; the extension of Peleg's semantics used to deal with external nondeterminism and
abilities was dened especially for this occasion.
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Nondeterminism has been subject of intensive research in the theoretical computer
science community (see for example [2, 11, 50]). Rather than providing a complete
overview of the various formalisms proposed to model nondeterminism, we restrict our-
selves to some approaches that, like our approach, are rooted in dynamic logic. It is
important to remark that none of these approaches deals with ability: all are restricted
to dening a semantics for dynamic formulae. The rst of these approaches is dynamic
logic itself: the action constructor + , which, to make things easy, denotes the nonde-
terminism that we call internal, is an element of the set of standard action constructors
for regular PDL [46]. The approach of Peleg [101], in which (internal) nondeterminism
and concurrency are combined, and the variant proposed by Goldblatt [43], could be seen
as formalisms in which internal and external nondeterminism are combined for results
and opportunities. The semantics dened by Peleg, which is in a slightly modied form
also used by Goldblatt, served as the foundation for our semantics of external nondeter-
minism for pessimistic agents. Another approach that we would like to mention is the
one proposed by Meyer [93]. In the semantics of Meyer so-called `_-sets' and `^-sets' are
used. The ^-sets can be seen as corresponding to the union of the results sets as it is















). The approaches of Peleg, Goldblatt and Meyer combine inter-
nal and external nondeterminism for dynamic formulae, but are not as easily adapted
to jointly deal with internal and external nondeterminism in the presence of abilities,
since the counterintuitive situation formalised in Example 4.2 does occur in all three
approaches.
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Proof: Let M 2 M
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and ' 2 L

be arbitrary. We















































































































































































































































































Proof: The rst item follows since CS

(confirm') = confirm', and r

(i; confirm')(s)
is dened as is r(i; confirm')(s). Items 3 and 6 are obvious, and item 4 is proved in
a similar way as item 2. Here we show items 2 and 5. Let M 2 M








and  2 L

be arbitrary.
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()] , which suces to conclude item 5.
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 od$ :' _ (' ^A
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; while' do od)
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while' do od) is not for all ' 2 L
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while' do od))! A
i
while' do od
Proof: We show the rst two items; items 3, 4 and 5 are obvious and 6 and 7 are shown
in a similar way as 1 and 2.
1. Assume that i 2 A and a
k




i be such that





































































which suces to conclude that M is a counterexample to item 1.
2. Let M 2M
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we conclude that item 2 holds.

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For this model it holds that






























































These three properties of M suce to conclude that it shows both items of Proposi-
tion 4.16.
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Proof: The second and fourth item are easily shown and left to the reader. The proofs
of items 7 and 8 are rather elaborate and fairly complicated and not given here. The
interested reader is kindly referred to [53] where these proofs are presented in all detail.
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Items 5 and 6 are shown by induction on the structure of , using items 1 through 4 of
this proposition in the proof of item 6. Here we show the rst and the third item.










; s) = 0, and secondly



























; s) = 0. With this the contraposition of the implication given
above | and thereby the implication itself | is proved.
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; s) = 0 we conclude that (the contraposition of)
item 1 holds.
3. Assume that Ter
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, may not end in a conrmation for :'. Hence
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(). Dene the action  in any of the three cases given
above as follows:
  = 
00
  = (confirm';
0
1





  = (confirm';
0
1
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Now  = j; confirm:'j
+
m





(i; )(s) 6= ;. Since m  k this contradicts the denition of k as given above.




) = 1, which was to be shown.
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Proof: Let M 2 M
+






and ' 2 L
+
be arbitrary. We















































































































































































































4.26. Proposition. For i 2 A we have:
 [do
i




()] ) is not for all  2 Ac
+












()] holds for all  2 Ac
+
,  2 L
+
Proof: First note that Denition 4.22 implies that for M a model with state s, and for
i 2 A,  2 Ac
+
and ' 2 L
+






















'). The rst item is now shown by considering the model
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) = 0, (p; s
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) = 1, (q; s
1
) = 0 = (q; s
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 R is arbitrary
















For this model it holds that


































































































These three properties of M suce to conclude that it is a countermodel to the rst
item of Proposition 4.26. The second item is a consequence of the fth item of Propo-
sition 4.23, in which it is stated that CR
+
M
(i; ; s) 6= ; for all i 2 A,  2 Ac
+
and states
s. For this implies that always some 
0





(i; ; s), while j=
+
 
suces to conclude that for this 
0


















sets of states in M.




in M we have:


































) for some s
0
2 U))
3. (s; U) 2 r
+;0













where jU j denotes the cardinality of U .
Proof: The rst and the second item are shown by applying induction on an appropriate
ordering on actions. The third item is a slight extension of a proof given by Peleg [101],
and the fourth item follows directly from the rst one. Here we sketch the proof of the
rst item. To show this item we prove the following two implications:






























The `)'-case is shown by induction on the subaction ordering < which is dened as the








































5. confirm';  while' do od













The well-foundedness of < is shown using the lexicographic path ordering, the technique
which was also applied in the soundness and completeness proofs of Chapter 3. We show
`)' for the case that  is a repetitive composition; the other cases are more easy and
left to the reader.
To show the case for repetitive compositions, let i 2 A, ' 2 L
+
and  2 Ac
+
be such
that for some model M with state s it holds that (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; while' do od) while
s
0
2 U . Assume that F
k
is dened as on page 87. Then it holds that (s; U) 2 F
l
for some




















(i; confirm:'), it follows that (s; U) 2 F
0
implies U = fsg and
M; s j=
+;0
'. Then it holds that (s; fsg) 2 r
+;0
(i; confirm:') while confirm:' 2
CS
+
(while' do od), which suces to conclude the case for k = 0.
k 7! k + 1: If (s; U) 2 F
k+1
, then either (s; U) 2 F
0





. If (s; U) 2 F
0
then the case is shown as above. So assume that (s; U) 2
r
+;0
(i; confirm';)  F
k













; : : :g) 2 r
+;0












plying the induction hypothesis for k we have that some  2 CS
+
(while' do od)










. By induction on < some
 2 CS
+




(i; ). Then by denition of
CS
+
we have that ;  2 CS
+




(i; ; ) the
statement follows for k + 1.
k is a limit-ordinal: This case follows directly by induction hypothesis.
Since the case holds for all k, it in particular holds for F
l
, which, since (s; U) was assumed
to be in F
l
, suces to conclude `)'.
The case for `(' is also shown by induction on the subaction ordering. Again we
sketch this case for repetitive compositions. Assume that (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; while' do od)











to show that s
0






= s, and U = fsg,
which indeed implies that s
0
2 U . So assume that M; s j=
+;0
'. It is obvious that in this
case (confirm'; ), with  2 CS
+
(), is a prex of 
0













; : : :


















the induction hypothesis it follows that s
1
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) is a member



























= (confirm'; ); 
0
.








and we are done. Otherwise we proceed analogously
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until we reach the state s
0




:', this process terminates.
From the proofs of the cases `)' and `(' we conclude that the claim stated in item
1 of Proposition 4.30 holds for repetitive compositions.
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Proof: We show the rst, second, fourth and fth item, leaving the third item to the
reader. Let M 2M
+






and ';  2 L
+
be arbitrary.
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0
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(while' do od)i 
, 9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0




 for all s
0
2 U)






 for all s
0
2 U)









 for all s
0
2 U)
, 9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; confirm:') [ r
+;0







 for all s
0
2 U)






 for all s
0
2 U) or
9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0







 for all s
0
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9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; confirm';)  r
+;0





 for all s
0
2 U)
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, M; s j=
+;0
(:' ^  ) or
9U((s; U) 2 r
+;0




 for all s
0
2 U)
, M; s j=
+;0




((confirm';); while' do od)i 
, M; s j=
+;0




(while' do od)i )
The last equivalence but one comprises three steps: in the rst two of these,
hdo
i







(while' do od)i , which, using the rst item, is trans-
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 od)i .












































































































4.32. Proposition. For i 2 A we have:
 [do
i




()] ) is not for all  2 Ac
+












()] holds for all  2 Ac
+
,  2 L
+
Proof: First note that Denition 4.28 implies that for M a model with state s, and
for i 2 A,  2 Ac
+
and ' 2 L
+













')). The rst item is now shown by the same model used
to show the rst item of Proposition 4.26. The second item follows from the third item
of Proposition 4.30. For then all the sets U such that (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; ) are nonempty,
while j=
+;0
 guarantees that all the states s
0






















































































Proof: We show the second and fourth item; the other items are similar to previously
proved ones. Let M 2M
+






and ' 2 L
+
be arbitrary.


















































































To show the fourth itemwe prove that ifM; s j=
+;0









(confirm';); while' do od, which, using items 1 and 2, suces to
conclude that item 4 indeed holds. To this end we use the following lemma, the proof of





4.36. Lemma. Let M be a model with state s and let U be a set of states in M. For
all i 2 A, ' 2 L
+






((s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; while' do od), (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; (confirm';); while' do od))
Now let M with state s be such that M; s j=
+;0









(confirm';); while' do od by proving
two implications.




while' do od, i.e. c
+;0
(i; while' do od)(s) = 1. This
implies that for some set U of states in M, (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; while' do od) and
8s
0
2 U8 2 CS
+




(i; ) ) c
+;0
(i; )(s) = 1). Now
since M; s j=
+;0
' it follows that (s; U) 2 r
+;0
(i; (confirm';); while' do od) by
Lemma 4.36. Let s
0
2 U and assume that  2 CS
+
((confirm';); while' do od) is




(); such a  exists by Proposition 4.30(1). Now, by deni-
tion of CS
+
, we have  2 CS
+
(while' do od). Since c
+;0
(i; while' do od)(s) = 1
it follows by the left-to-right implication of the second item of Proposition 4.30 that
c
+;0
(i; )(s) = 1. By the right-to-left implication of the same item it follows that
c
+;0
(i; (confirm';); while' do od)(s) = 1, which is necessary and sucient to




(confirm';); while' do od.




(confirm';); while' do od. From this it follows that
c
+;0
(i; confirm';)(s) = 1 and some set U of states exists such that (s; U) 2
r
+;0
(i; confirm';) and c
+;0
(i; while' do od)(s
0
) = 1 for all s
0





; : : :g. Then c
+;0
(i; while' do od)(s
k















lows that (s; V ) 2 r
+;0
(i; confirm';)  r
+;0
(i; while' do od), which, by the fact
that r
+;0
(i; while' do od) is a xed point of F
(i;confirm';)
, implies that (s; V ) 2
r
+;0
(i; while' do od). Now let s
0
2 V . By the rst item of Proposition 4.30 it




(i; ) for some  2 CS
+
(while' do od). Since M; s j=
+;0
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' it follows that  2 CS
+
((confirm';); while' do od). From the fact that
c
+;0
(i; (confirm';); while' do od)(s) = 1 it follows by the left-to-right implica-
tion of the second item of Proposition 4.30 that c
+;0
(i; )(s) = 1. By the right-to-left
implication of the second item of Proposition 4.30, c
+;0
(i; while' do od)(s) = 1,




while' do od, which was to be shown.

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Chapter 5
Intelligent information agents
Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand?
Come, let me clutch thee.
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
Shakespeare, `Macbeth, Act 2, Scene 1'.
In this chapter we present a framework that allows one to formalise intelligent information
agents, which are agents that manipulate information, usually on the authority of some
user they assist with his/her informationmanagement. The formalisation that we present
concerns the agents' informational attitudes, the actions that they may perform and the
interaction between these notions. We consider various notions of belief that dier in
the degree of credibility that is attached to them. In combination with knowledge,
which is treated as the most credible kind of belief, these notions constitute the agents'
informational attitudes. In addition we formalise special, so-called informative actions.
By performing an informative action an agent may aect a designated region of its beliefs,
i.e. each of the informative actions is associated with a special part of the agent's beliefs.
The informative actions that we propose can be seen as corresponding to three dierent
ways in which an agent can acquire information, viz. through observations, through
communication, and by making assumptions by default. Of these, observations are
considered to yield information with the highest credibility, whereas information adopted
by default is assumed to have the lowest degree of credibility. In general, whenever an
agent successfully executes an informative action all regions of the same, or, in the case
of communication, another agent's beliefs are modied of which the credibility is at most
that of the information acquired as the result of executing the informative action. To
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account for this modication of an agent's beliefs we interpret informative actions as
model-transformers, rather than the more common interpretation of actions as state-
transitions that was employed in the previous chapters. This interpretation is such that
the changes in the beliefs of an agent brought about by execution of an informative action
comply with the well-known AGM postulates for belief revision. Abilities for informative
actions are used to formalise both the limited capacities of agents to acquire information
and the preference of one kind of information acquisition over another. As usual, we
conclude this chapter with a short summary, an indication of possible extensions, some
pointers to the relevant literature, and a collection of proofs of selected propositions.
5.1 Intelligent information agents
An important class of agents' implementations deals with agents that manipulate infor-
mation. These intelligent information agents as we call them are usually software agents
that assist a (computer) user with his/her information management, thereby helping the
user to sift his/her way through the information age. Agents like these may for instance
manage the user's email by automatically sorting or forwarding incoming email mes-
sages. Also implemented agents exist that manage the Usenet newsgroups for a user, for
instance by ltering out messages that it considers (ir)relevant for the user. The essence
of these intelligent information agents is the interaction between their acts and their in-
formation: on the one hand these agents perform actions based on the information they
have, on the other hand they may perform actions to acquire additional information.
The agents that we formalise in this chapter may be seen as (moderately) intelligent
information agents that have three possible sources of information at their disposal. The
rst of these is an exogenous source of information and consists of observations that
an agent makes about the current world. The software agents implemented at the MIT
Media Laboratory [88, 89, 90] use this source of information to learn about the user they
are assisting. The second source is also an exogenous one and is constituted by the infor-
mation that other agents communicate. For example, the intelligent information agent
that assists some user with his/her information management on the World Wide Web
may contact an agent at another site to nd out about the availability of technical re-
ports that it deems relevant for the user. The third information source is an endogenous
one and consists of the possibility to adopt assumptions by default. An agent may for
instance assume by default that its user will be interested in incoming email concerning a
workshop on information agents (for example since it knows that the user is interested in
agents in general). All these kinds of information acquisition are formalised by so-called
informative actions, to be performed by the agents. Before we introduce these actions,
we rst elaborate on the degree of credibility of, and the possibility of conicts between,
information.
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5.2 A classication of information
In any situation in which an agent is busy acquiring information, the possibility of
conicts exists. That is, newly acquired information may contradict already present,
previously acquired information. Since the information of (rational) agents is in general
demanded to be non-absurd, it has to be decided how these information conicts are to
be solved. According to the most well known paradigm to information change, the AGM
axiomatisation for belief change due to Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [1, 38, 39],
priority should be given to the most recently acquired information. That is, in the case of
a conict between new, incoming information and already present information, the rst
should prevail. However, in the presence of various dierent sources of information, as
is the case in our setting, the principle of priority to most recently acquired information
no longer takes root. For one of the sources may be more credible than another one, a
situation which applies to our framework, which should imply that information acquired
from the former, more credible source should always prevail over that acquired from the
latter one, regardless of the order in which the information is acquired. The strategy that
we propose to replace the AGM paradigm is therefore that incoming information only
causes a revision if it does not conict with already present information of at least the
same credibility; if a revision indeed takes place then it should be performed to comply
as much as possible with the AGM postulates for belief revision.
To formalise these intuitive ideas we need a way to attach a degree of credibility both
to the information that an agent has, and to the sources used to acquire (additional)
information. The credibility ordering of the three sources of information as we propose
it, is a rather straightforward one: roughly speaking, observations are more credible than
communication and default assumptions, and communication is more credible than de-
fault reasoning (more details can be found in Sections 5.5 to 5.7). In order to impose a
credibility ordering on the information of an agent, we propose to structure this informa-
tion into four sets, situated within each other. The innermost of these sets contains the
knowledge of the agent. Knowledge can be seen as the most credible kind of information
available to the agent. This information is in particular such that it is never modied as
the result of the execution of an informative action. The set directly encompassing the
agent's knowledge contains the observational beliefs of the agent. These are the beliefs
that an agent has on the ground of its knowledge and the observations it has made. The
third set contains the communicational beliefs of an agent. These are the combined be-
liefs that it either knows or acquired through observations and/or communication. The
outermost set contains the default beliefs. These are the beliefs for which application
of a default may have been a necessary condition. The credibility of a belief formula
is determined by the smallest belief set that it is a member of, i.e. formulae that are
known have the highest credibility whereas formulae that are believed by default have
108 Chapter 5. Intelligent information agents
the lowest one.
In the spirit of Hintikka's representation of belief [48], we use operators B
x
to refer to
the various notions of belief that we formalise. The formula B
o
i
' denotes that ' belongs
to the observational beliefs of agent i, B
c
i




' denotes that i believes ' by default. In addition to these doxastic
operators, the language L
I
furthermore contains an operator D
;
, which is used to model
the dependence or authorisation relations between agents: D
i;j
' denotes that agent i
accepts j as an authority on the subject '. The relevance of this operator will be made
clear in Section 5.6. The class Ac
I
of actions is built up from the core constructors and
three new constructors, viz. observe , inform ( ; ) and try jump . Whenever f is a
propositional formula, observe f is the action consisting of observing whether f holds,
and try jump f is the action of adopting f by default. For f 2 L
0
and j 2 A, the action
inform (f; j) formalises the act of telling agent j that f holds. It is obvious that if one is
to model realistic communication, more than one agent should be present, which explains
the constraint that A contains at least two elements in Denition 5.1. The demand for
niteness is explained in Remark 5.32.
5.1. Definition. To dene the language L
I
, it is demanded that the set A of agents,
on which L
I
is founded, is nite and contains at least two elements. The alphabet is






, the dependence operator D
;
and the action constructors observe , try jump and inform ( ; ). The language L
I
is
the smallest superset of  such that the core clauses are validated and furthermore
 if ' 2 L
I















 if ' 2 L
I






is the smallest superset of At closed under the core clauses and such that
 if f 2 L
0
and j 2 A then observe f 2 Ac
I
, inform (f; j) 2 Ac
I
and try jump f 2 Ac
I
5.2. Remark. Both for reasons of practical convenience and notational uniformity, we
sometimes use B
k
, which may be read as denoting known beliefs, to represent K .
The restriction to propositional formulae as appearing as arguments of the action
constructors modelling information acquisition is dictated by the limits of the AGM
paradigm for belief revision. For execution of an informative action will in general cause
the beliefs of the agent that executes the action to be revised. The AGM paradigm
describes how non-consecutive changes of belief are to be implemented for propositional
formulae [1, 38, 39]; several extensions and modications of the AGM axiomatisation
deal with iterated changes of belief with propositional formulae [22, 77, 81]. Changes
of belief with other formulae, and in particular with epistemic or doxastic formulae, are
not equally well understood. It is for instance not at all clear what it means to revise
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the beliefs of some agent i with the formula p ^ :B
o
i




p as the result of a revision of its beliefs with this formula? For believing the
formula would imply that the agent both believes that it believes p and believes that it
does not believe p, which would render its beliefs inconsistent
1
. Having said so, it must
be remarked that a restriction to propositional formulae is for our framework in fact too








)i(p^ q), or any other formula of which truth does
not depend on informational attitudes, do not cause any problems. Both for reasons of
convenience and since an extension to this kind of formulae is not substantially dierent,
we have decided to maintain the restriction to propositional formulae.
The models that are used to interpret formulae from L
I
contain, besides the core
elements, functions to interpret the various doxastic operators and the dependence op-
erator. By imposing certain constraints upon the functions interpreting the doxastic
operators, we ensure that these operators validate certain intuitive desiderata. Most of
these desiderata stem from our view on knowledge and belief, which is to a large extent in
line with the predominant one in AI and computer science. That is, the main dierence
between knowledge and belief is that the latter notion is not necessarily veridical, but
validates the weaker demand of consistency, or non-absurdness. Hence an agent does not
believe inconsistent (absurd) formulae, and has positive and negative introspection on
its beliefs. Although beliefs in general are not veridical, we feel that the observational
beliefs of an agent are. For these are the things that the agent believes because it saw
them with its own eyes, and, assuming that the agent's eyesight is reliable, are there-
fore certainly true. Hence the observational beliefs of agents are not only consistent,
but even veridical
2
. The other beliefs of an agent are not veridical: an agent may tell
another agent things that turn out to be false (even though the rst agent believed them
to be true), and beliefs adopted by default are not necessarily true, by the very nature
of defaults.
To formalise all of these desiderata we propose a semantics for the doxastic operators
which is based on the use of so-called belief clusters [94]. In essence, belief clusters are
nothing but (sub)sets of possible worlds that together constitute a designated body of
belief of an agent. In the special way that we use them, belief clusters are sets of worlds,
situated within each other, that each represent a set of beliefs of a certain credibility. A
1
Formulae of this kind are considered by Thijsse ([125], pp. 131-132) to represent non-contradictory
sentences but contradictory utterances. This implies that although the sentence in itself is consistent, it
is not consistent to believe the sentence.
2
This veridicality of observational belief, which turns it de facto into a kind of knowledge, raises the
philosophical question whether there is room for two kinds of knowledge, living alongside each other. In
our opinion this room indeed exists. The argument supporting this view dates back to Kant [66], who
postulated that knowledge can be distinguished in a priori knowledge, belonging to pure reason, and a
posteriori knowledge, which is acquired through experience. Adopting this point of view, our kind of
knowledge can be seen as a priori while observational beliefs denote a kind of a posteriori knowledge.
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formula is believed with a certain credibility i it holds at all the possible worlds in the
associated belief cluster, i.e. the doxastic operators are interpreted as necessity opera-
tors over their associated belief clusters. Corresponding to the idea that knowledge is
the most credible kind of belief, the knowledge cluster is the largest, outmost one. The
other belief clusters are successively situated inside the knowledge cluster. That is, the
knowledge cluster may contain several observational belief clusters, each corresponding
with a certain observation that the agent has made, inside of which a communicational
belief and a default belief cluster are situated. We propose that each observational belief
cluster contains a unique communicational and default belief cluster. The reason for the
non-uniqueness of the observational belief clusters lies in the history of origin of these
clusters. For the idea is that these clusters come forth from observations that the agent
has made, and since the eect of observations depends on the state of the world, obser-
vations in dierent states of aairs may result in dierent observational belief clusters.
The uniqueness of the communicational and default belief clusters stems from the fact
that these beliefs have no objective standard to which they are measured. Therefore,
it does not seem to make much sense to let communication or default reasoning result
in dierent belief clusters rather than one cluster. Having said so, it must be remarked
that in Section 5.9 we propose one possible interpretation of multiple communicational
belief clusters.
5.3. Definition. A modelM for the language L
I
is a tuple containing the core elements,
three functions B
o
: A ! }(S  S), B
c
: A  S ! }(S) and B
d
: A  S ! }(S) which
yield the various sets of doxastic alternatives of an agent in a state, and a function
D : A  A ! S ! }(L
I
), used to interpret dependence relations. The B-functions are





(i) is an equivalence relation
 B
d
(i; s) 6= ;
 B
d
(i; s)  B
c





























is dened analogously to [s]
R(i)
.
As hinted at above, the doxastic operators are interpreted as necessity operators over
their associated belief clusters.
5.4. Definition. The binary relation j=
I
between a formula from L
I
and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L
I
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When interpreting the doxastic operators as in Denition 5.4 for the models given
in Denition 5.3, these operators indeed validate the desiderata formulated above. It
is in particular the case that these operators may be compared according to credibility
(Proposition 5.5), and that they validate the desired axiomatisations (Proposition 5.6).


























g, and for all ' 2 L
I
we have that if X  Y then j=
I
X'! Y'.



































Since the doxastic operators model essentially dierent informational attitudes, one
does obviously not want these operators to collapse. For a certain class of formulae,
however, certain combinations of doxastic operators do collapse. To formalise this prop-
erty we extend the notion of i-doxastic sequenced formulae as introduced by Van der
Hoek [51] for a system containing knowledge and (plain) belief to deal with the doxastic
operators that we consider.
5.7. Definition. A formula  2 L
I






























5.8. Proposition. For all i-doxastic sequenced formulae  2 L
I
, for all ' 2 L
I
and


































:X' is not for all ' 2 L
I
valid
The rst item of Proposition 5.8 implies that i-doxastic sequenced formulae are ob-
servationally believed by agent i i they are communicationally believed i they are





. The last two items of Proposition 5.8 state that the propositions formulated
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in items 2 and 3 do not hold when swapping X and K
i
in the left-hand side of the
equivalence. That is, it is for instance not the case that whenever agent i observationally
believes ' it also knows that it does so. For observational beliefs this is obvious: since B
o
i





 , which would collapse knowledge
and observational beliefs. That these non-validities then also apply for communicational
beliefs and default beliefs, i.e. agents do not necessarily know that they believe something
by default if they do so, is a consequence of the formal implementation of the various
doxastic operators. For it is demanded that each observational belief cluster contains a
unique communicational and default belief cluster, but since various observational be-
lief clusters may be situated within one knowledge cluster, it does not follow that each
knowledge cluster contains its own unique communicational and default belief cluster.
The last two items of Proposition 5.8 are perhaps not for everyone completely accept-
able from an intuitive point of view, i.e. it seems quite reasonable to demand agents to
know of all their beliefs. However, as Corollary 5.9 states, agents are aware of all their
information at the level of their observational beliefs, which is a level with a considerable
degree of credibility attached to it.
5.9. Corollary. For all ' 2 L
I





































and the credibility ordering between
them, it is possible to model exactly nine dierent informational attitudes of a given

















































































' `i is completely ignorant wrt ''
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The intuitive interpretation of the various formalised informational attitudes is given






', which states that
agent i does not observationally believe whether ' holds but does so on the level of its
communicational beliefs, is taken to represent that i was told that ' holds, i.e. some other
agent communicated to i that ' is the case. To enhance the reasoning with and about
the agents' informational attitudes we introduce the following predicates by denitional
abbreviation:






























As mentioned above, the Heard
i
operator does not formalise hearing per se, but
rather believing on the basis of being told. For one cannot prevent an agent from being
told inconsistencies, or formulae that it already knew or believed observationally. How-
ever, hearing these formulae does not modify the beliefs of the agent that are grounded
in the things that it has been told.
5.11. Remark. Note that the denition of Ignorant
x
i

































', respectively. To emphasise that the agent is gen-




denition of the derived belief operators, even though we feel free to use the condensed
version whenever convenient.
To characterise the derived informational operators introduced in Denition 5.10 we
investigate in a structured way which of the axioms of modal logic given by Chellas [19]
are validated by the various operators.
5.12. Proposition. Let ';  2 L
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That the K-axiom holds for all three derived belief operators might look somewhat
surprising at rst sight. However, validity of this axiom has everything to do with the
rationality of agents. Take the example of a rational agent grounding its belief in both
' and ' !  in its observations. Being the rational creature that it is, it is obvious
that it in any case observationally believes  . Again given the rationality of the agent
it cannot attach a higher credibility to  than to ' !  : for the latter is implied by
the former, and therefore the credibility attached to it is at least the credibility attached
to  . Hence both  and ' !  are believed with the same strength, which explains
the validity of the K-axiom. Beliefs are consistent (the D-axiom), and beliefs that are
grounded in observations are furthermore veridical (the T-axiom). The rst property
is highly desirable for rational agents, the latter property is the essential characteristic
of beliefs acquired through observations (cf. [7], p. 12). That in general agents do not
have positive (4,4',4") and negative (5,5'5") introspection on the derived belief operators
is a direct consequence of Corollary 5.9. The validities given in the items 6 and 9 are
fairly conspicuous. They state that in certain circumstances agents may have positive
and negative introspection on the beliefs they acquired through observation, i.e. it is
possible that an agent saw that it saw ' because it saw '. Although these validities
are possibly not completely acceptable from an intuitive point of view, they are easily
explained from a technical point of view, viz. the denition of the derived operators and
the properties of the primitive doxastic operators. For whenever an agent i saw ' to hold,





' holds. If the agent














'. Analogous arguments can
be given to explain the reverse implication of item 6 and the equivalence of item 9. We
suggest that when appearing in formulae as given in items 6 and 9, the Saw
i
operator
should not be interpreted as `having seen' but instead simply as `observationally believing
but not knowing'. All derived belief operators validate the C-axiom, none validates the
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M-axiom, but all validate a variant of the M-axiom. The validity given in item 12 states
that if an agent believes a conjunction with a certain credibility and not with a higher
one, then it believes both conjuncts at least with the same credibility as attached to
the conjunction, while at least one of the conjuncts is believed with exactly the same
credibility. For example, if an agent believes ' ^  since it is told that this holds,
then it knows, saw, or was told both ' and  , while it believes either ' or  on the
ground of it being told this to be true. None of the operators satisfy necessitation (the
N-rule), the reason for this being the fact that valid propositions are already known,
and are therefore never grounded in observations, communication or default jumps. The
derived belief operators are in general not monotonic (the RM-rule), but satisfy some
kind of `upward monotonicity' (the RM'-rule), corresponding to the idea that whenever
some proposition is believed to a certain degree, weaker propositions might already be
believed to a higher degree (the degenerate case being one where the weaker propositions
are validities that are necessarily known to the agent). Finally, all derived belief operators
are closed under equivalence of (believed) propositions. Although it is sometimes argued
against this property (cf. [7], p. 18), it seems harmless for articial agents with perfect
reasoning capacities.
5.3 Informative actions as model-transformers
To treat informative actions as genuine, fully-edged actions, one has to decide both
upon an informal description of the result, opportunity and ability of these actions, i.e.
what is it that constitutes these notions, and upon a formal interpretation in terms of our
framework. The one notion that is most easily described is probably that of the result.
For although the results of dierent informative actions are dierent in that execution of
an observe f action will in general aect all of the beliefs of an agent whereas executing
try jump f aects only the agent's default beliefs, their common characteristic is that
they cause a modication, i.e. revision, of the agent's beliefs. With regard to opportunity
and ability these actions are much less similar. Therefore we focus at rst on the result
of informative actions, leaving the informal description as well as the formal denition
of ability and opportunity to the sections dealing with the respective actions.
If the result of execution of an informative action is somehow to modify the beliefs
of an agent, we have to ensure that this is formalised in our semantics. Our guideline
throughout dening the semantics is that whenever execution of an informative action
should cause a change in the agent's information, or better a revision of the agent's
beliefs, then it should do so in compliance with the AGM postulates for belief revision.
More in particular, we consider the notion of minimal change as sacrosanct, i.e. the
performance of an informative action should cause only those changes that are necessary
for the action to be informative. We can imagine at least two ways of dening an adequate
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formal semantics that complies with this guideline. The rst would be to interpret
informative actions as transitions to states that minimally dier from the starting state,
while the agent's beliefs have been revised appropriately. Given the fact that agents may
in principle perform arbitrary informative actions, this would probably require some
kind of fullness-condition to be imposed on the models. That is, for every agent i and
every state s in a model, every possible doxastic state, i.e. every state of the agent's
beliefs that could possibly result from some change in the beliefs of i in s in compliance
with the AGM postulates, should be present somewhere, i.e at some state s
0
, in the
model. Although it could be possible to formally dene this fullness-condition, it would
cause the models to be enormous, with a gigantic overhead of states that are possibly
never used in any reasoning of or about the agents. And even though the computational
intractability that would possibly be involved with this kind of enormous models is not
our primary concern, the ponderousness of this solution is. The second way of dening
adequate semantics for informative actions | which is the one that we will pursue |
is based on the idea that every state in a model is most similar to itself. Hence, if
one wants informative actions to aect the belief sets of an agent in some state while
causing as little change as possible, it might be a good idea to change just the doxastic
state of the agent, embodied through the B-functions, while leaving the state in itself
unaected. In this way one can easily ensure that informative actions result in the
appropriate changes in the agent's beliefs, while at the same time changing as little as
possible. Note that this suggested interpretation of informative actions as transforming
models is a generalisation of the standard paradigm of Propositional Dynamic Logic, in
which actions are interpreted as causing transitions between states.
The interpretation of informative actions as we dene it later on is such that the
models resulting from execution of an informative action in some state of some model M
resemble M in all aspects except (possibly) the B-functions. To account for this property
formally, we introduce the class of models similar to a given model.
5.13. Definition. Let M 2 M
I
be some model for L
I






models that (possibly) dier from M only in the B-functions.
To allow ordinary, mundane actions to occur alongside informative actions, we com-





used to interpret the non-core formulae. In Denition 5.3 we




that deals with the core actions; the more interesting part




, i.e. the part dealing with informative actions, is presented
in Sections 5.5 through 5.7.
5.14. Definition. The binary relation j=
I
between a formula ' 2 L
I
and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L
I
and a state s in M is for dynamic and ability formulae
dened by:
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(i; while' do od)(M
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; s) = 1
for some k 2 IN
c
I
(i; )(;) = 1
For an action  from Ac
I
it holds, just like for those from Ac in Chapter 3, that the
operator [do
i
()], with i 2 A, is normal, i.e. this operator validates both the K-axiom and
the N-rule. Thus interpreting actions as model-transformers rather than state-transitions
does not aect the normality of the dynamic operators [do
i
()]. The reason for this is
in fact fairly obvious: since validity is dened as truth in all models of a given class, it
suces to show that execution of an action transforms a model into another (well-formed)
model from that class.
5.15. Proposition. Let  2 Ac
I
be arbitrary. If for all M 2M
I
with state s and all
i 2 A, r
I






()] is a normal modal operator.
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5.16. Corollary. Let  2 Ac
I
be arbitrary. If for all M 2 M
I
with state s and all
i 2 A, r
I























For informative actions several interesting properties can be distinguished in addition
to those given in Chapter 2. Of these the most important one is informativeness,
which formally characterises the essence of informative actions, viz. their resulting in
the acquisition of information. The property of truthfulness is mainly important for
reliable informative actions, like observations. The idea is that the truth or falsity of
the proposition that is observed is not aected by the actual act of observing. Since we
more or less adopt a classical view on the world, in that all propositions are either true
or false, we do not have to worry about observations at a quantum level that themselves
determine the truth value of the proposition whose truth is observed.
In Proposition 5.18 we relate the additional properties introduced above with each
other and those of Chapter 2.
5.17. Definition. For  2 Ac
I
and ' 2 L
I
we dene:


























()]') ^ (:'! [do
i
()]:')
where the right-hand side of these denitions is to be understood as a schema in i.
5.18. Proposition. For all  2 Ac
I
and ' 2 L
I
we have:
 if  is realisable and x-informative with regard to ' then  is genuinely x-
informative with regard to '.
 if  is deterministic and genuinely x-informative with regard to ' then  is
x-informative with regard to '.
5.4 Generalised belief revision
To formalise the actual transformation of a model due to execution of an informative
action, we introduce three functions, viz. revise
x
with x 2 fd; c; og, which are used in
the denition of r
I
for informative actions. Informally, these functions take care of a
belief revision complying with the AGM postulates, but stretched over dierent levels
to ensure that the credibility ranking on the agent's beliefs is preserved. For example,
consider the case where an agent observes f to be true, and hence a revision of its ob-
servational beliefs with f should take place. If observational beliefs are still to imply
communicational and default beliefs, one should also revise the latter kinds of belief.
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Hence the revision should not only occur at the level of the agent's observational beliefs,
but should be stretched over the communicational and default beliefs as well. Essen-
tially, a revision can be seen as consisting of dropping some information and including
other information, while maintaining consistency. In our framework the information of
an agent is formalised through its set of (epistemic and) doxastic alternatives. A natural
implementation of the dropping and inclusion of information in terms of our frame-
work is therefore given by the inclusion and dropping of doxastic alternatives, where
the dropping of information corresponds to the inclusion of new worlds into the set of
doxastic alternatives of the agent and the inclusion of (new) information corresponds to
dropping some states from this set. The general idea behind the revisions formalised
through the revise
x
functions is that if incoming information f is suciently credible
to cause a modication of some set of beliefs while not contradicting these beliefs, then
it is straightforwardly added to this set by restricting the appropriate set of doxastic
alternatives to those that satisfy f . In the case that f does contradict the original set
of beliefs, which is, due to the veridicality of observational beliefs and the truthfulness
of observations, only possible for communicational and default beliefs, then the set of
beliefs is reset. That is, the new set of beliefs consists of the set of beliefs at the next level
of credibility combined with f . In terms of models this corresponds to resetting the set of
communicational belief alternatives to the observational belief alternatives satisfying f ,
and the default belief alternatives to the set of communicational belief alternatives that
satisfy f . As a consequence, the function revise
x
is for x 2 fd; cg not always dened.
More in particular, it is not possible to revise the beliefs of an agent i with f if :f is
believed by i with a higher level of credibility. For this would cause the latter set of
beliefs to be inconsistent, a possibility which is ruled out by Denition 5.3. When using
the functions revise
x
to interpret informative actions, i.e. in the denition of r
I
, it is
ensured that this kind of inappropriate use does not occur. That is, the denition of r
I
is such that revise
x
(i; f) is not applied in situations where i believes the negation of f
with a credibility higher than x. Thus, even though the revise
x
functions are not always
dened, they are when used as in the denition of r
I
for informative actions (which is
given in the following sections).
Below the revise
x
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that do not satisfy f , and Cl
eq
as the function that yields the
Cartesian product of a given set with itself.
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5.20. Proposition. For all M 2M
I
, s 2 M, i 2 A, f 2 L
0
it holds for x 2 fc; dg:
 revise
o




(i; f)(M; s) is dened, then revise
x
(i; f)(M; s) 2M
I
The following example is meant to shed some more light on the, rather elaborate,
denition of the revise
x
functions.































































 R(i) = S S
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g for u 2 S
 B
d
(i; u) = fsg for u 2 S






In Figure 5.1 we graphically depict how the model M changes as the result of applying
revise
o
(i; p) to M; s. The model M
0

















































































g. To guarantee well-denedness of M
0
, the set of communicational belief




























the set of default belief alternatives for agent i is not changed as compared





a reset of default belief
alternatives has taken place, which results in B
d
0
(i; u) = B
c
0





The revision implemented by the revise
x
functions for x = c; d is what we call
the All-is-Good (AiG) revision [84]. This kind of revision corresponds to a revision
based on full meet contraction in terms of the AGM framework (cf. [1, 38]). Full meet
revision constitutes the most rigorous way of revising beliefs under the AGM postulates.
For instance, a revision with :f of the beliefs of an agent that believes f results in it
believing only those formulae that are somehow implied by :f . Although this rigour of
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revision is in general considered unacceptable, in the following sections we will argue that
for our purposes AiG revision is acceptable. The revision implemented by the revise
o
function is in fact a trivial one, viz. an expansion. This corresponds to the idea that,
since observations are truthful and observational beliefs veridical, the need for a genuine
revision of observational beliefs never arises. In Propositions 5.23 and 5.24 we formulate
the relations between the revise
x
functions and the AGM framework. To this end we
introduce some additional terminology.
5.22. Definition. For M 2M
I
, s in M, i 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and x 2 fo; c; dg we dene:
 B
x
(i;M; s) , ff 2 L
0
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5.23. Proposition. For all M 2M
I
, s 2 M, i 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and x 2 fc; dg we have:
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Proposition 5.23 provides a rephrasing of the AGM postulates for belief revision in
terms of our framework. We focus on some peculiarities in this proposition, and refer
for a thorough explanation on these postulates to the standard work by Gardenfors [38].
The most remarkable cases of Proposition 5.23 are given in the fourth and the fth item.
The fourth item states that a revision with f of the x-beliefs of an agent i results in the
absurd belief set i i believes :f with a credibility higher than x. Whenever we apply
the revise
x
(f; i) functions in the interpretation of the informative actions, we will (have
to) ensure that agent i does not believe :f with a credibility higher than x, thereby
preventing the agent's belief set from becoming inconsistent. The fth item states that
if agent i believes in the equivalence of f and g with a credibility higher than x, then
x-revisions with f and g result in the same set of (propositional) x-beliefs.
As mentioned above, the revise
o
function implements a special kind of AGM ex-
pansion. More in particular, in states where a formula f holds, revise
o
(i; f) causes an
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expansion with f of the observational beliefs of agent i, whereas in states where f does
not hold, i's observational beliefs are expanded with :f .
5.24. Proposition. For all M 2M
I
, s 2 M, i 2 A and f 2 L
0
we have:


















5.5 Formalising observations: seeing is believing
Through observations an agent learns whether some proposition is true of the state
in which it is residing. For articial agents it seems to be a reasonable assumption to
demand that observations are truthful. That is, if some observation yields information
that f , then it should indeed be the case that f
3
. Observations form the most trustworthy
way of acquiring information: utterances like `I've seen it with my own eyes' or `Seeing
is believing' support this claim
4
. The formalisation that we propose is therefore such
that observations overrule any beliefs acquired by other means. In situations where an
agent does not observationally believe whether f , its beliefs are revised by applying the
revise
o
function to the model and the state under consideration. If the agent already
observationally believed whether f no revision takes place. Note that observations will
never conict with an agent's observational beliefs or its knowledge: since both these
notions are veridical, and observations are truthful, it is not possible that an observation
that some formula f holds contradicts observational belief or knowledge that :f holds,
since this would force both f and :f to be true in one and the same state.
5.25. Definition. For all M 2M
I





(i; observe f)(M; s) =
(








(i; f)(M; s); s otherwise
The function r
I
for actions observe f with f 2 L
0
as given in Denition 5.25 is
indeed well-dened in the sense that well-formed models are transformed into well-formed
models as the result of performing an observation.
3
Note that this property does not always hold for human agents: magicians make a living out of this.
4
There is evidence that even for articial agents this assumption may be an oversimplication. As was
pointed out by Gil Tidhar [126, 127], agents that simulate the behaviour of air combat pilots should on
some occasions, i.e. when engaging in close combat, consider the observations made by their own sensors
most credible, while on other occasions, i.e. when the enemy's aircrafts are beyond visual range, the
information obtained from the ground controller provides for the most credible source. In situations of
the latter kind, the information communicated from the ground controllers is far more credible than the
one that is observed by the agent.
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5.26. Proposition. For all M 2 M
I





; s = r
I






Besides being correct, Denition 5.25 is also intuitively acceptable as can be seen in
the following proposition.
5.27. Proposition. For all i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
we have:
1. observe f is o-informative and truthful with respect to f





































































































The rst item of Proposition 5.27 formalises two essential properties of observations,
viz. their informativeness and truthfulness. The properties given in the second item are
not uncommon for informative actions: determinism and idempotence are strongly re-
lated to the AGM postulates, and are also encountered for the other informative actions.
Realisability is typical for observations; it models the idea that our agents are perfect
observers which always have the opportunity to make an observation. Item 3 states that
the knowledge uents | the propositional formulae known to be true | of all agents
remain unaected under execution of an observe action by one of them, and item 4
states an analogous, but slightly weaker property, for their observational beliefs. The
fth and sixth item follow from the fact, formalised in Proposition 5.24, that observa-
tional beliefs are not so much revised as expanded. In item 7 it is formalised that the
observe f action models `observing whether f ': observing whether f is in all aspects
equivalent to observing whether :f . Items 8 and 9 state that for knowledge-ignorant
agents observations actually lead to learning by seeing. Item 10 | a special case of
item 8 | is intuitively a very nice one: it states that observations are the most credible
source of information. Observations overrule other beliefs acquired through communica-
tion or adopted by default, i.e. incorrect communicational or default beliefs are revised in
favour of observational beliefs. The last item of Proposition 5.27 sheds some more light
on the (rigorous) way in which beliefs are revised: observing something that contradicts
communicational beliefs leads to a reset of both the latter and the default beliefs of the
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agent, i.e. after such a revision all the beliefs of the agent are at least grounded in its
observations. Phrased dierently, there no longer is any formula that the agent believes
due to it being told or assuming it by default, i.e. after such a revision there is no formula





5.6 Formalising communication: hearing is believing
The second source of information available to an agent consists of the information com-
municated by other agents. As we present it here, communication is reduced to its barest
form, viz. the transfer of information. That is, we are not dealing with concepts like com-
munication protocols, synchronisation and the like, but instead consider communication
as consisting of an agent transferring some of its information to another agent. In general,
agents have the opportunity to send all of their beliefs, and nothing else. Depending on
the credibility of both the sending agent and the information that it sends, the receiving
agent may use this information to revise its beliefs. For reasons of simplicity, we dene
the credibility of the sending agent as a binary notion, i.e. the agent is either credible or it
is not credible, without distinguishing degrees of credibility. The notion of credibility is
modelled through the so-called dependence operator, originally proposed by Huang [59].
This ternary operator, pertaining to a pair of agents and a formula, models that there
is a relation of trust, dependence or credibility between the agents with respect to the
formula: D
i;j
' indicates that agent i accepts agent j as an authority on ', or that j is a
teacher of i on the subject '. TheD
i;j
operator is interpreted by incorporating a function
D : AA! S! }(L
I




' is true in a state s of some model i '
is in D(i; j)(s). The credibility of the transferred information is determined by both the
credibility that the sending agent attaches to this information and the credibility that
the receiving agent attaches to any of its beliefs that contradict this information. That
is, if the sending agent itself observationally believes the information that it is sending,
then this information overrules any contradicting beliefs that the receiving agent may
have. If the sending agent itself was told the information that it is now transferring, the
receiving agent will accept this information only if it does not have any contradicting
information that it believes at least with the credibility attached to communicational
beliefs. Information that the sending agent adopted by default is considered to be too
weak to ever justify a revision of the receiving agent's beliefs. These intuitive ideas are
formalised in Denition 5.28.
5.28. Definition. For all M 2M
I
with state s, i; j 2 A, ' 2 L
I







', ' 2 D(i; j)(s)
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r
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The denition of r
I
is also for communication actions well-dened.
5.29. Proposition. For all M 2M
I





(j; inform (f; i))(M; s) = M
0






In the following proposition we summarise some validities describing the behaviour
of the communication actions. These validities show that our formalisation indeed cor-
responds to the intuitive ideas unfolded above.
5.30. Proposition. For all i; i
0
; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
, we have:

































































































































(inform f; i))i'$ ') for x 2 fk; o; c; dg
The rst item of Proposition 5.30 states that the inform action also obeys the proper-
ties of determinism and idempotence that are intuitively related to the AGM postulates
for belief revision. The second item states that both the knowledge and the observa-
tional belief uents of all agents persist under execution of an inform action by one of
them. Thus communication does exclusively aect the regions of beliefs that it should
aect, viz. the communicational and default belief clusters. Note that, in contrast with
the corresponding items of Propositions 5.27 and 5.36, the communicational beliefs of
the receiving agent do not necessarily persist. The reason for this is given in item 9,
where communicational beliefs are genuinely revised (and not just expanded). Item 3
states that agents may transfer all, and nothing but, their beliefs. Attempts to send
non-beliefs are doomed to fail. Agents are therefore not even allowed to tell white lies;
they are utterly honest. Note that item 3 also shows that the inform action is | in
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contrast with the observe action | not realisable. Item 4 formalises that authority is a
conditio sine qua non for eectual communication: if the receiving agent does not trust
the sending agent on the transferred information, it lets the information pass without
revising its beliefs (or changing anything else for that matter). Item 5 states that if some
trustworthy agent j tells another agent i some formula f that j either knows, observed
or was told, this leads to a state of aairs in which the receiving agent believes whether
f at least with the credibility attached to communicational beliefs; whenever i is before-
hand ignorant with regard to f on the level of communicational beliefs, the receiving
agent actually learns f by being told (item 6). Item 7 states that if agent j tells i some
formula that j itself was told while i already communicationally believes whether f ,
nothing changes, really. Items 8 and 9 deal with the ways in which the receiving agent's
beliefs are revised as the result of it acquiring information through communication. If
the sending agent j communicationally believes the transferred formula f and the re-
ceiving agent i is communicationally ignorant with respect to f , then an expansion with
f of the communicational beliefs of i takes place (item 8). If j observationally believes
f and i is observationally ignorant with respect to f while communicationally believing
:f , then i's communicational beliefs consist henceforth of the observational beliefs that
are implied by f (item 9). Item 10 states that default beliefs are not transferable: the
credibility of this kind of information is too low for it to have any eect upon being
heard. The last item shows that agents cannot increase the credibility they attach to
information by talking to themselves, since this talking to themselves does not change
anything. Thus our agents are not susceptible to this kind of autosuggestion.
5.7 Formalising default jumps: jumping is believing
The last possible source of information that we consider in this chapter is the only
endogenous one, and consists of the possibility to adopt beliefs by default. In general in
default reasoning, plausible yet fallible conclusions are derived on the basis of the presence
of certain information and the absence of other information. In the formalisation of







, which should be interpreted as stating that if '
1





may be derived. Here we consider the most basic form of default
reasoning, in which no information is required to be present and the information that
needs to be absent is strongly related to the conclusion that is to be derived. In terms
of Reiter's framework, the kind of default reasoning that we consider here uses only
supernormal defaults, i.e. defaults of the form : '='; these defaults can be seen as
possible hypotheses in Poole's system [103]. Instead of introducing these supernormal
defaults as an additional syntactical construct, we want to formalise them by using
concepts already present in our language. To this end we need a modal (epistemic)
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translation of defaults. If one looks at the modal translations of defaults that have
been proposed in the literature [91], it turns out that for supernormal defaults : '='
in an epistemic S5 framework all of these translations amount to either the formula
M
i




'. These translations stem from the usual, static, account of
default reasoning and are therefore not completely suitable for our dynamic framework,
where default reasoning is formalised by informative actions. Intuitively, our notion of
defaults corresponds to the antecedent of both the implications given above, whereas
the consequents of these implications correspond to possible results of attempted jumps.
Therefore it seems reasonable to consider the formula M
i
' as a candidate to represent
our kind of defaults. However, in our opinion this formalisation would do no justice
to the empirical character of defaults. More in particular, the idea of defaults being
rooted in common sense is not visible when formalising defaults as ordinary epistemic
possibilities. In our multi-agent system, common sense is related to the knowledge and
lack of knowledge of all agents. To capture this idea of defaults as determined by the (lack
of) knowledge of all agents, we propose the modality of common possibility, intuitively
corresponding to being considered epistemically possible by all agents. Although at
rst sight defaults as common possibilities have an optimistic avour to them, agents
that jump to these formulae are not that bold at all: there is nothing in the joint
knowledge of all agents that could deem these jumps inappropriate.
5.31. Definition. For ' 2 L
I
, the formula N', for nobody knows not ', is dened by:
N' ,M
1
' ^ : : : ^M
n
'
5.32. Remark. In order for the common possibility operator to be well-dened, the set
of agents has to be nite, since the languages considered in this thesis do not allow
for innite conjunctions. It is furthermore obvious that, should the common possibility
operator express a notion dierent from ordinary, epistemic possibility, the set of agents
should contain at least two elements. These arguments provide (additional) support for
the constraints imposed in Denition 5.1.
Not surprisingly, the common possibility operator N shares some of the proper-
ties of the epistemic possibility operator M
i
. In particular, N satises the dual KT4-
axiomatisation, but satises only one direction of the dual 5-axiom. Moreover, whereas
the epistemic possibility operator satises the axiom of weak belief (M
i





 )), the common possibility operator does not satisfy the left-to-right im-
plication.
















5. N:N'! :N' is not for all ' 2 L
I
valid











9. N' ^N('!  )! N is not for all ';  2 L
I
valid
10. N' ^N ! N(' ^  ) is not for all ';  2 L
I
valid
11. N'! :N:' is not for all ' 2 L
I
valid
The properties formalised in Proposition 5.33 indicate that N is in most respects
indeed a possible candidate to represent defaults. Item 1 states that true formulae are
defaults. This is a consequence of the reexivity of the epistemic accessibility relation
that ensures veridicality of knowledge. For each agent considers all formulae that hold in
the `current' state to be epistemically possible, and hence all these formulae are common
possibilities. Item 2 indicates that in principle all gaps in the agent's information are
`llable' by a default belief, i.e. for all formulae ' either ' or :' is a default. Possibly the
most important and remarkable property of the common possibility operator with regard
to its usability to represent defaults is given by item 6, which indicates that disjunctive
defaults are not necessarily trivialised, i.e. these disjunctions are not necessarily reduced
to their disjuncts. This property is very important for the expressive power of our
framework. Consider for instance the situation of a lottery with m 1 players (cf. [75]).
Then it is not the case that player 1 wins by default, and neither is this the case for
any of the players 2 to m, 1. But it is also the case that by default one of these m, 1
players actually does win. Since f:Nw
1




_ : : :_w
m 1
)g is satisable,
this aspect of the lottery can be formalised in our framework. Note that this situation
cannot be formalised by taking ordinary (single-agent) epistemic possibility instead of
common possibility, since M
i




 is a valid formula. Items 10 and 11
show that the Nixon-diamond (cf. [113]) can be represented. That is, it is possible to
represent that it is a default that Nixon was a pacist and that it is a default that he
was a non-pacist, even though it is not a default that he was a walking contradiction.
Using the common possibility operator to represent defaults, we now come to the
formalisation of the attempted jumps to conclusion that constitute (supernormal) default
reasoning. Since adopting a belief by default accounts for acquiring information of the
lowest credibility, it is obvious that default jumps are eective only for agents that are
completely ignorant with respect to the default that is jumped to.
5.34. Definition. For all M 2M
I





(i; try jump f)(M; s) =




















Also for this last kind of informative actions, the function r
I
is well-dened.
5.35. Proposition. For all M 2 M
I





(j; try jump f)(M; s) = M
0






In addition to being correct, Denition 5.34 is also intuitively acceptable, which is
shown in Proposition 5.36.
5.36. Proposition. For all i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
, we have:


























































(try jump f)i'$ ')
The rst item of Proposition 5.36 deals again with the properties more or less typical
for informative actions. It is obvious that the property of realisability is not validated
since an agent may attempt to jump to a non-default, and in 3 it is formalised that
such attempted jumps are doomed to fail. Item 2 states that all information of all agents
persists under the attempted jump to a formula by one of them. Item 4 states that default
jumps for which an agent has the opportunity always result in the agent believing by
default whether the formula that is jumped to holds. The fth item formalises the idea
that agents that are completely ignorant with respect to some formula f jump to new
default beliefs by applying the try jump f action. The incorporation of these new beliefs
is brought about by expanding the default beliefs of the agent with the default that is
adopted (item 6). The last item states that attempted jumps to default conclusions yield
information for totally ignorant agents only.
5.8 The ability to gather information
As we see it, in the ability of intelligent information agents to execute informative actions
two dierent notions are combined. On the one hand, the abilities of an agent restrict its
practical possibility to acquire information: only the actions that are within the agent's
capacities can be used as means to extend its information. This corresponds to the idea
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that agents are not just able to acquire all the information they would like to acquire.
On the other hand, we use the agents' abilities to steer the way in which information is
acquired. That is, through its abilities an agent is forced to prefer more credible sources
of information. We will, for instance, dene an agent to be able to try to adopt some
formula by default only if it cannot acquire this information through its | more credible
| observations.
Since, by nature, observations provide the most credible source of information, the
ability to observe is determined strictly by the fact that the agents' information gathering
is limited, and does not depend on other means to acquire information. In our opinion
it is reasonable to consider this limit to the agent's ability to perform observations
as given by the construction of the agent. For instance, human agents are built in
such a way that they cannot observe objects at great distances, or objects that are
outside the spectrum of human observation, like for instance X-rays. In the case of
articial agents, one could think of two robots, working together to explore a strange,
new world. Each robot is equipped with its own, personal set of sensors: one robot is
for instance able to observe whether its environment is radioactive, the other whether
the planet's atmosphere contains oxygen, but neither robot is able to observe both.
Being a construction decision, we assume that the observational capacities of agents are
determined beforehand, i.e. with respect to the agents' ability observations are treated
as being atomic.
In dening the capabilities of agents to inform other agents, we consider the moral
component of ability to be most relevant. That is, we demand our agents to be sincere
in that they are morally unable to lie or gossip. The things that an agent is capable
of telling to other agents are exactly the things that it itself believes, be it with the
lowest credibility. In this way the information acquisition of an agent that is due to
communication is restricted to those formulae that are believed by some authority.
The ability to attempt to jump to a default captures both aspects described above,
i.e. both the aspect of restricted information acquisition as well as that of preferring the
most credible source of information are visible in the denition of the ability to (attempt
to) jump. Concerning the rst aspect, an agent is able to jump to a default only if it
knows it to be a default, i.e. agents have to know their defaults in order to be able to use
them. With respect to the second aspect, the capability to jump is dened to depend
on the observational capacities of the agent: an agent is able to attempt a jump to a
formula only if it knows that it is not able to observe whether the formula holds. In this
way it is ensured that agents resort to default jumps only if the possibility of acquiring
the information through observations is excluded.
5.37. Definition. Let M 2 M
I
be some model. The function c
I
is for the informative
actions dened as follows, where s is some state in M, i; j are agents and f 2 L
0
is some
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(i; observe f)(M; s)) is a function in f such that
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(i; observe f)(M; s) = c
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observe f ! :A
i
try jump f
The rst item of Proposition 5.38 again expresses that the observe actions formalise
`observing whether'. Item 2 and 3 state that both the actions modelling communication
and those modelling default reasoning, though not realisable per se, are A-realisable,
i.e. having the ability to perform these actions implies having the opportunity to do so.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the property of A-realisability is considered unacceptable
for mundane actions, but given our view on the notion of ability for the non-mundane,
informative actions this property seems much less controversial. For both the ability and
the opportunity to perform informative actions are dened in terms of informational
attitudes, and thus the distinction between these notions is less clear than it is for
mundane actions. The last item of Proposition 5.38 expresses that agents are able to
attempt to jump to a formula only if it is not within their capacities to observe whether
the formula holds.
5.9 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we presented a formal framework that may be seen as a step towards a
formalisation of intelligent information agents. This formalisation concerns the agents'
informational attitudes, the actions that the agents may perform, and in particular the
interaction between actions and information. In order to solve information conicts,
we imposed a credibility ordering both on the beliefs of an agent and on its possible
sources of information. This ordering is dened by dividing the information of an agent
into four sets, situated within each other. The credibility of an item of information is
determined by the smallest set that it is an element of. To model the act of acquiring
information, we introduced special, so-called informative actions. By performing an
informative action, an agent may acquire (additional) information. We considered three
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kinds of informative actions, which correspond to information acquisition by observation,
communication and default, respectively. Of these, observations provide the information
with the highest credibility, while communication is in general considered to be a more
credible source than reasoning by default. The changes in the beliefs of an agent that
result from the execution of an informative action are brought about by changing the
model under consideration, which accounts for a model-transforming interpretation of
informative actions rather than the standard state-transition one. The transformation
of models is such that the beliefs of an agent are changed in compliance with the AGM
postulates for belief revision. Through the abilities of agents we dened both the limited
capacities of agents to acquire information and the priority that agents should give to
the most credible information source. On the whole, the formal framework can in our
opinion rightfully be seen as a formalisation of intelligent information agents.
5.9.1 Possible extensions
One can think of several obvious yet interesting extensions of the framework presented
in this chapter, most of which are in fact not too hard to implement. The rst of these
would be to consider a more rened way of revising the agents' beliefs, i.e. instead of the
straightforward AiG revision one could think of using a more rened and intuitively bet-
ter revision. By using the machinery presented in [81, 84] we could not only implement
a more rened revision, but also formally account for iterated revisions of belief. The
second possible extension was suggested by Castelfranchi [15], and consists of rening
the communication part of information acquisition. In this more rened form of com-
munication it should be possible to relate the credibility that an agent attaches to some
formula that it has been told, to the number of agents that have been communicating
this formula, i.e. the more agents that tell that some formula is true, the more ercely
it is believed. It is possible to formalise this intuitive idea by splitting the communi-
cational belief cluster of an agent into dierent parts, one for each of the other agents.
Whenever an agent j informs an agent i of the truth of f , i's communicational belief
cluster that is associated with j is revised with f . Over the dierent communicational
belief clusters a kind of graded belief modality could be dened, which formalises the




then be taken to represent that agent i communicationally believes f with credibility
0:5, i.e. f holds in at least half of the communicational belief clusters of i. It is clear
that in this way it can indeed be modelled that the credibility attached by i to one of its
communicational beliefs depends on the number of agents that have informed i of the
truth of this formula. Another possibility to rene communication could be to allow a
form of `demand-driven' communication in addition to the `supply-driven' one consid-
ered here. In this extended form of communication an agent may request information on
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the truth or falsity of certain proposition from another, trusted, agent. One possible way
of formalising this kind of extended communication is given in [82], where an additional
modal operator is used to record the agents' requests. Yet another possible extension
that we would like to mention here concerns the possibility of agents to reason by default.
Instead of restricting oneself to supernormal defaults, one could consider more general
defaults. Rather than using (epistemic) concepts already present in the framework, these
defaults would probably have to be modelled by some additional means (like a function
yielding the defaults available to an agent in a state), but as soon as these means are
provided, there is nothing to prevent one from using more general defaults.
Another very interesting extension of the framework presented in this chapter con-
cerns the incorporation of actions associated with belief updates (cf. [67]) in addition to
the ones associated with belief revision that we considered here. Whereas belief revisions
are changes in information on an unchanging world, updates are information changes that
are associated with a change in the state of the world. The interaction between these
dierent information changes might well be worth looking at.
The framework could also be extended to make it a suitable formalisation tool for
special agents, like intelligent information retrieval agent. These agents assist a user
with nding relevant information, particularly in cyberspace, that satises one of his/her
information needs. To this end they communicate, either with their user or with other
(intelligent information retrieval) agents, go to World Wide Web sites to seek for rele-
vant information, or make assumptions by default. A preliminary formalisation of these
intelligent information retrieval agents based on the framework proposed in this chapter
was presented by Huibers & Van Linder [62, 63].
5.9.2 Bibliographical notes
The backbone of this chapter is an extended and revised version of [87], in which elements
of various other papers have been incorporated. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, parts of [84]
have been used, Section 5.5 uses [83], in Section 5.6 elements of [82] were used and in
Section 5.7 we used [85].
There is not much related work on the formalisation of (aspects of) intelligent infor-
mation agents that we know of. Kraus & Lehmann were the rst to combine knowledge,
belief and time [71], but the only genuinely relevant related work that we know of is the
formalisation of knowledge-producing actions in the Situation Calculus as proposed by
Scherl & Levesque [116]. The term `knowledge-producing' as used by Scherl & Levesque
coincides for the greater part with our use of the term `informative'. The most impor-
tant characteristics of knowledge-producing actions is that upon execution knowledge
is produced while leaving all other uents unaected. To formalise knowledge, Scherl
& Levesque adapt the standard modal possible worlds model to the Situation Calculus:
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instead of an epistemic accessibility relation as used in our framework, a relation over
situations is used. The interpretation of knowledge-producing actions resembles our in-
terpretation of informative actions to some extent. When performing an action SenseP ,
which represents the act of sensing whether P holds, in a situation S, a situation S
0
re-





the truth-value assigned to P , while causing as little change as possible. Since only one
informational attitude is considered, viz. knowledge, which is veridical, and knowledge-
producing actions are by denition truthful, there is no question of AGM-like revision
procedures as is the case in our framework. That is, knowledge-producing actions are
really knowledge-producing, and not knowledge-revising. Still, in spite of this dierence
and the ones due to the conceptual and ontological distinctions between the framework
underlying the formalisation of Scherl & Levesque | the Situation Calculus | and that
underlying ours, the treatment of informative and that of knowledge-producing actions
are surprisingly similar.
5.10 Selected proofs
5.8. Proposition. For all i-doxastic sequenced formulae  2 L
I
, for all ' 2 L
I
and


































:X' is not for all ' 2 L
I
valid
Proof: We show the rst, fourth and fth item; the second and third are obvious. So
let  be an i-doxastic sequenced formula Y, and let M be some model with state s.









. To prove the rst item, we distinguish two cases:
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g. In this case we have:

































, M; s j=
I
XY
, M; s j=
I
X



















. Since the two items given above capture
all possible i-doxastic sequenced formulae  we conclude that the rst item of Proposi-
tion 5.8 holds.
To show the fourth and the fth item, consider the model M which is for some
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ve.
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5.12. Proposition. Let ';  2 L
I















Dene the ordering 
0

















. Then we have:
1. j=
I























































(Y' ^Y )! Y(' ^  ) C











































5.10. Selected proofs 137
Proof: For each case, the proofs for the dierent operators are highly analogous. There-
fore, we mostly restrict ourselves to proving the case for theHeard
i
operator. At various
places in the proofs we use the equivalent formulations of the derived belief operators
that are proposed in Remark 5.11. So let M 2M
I
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validates the T-axiom it
follows that M; s j=
I
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', which suces to conclude
that the left-to-right implication holds. The right-to-left implication follows by the
denition of Saw
i
' and the fact that observational beliefs are veridical.
Items 7, 8 and 9 are proved in a similar way as 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
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I




 . It is easy to see that the
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 is satisable for some formula '
which is contingent, i.e. a formula ' which is neither a tautology nor a contradiction.
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both hold, the rst of the conjuncts on the right-hand side follows more or less
directly from the RM'-rule, which is proved below. For the second conjunct note
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15. Assume that j=
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5.18. Proposition. For all  2 Ac
I
and ' 2 L
I
we have:
 if  is realisable and x-informative with regard to ' then  is genuinely x-
informative with regard to '.
 if  is deterministic and genuinely x-informative with regard to ' then  is
x-informative with regard to '.
Proof: We show both items. Let  2 Ac
I
and ' 2 L
I
be arbitrary.

























as a schema in i 2 A, hence  is genuinely x-informative with regard to '.

























' in i 2 A, i.e.  is x-informative with regard to '.
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5.20. Proposition. For all M 2M
I
, s 2 M, i 2 A, f 2 L
0
it holds for x 2 fc; dg:
 revise
o




(i; f)(M; s) is dened, then revise
x
(i; f)(M; s) 2M
I
Proof: We show the rst item, leaving the second item, which is analogous to the rst












with state s, i 2 A and f 2 L
0
be arbitrary. Let M
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We successively show that M
0
indeed meets these four requirements.
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is an equivalence relation by showing that it is reexive, symmetrical and transitive.
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(i) is reexive, symmetrical and transitive, and hence an equivalence rela-
tion.
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then this requirement is trivially met, since in this case M
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5.23. Proposition. For all M 2M
I
, s 2 M, i 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and x 2 fc; dgwe have:
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Proof: Let M 2M
I
with state s, i 2 A and f; g 2 L
0
be arbitrary. We successively show
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c
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(i;M; s), which suces to conclude item 3.
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Since these six cases capture all possibilities, we conclude that item 6 of Proposi-
tion 5.23 indeed holds.
7. To prove item 7 we distinguish the same six cases as in the previous item. The only
two cases that are interesting, are the fourth and the sixth one; for the other cases it
holds that :g 2 B
?f
c
(i;M; s) which trivially proves item 7. Since the interesting cases
are completely analogous, we show only the fourth one. So suppose that B
c
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the deduction theorem for classical propositional logic in the same way as in item
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5.24. Proposition. For all M 2M
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
5.10. Selected proofs 143
5.26. Proposition. For all M 2 M
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5.27. Proposition. For all i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
we have:
1. observe f is o-informative and truthful with respect to f





































































































Proof: Let M 2M
I
with state s, f; g 2 L
0
, i; j 2 A and ' 2 L
I
be arbitrary.
1. Both o-informativeness and truthfulness are easily shown by using Proposition 5.24
and Proposition 5.26, respectively. We prove here that observe f is o-informative.
The proof of this claim proceeds according to an established pattern, according to
which also proofs that other informative actions satisfy other properties proceed.
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Now let F 2 F
I
, i 2 A,  2 (  S) ! bool and s 2 S be arbitrary. Let
furthermore M
0
; s = r
I
(i; observe f)((F; ); s); M
0

















































































f , which suces to conclude that observe f is o-informative.
2. Determinism and realisability follow directly from Proposition 5.26. Idempotence is
easily shown by inspection of Denition 5.19.









g. Due to the realisability and determinism
of the observe action the box may be replaced by a diamond.
4. Let M
0
; s = r
I
(i; observe f)(M; s); M
0
exists since observe f is realisable. We distin-
guish two cases:
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g in the case that j 6= i.
j = i: From Proposition 5.24 it follows that B
o




; s). Hence when-


































g we conclude that item 4
holds.











(i; observe f)(M; s). We distin-
guish two cases:





f , then M
0





































(f ! g), and




































g implies by similar
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(f ! g)) it follows
that item 5 indeed holds.









:f and furthermore revise
o
(i; f)(M; s) =
revise
o
(i;:f)(M; s) it follows that r
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8. Combining item 5 with the o-informativeness of observe f with regard to f yields































f , which suces to conclude that this item indeed holds.
9. The proof of this item is completely analogous to the previous one.


































(i; observe f)(M; s). By denition of revise
o
























































to conclude item 10.

5.30. Proposition. For all i; i
0
; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
, we have:

































































































































(inform f; i))i'$ ') for x 2 fk; o; c; dg
Proof: Let M 2M
I
with state s, i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
be arbitrary.
1. Determinism and idempotence of inform (f; i) are easily shown by inspection of Def-
initions 5.19 and 5.28.
2. This item follows since communication aects neither the epistemic accessibility
relation nor the observational belief clusters of any agent.
3. This item is straightforward from Denition 5.28 and Proposition 5.20(2).







f then, by Denition 5.28, r
I
(j; inform (f; i))(M; s) = M; s.




(inform (f; i))i' i M; s j=
I
'.







f . By item 3 we know that M
0
; s exists such that
M
0
; s = r
I
(j; inform (f; i))(M; s). We distinguish two cases:
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f , which was to be shown.











f . In this case M
0
= M, so we have to











































which suces to conclude item 5.










f . Let M
0
be the model such that
M
0
; s = r
I





























and since communication does not aect observational beliefs on propositional for-


















































f), which implies that
r
I
(j; inform (f; i))(M; s) = M; s. Thus M; s j=
I





which suces to conclude that item 7 holds.
8. The proof of this item proceeds along the lines of the ones given for items 5 and 6
of Proposition 5.27.















; s = r
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(j; inform (f; i))(M; s);M
0





Inspection of Denition 5.19 shows on its turn that B
c
0




\[[f ]]. By similar













which suces to conclude that item 9 holds.














i M; s j=
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f . By item 3 it fol-
lows that M
0
; s = r
I












f are not satisable, and therefore not true in s, the second
clause of Denition 5.28 is not applicable, and hence M
0







', which concludes the proof of item 11.

5.36. Proposition. For all i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
, we have:
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(try jump f)i'$ ')
Proof: Let M 2M
I
with state s, i; j 2 A, f; g 2 L
0
and ' 2 L
I
be arbitrary.
1. Determinism and idempotence follow by inspection of Denitions 5.19 and 5.34.
Informativeness is shown as it was for the observe f actions in item 1 of Proposi-
tion 5.27.
2. In the case that r
I
(i; try jump f)(M; s) = ;, the proposition trivially holds. Hence
assume that r
I
(i; try jump f)(M; s) = M
0
. In this case one concludes by a similar



























exists such that M
0
; s = r
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= M and else M
0
exists by denition of the revise
d
function and
Proposition 5.20(2). The reverse implication is even so obvious.




(try jump f)i>, and let M
0
; s = r
I
(i; try jump f)(M; s). We
distinguish two cases:




























' then M = revise
d























f we conclude that the
left-to-right implication of this item holds. The right-to-left implication is trivial.





f . Let M
0
; s = r
I
(i; try jump f)(M; s). From Deni-























Since attempted jumps to conclusions do not aect the communicational beliefs





















6. This item is shown in similar ways as item 8 of Proposition 5.30 and items 5 and 6
of Proposition 5.27.





f . Then it follows from Denition 5.34 that
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Chapter 6
How to motivate your agents
Wir stellen uns die Frage, ob an der Arbeit unseres
seelischen Apparates eine Hauptabsicht zu erkennen
sei, und beantworten sie in erster Annaherung, da
diese Absicht auf Lustgewinnung gerichtet ist. Es
scheint, da unsere gesamte Seelentatigkeit darauf
gerichtet ist, Lust zu erwerben und Unlust zu vermei-
den, da sie automatisch durch das Lust-prinzip regu-
liert wird. Nun wuten wir um alles in der Welt gerne,
welches die Bedingungen der Enstehung von Lust und
Unlust sein, aber daran fehlt es uns eben.
Sigmund Freud, `Vorlesungen zur Einfuhrung in die Psychoanalyse'.
In this chapter we present a formalisation of motivational attitudes, the attitudes that
explain why agents act. We consider the statics of these attitudes both at the assertion
level, i.e. ranging over propositions, and at the practition
1
level, i.e. ranging over actions,
as well as the dynamics of these attitudes. Starting from an agent's wishes, which form
the primitive, most fundamental motivational attitude, we dene its goals as induced
by those wishes that do not yet hold, i.e. are unfullled, but are within the agent's
practical possibility to bring about, i.e. are implementable for the agent. Among these
unfullled, implementable wishes the agent selects those that qualify as its goals. Based
on its knowledge on its goals and practical possibilities, an agent may make certain
commitments. In particular, an agent may commit itself to actions that it knows to
be correct and feasible to bring about some of its known goals. As soon as it no longer
knows its commitments to be useful, i.e. leading to fullment of some goal, and practically
possible, an agent has the practical possibility to undo these commitments. Both the
act of committing as well as that of undoing commitments is modelled as a special
model-transforming action in our framework, according to the generalised paradigm for
1
The term `practition' is due to Casta~neda [14].
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Propositional Dynamic Logic as introduced in the previous chapter. In between making
and undoing commitments, an agent is committed to all the actions that are for all
practical purposes identical to the ones in its agenda. By recording nite computation
runs of actions rather than the actions themselves in the agent's agenda, it is ensured
that commitments display an acceptable behaviour with regard to composite actions.
As usual, we conclude this chapter with a brief summary, some guidelines for future
research, an overview of the relevant literature, and proofs of selected propositions.
6.1 Motivational attitudes: wishes, goals and commitments
Motivational attitudes constitute what probably is the most fundamental, primitive and
essential characteristic of agency
2
. These attitudes provide the motive for any act on
behalf of the agents, i.e. the acting of agents is driven by their motivational attitudes.
Typical examples of motivational attitudes are amongst others wishes, desires, prefer-
ences, concerns, ambitions, goals, intentions and commitments. The meaning of most
of these terms is intuitively much less clear than that of the informational attitudes of
knowledge and belief, or of the aspects of action (result, opportunity, ability) that we
considered. It is therefore also not clear which of the aforementioned motivational at-
titudes are relevant, and worth formalising, when modelling rational agents. In their
BDI-architecture, Rao & George [109] consider desires and intentions to be primitive,
and dene a notion of commitment in terms of these, Cohen & Levesque [20] consider
goals to be primitive and dene intentions using goals, and Shoham [121] restricts him-
self to formalising commitments. In our opinion each of these formalisations lacks some
of the aspects that are vital to modelling motivational attitudes. Firstly, psychological
evidence seems to suggest that notions like goals, intentions and commitments are not
primitive, but rather induced by some more fundamental notion. There is an ongoing
debate in the psychological literature on the actual nature of this notion. Aristotle, and
in his footsteps the adherents of cognitive motivation theories, proposed that the pursuit
of knowledge is men's most primitive motivational attitude. Freud distinguished in his
psychoanalytical theory two fundamental human motivations, viz. libido, the complex
of desires associated with sexuality and the erotic, and aggression, which comprises be-
sides a proclivity towards destruction also the propensity to self-preservation. Although
the theories of Aristotle and Freud are readily applicable to human agents, the question
arises whether this is also the case for non-human, articial agents. We argue that this
is indeed so. For highly advanced articial agents, like for instance the robots appearing
2
There are two main reasons for not dealing with these attitudes until this chapter, in spite of the fact
that they are fundamental to agency. The rst of these is the inherent complexity of formalisations of
motivational attitudes. Related to this, an adequate modelling of motivational attitudes will in general
necessitate a formalisation of most of the concepts considered in the previous chapters.
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in the famous robot adventures by Asimov [4, 5, 6], are so much like humans that they
can safely be ascribed human motives. Software agents that assist some user with some
specic task, are in general not to be ascribed human motives. The primitive motiva-
tional attitudes of these agents could however quite well be identied with those of the
user they are assisting. Lastly, the intelligent information agents that we considered in
the previous chapter could be said to be driven by a quest for information, which would
make them obey Aristotle's theory. In this chapter we will simply assume that all agents,
human and articial alike, posses some fundamental motivational attitude | whatever
it may actually be.
Secondly, in addition to being faithful to insights gained in psychology, we feel that
it is also important to pay attention to those gained in analytical philosophy. More
specically, we are of the opinion that the modelling of practical reasoning should be
part of any formalisation of motivational attitudes that pretends to be an adequate one.
The term `practical reasoning' dates back to Aristotle, and refers to the process through
which (human) agents conclude that they should perform certain actions in order to
bring about some of the things that they like to be the case. It seems very likely that for
autonomous agents in AI applications, which have to act (autonomously) to achieve some
of their goals, practical reasoning accounts for the most essential and most frequently
used kind of information processing. Hence an adequate formalisation of motivational
attitudes should pay at least some attention to this kind of reasoning.
The third essential facet of any formalisation of motivational attitudes consists of the
modelling of the act of selecting: agents have to make choices among the things they
like to be the case, thereby deciding which of these they will try to achieve next. For it
might be impossible to satisfy all of an agent's wishes simultaneously, since these wishes
are either analytically inconsistent or incompatible given the agent's resources.
In our opinion all of the aspects mentioned above should be present in an adequate
formalisation of motivational attitudes, and they are indeed so in the one that is presented
in this chapter. The notions that are essential in this formalisation are wishes, goals
and commitments. Of these, wishes constitute the primitive motivational attitude that
models the things that an agent likes to be the case. As such, wishes naturally range
over propositions, corresponding to the idea that agents wish for certain aspects of the
world. We formalise wishes through a normal modal operator, i.e. an operator validating
just the K-axiom and the N-rule. Agents set their goals by selecting among their wishes.
However, agents are not allowed to select arbitrary wishes as their goals, but instead
may only select wishes that are unfullled yet implementable. Whenever an agent knows
that it has some goal, it may commit itself to any action that it knows to be correct and
feasible with respect to the goal. This act of committing to an action is itself formalised
as a special kind of action. Commitments to actions are in general to persist until all
of the goals for which the commitment was made are fullled. Having said so, agents
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should not be forced to remain committed to actions that have either become useless in
that they do not lead to fullment of any goal, or impossible in that the agent no longer
knows that it has the opportunity and ability to perform the action. Phrased dierently,
an agent should be allowed to uncommit itself whenever an action is no longer known to
be correct and feasible with respect to one of the agent's goals.
To formalise wishes, goals and commitments and their associated concepts, we intro-
duce a modal operator modelling wishes, operators modelling implementability, (made)
choices and (made) commitments, and action constructors modelling the acts of selecting,
committing and uncommitting.
6.1. Definition. To dene the language L
C
, the alphabet is extended with the wish
operator W , the implementability operator  , the selected operator C , the com-
mitment operator Committed and the action constructors select , commit to and
uncommit .
The acts of committing and uncommitting are of an essentially dierent nature than
the regular actions, execution of which changes the state of the world. Through the
former actions agents (un)commit themselves to actions of the latter kind. Intuitively it
does not make much sense to allow agents to commit themselves to making commitments:
it is not at all clear how a statement like `i is committed to commit itself to do ' is to be
interpreted. Also statements like `it is implementable for agent i to become committed'
seem to be of a rather questionable nature. To avoid these kinds of counterintuitive
situations, we dene the language L
C
on top of the language L as dened in Chapter 3.
That is, the operators modelling wishes, implementability and selections are dened in
such a way that they range over formulae from L rather than those from L
C
. The operator
modelling the commitments that an agent has made is dened to range over the actions
from Ac, the class of actions associated with L, and not over Ac
C
. Analogously, the
special actions in Ac
C
, as there are the action modelling the act of selecting and those






6.2. Definition. The language L and the class Ac of actions are as in Denition 3.1,
i.e. L is the smallest superset of  closed under the core clauses and Ac is the smallest
superset of At satisfying the core clauses.
The language L
C
is the smallest superset of  such that the core clauses are validated
and furthermore
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The class Ac
C
is the smallest superset of At closed under the core clauses and such that
 if ' 2 L then select' 2 Ac
C
 if  2 Ac then commit to 2 Ac
C
 if  2 Ac then uncommit 2 Ac
C
6.3. Definition. For i 2 A,  2 Ac
C
and ' 2 L
C







(; ') and Can
i
(; ') are dened as in the language L.
The models for the language L
C
are equipped with elements used to interpret the
agents' wishes, selections and commitments. Wishes are interpreted through an acces-
sibility relation on worlds that denotes worlds that are more desirable from the agent's
point of view. Selections are straightforwardly interpreted through a set of formulae
that denotes the choices that an agent has made. From a formal point of view, this set
acts as a kind of awareness on the wishes of an agent, thereby ensuring an intuitively
acceptable behaviour of goals. Originally, Fagin & Halpern [31] introduced the idea of
awareness sets as a means to solve the so-called problems of logical omniscience. As we
will see in Section 6.3, the eect of the selection sets on the behaviour of goals is similar
to that of the awareness sets on the properties of knowledge. The agents' commitments
are interpreted by means of the agenda function, which yields for each agent in every
state the commitments that it has made and is up to. Detailed accounts of the respective
interpretations are given in the following sections.
6.4. Definition. A modelM for the language L
C
is a tuple containing the core elements,
the functions W : A ! }(S  S), which determines the desirability relation of an agent
in a state, and C : A S! }(L) denoting the choices made by an agent in a state, and
a function Agenda : A S! }(Ac
b
), which records the commitments of agents.
As we did for the informative actions of Chapter 5, we interpret the acts of selecting,
committing and uncommitting as model-transformations. Whereas the informative ac-
tions transformed models by modifying belief functions, the act of selecting does so by
aecting the set of choices, and the act of (un)committing transforms the agent's agenda.
To account for these modications, we introduce the set of possible result models of a
given model for L
C
analogously to the set M
I

dened in the previous chapter.
6.5. Definition. Let M 2M
C
be some model for L
C






models that (possibly) dier from M only in the C or the Agenda functions.
The dynamic and ability formulae from L
C













. We will not repeat these denitions here (the reader is kindly
referred to Chapter 5), but instead focus on the novel elements of the system of this
chapter, the rst of which is our formalisation of wishes.
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6.2 Formalising wishes
Wishes are the most primitive, fundamental motivational attitudes, i.e. in ultimo agents
are motivated to full their wishes. As mentioned in Section 6.1, we formalise wishes
through a plain normal modal operator, i.e. wishes are straightforwardly interpreted as
a necessity operator over the accessibility relation W.
6.6. Definition. The binary relation j=
C
between a formula in L
C
and a pair M; s con-
sisting of a model M for L
C














It is well-known that normal modal operators have certain properties that are occa-
sionally considered undesirable for the commonsense notions that they are intended to
formalise. For example, although the formal notions of knowledge and belief are closed
under logical consequence, this property will in general not hold for human knowledge
and belief (although it will for instance hold for the information that is recorded in
a database, or for the knowledge and belief of an articial agent). When formalising
motivational attitudes the undesired properties induced by closure under logical conse-
quence become even more pregnant. For agents do in general not desire all the logical
consequences of their wishes, nor do they consider the logically inevitable to be among
their goals. For example, an agent that wants its teeth to be restored will in general
not want or wish for the pain that inevitably accompanies such a restoration. And al-
though the sun rises in the east there will hardly be an agent that desires this to be the
case. The problem embodied by the former example is known as the side-eect prob-
lem; the problem that all logical tautologies are wishes (goals) of an agent is known as
the transference problem. Both in syntactical shape as in meaning, these problems are
closely related to the problems of logical omniscience that have plagued formalisations
of informational attitudes for many years. In terms of our framework, seven of the most
(in)famous problems of logical omniscience can be formulated as follows.
6.7. Definition. Let ';  2 L
X
be formulae, and let X be some operator.
 j=
X


















(X' ^X )! X(' ^  ) LO5
 j=
X
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Properties LO1 and LO3 as given in Denition 6.7 capture the side-eect problem,
and property LO2 captures the transference problem. Of the other properties given
not all are equally harmful when formalising wishes. In our opinion, property LO4 is
not that harmful, and could even be considered desirable, dependent on the demands
for rationality that one is willing to make. Property LO5, which we like to think of
as representing `the problem of unrestricted combining', is in general undesirable when
formalising motivational attitudes. This is for instance shown by the example of an agent
that likes watching TV and likes to read a book, while not wanting to watch TV and
read a book at the same time. Property LO6, for which we coin the term `the problem of
unrestricted weakening', is a special instantiation of the side-eect problem. That this
property is undesirable is shown by the example of an agent desiring itself to be painted
green, without desiring being green or being crushed under a steam roller
3
. Property
LO7 is unacceptable for certain kinds of motivational attitudes but a necessity for others.
It is for instance perfectly possible for agents to have contradicting wishes
4
, but it seems
hardly rational to allow agents to try and full these conicting wishes simultaneously.
Thus, whereas the absence of LO7 is essential when formalising wishes, the presence is
when formalising goals.
It turns out that our formalisation of wishes validates all but one of the properties of
logical omniscience.
6.8. Proposition. All of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Deni-
tion 6.7, with the exception of LO7, are valid for the W
i
operator.
Although we argued against the properties of logical omniscience when formalising
motivational attitudes, we do not consider it a serious problem that our formalisation of
wishes validates (almost all of) these properties. For these wishes are both implicit in
the terminology of Levesque [80] and passive in the sense of Castelfranchi et al. [17].
Being implicit, it will not be the case that agents explicitly desire all of their wishes
5
.
Being passive, wishes in themselves do not actively inuence the course of action that an
agent is going to take. Through the act of selecting, agents turn some of their implicit,
passive wishes into explicit, active goals. Hence even though an agent implicitly and
passively desires all logical consequences of one of its wishes, it will not do so explicitly
3
The problem of unrestricted weakening is intuitively related to the Ross's paradox [115], well-known
in deontic logic[3, 97]. The standard counterexample towards the desirability of LO6 in a deontic context,
where the operatorX is interpreted as `being obliged to', is that of an agent that is obliged to mail a letter
while not being obliged to either mail the letter or burn it.
4
Even stronger, human agents will almost always suer from conicts between their wishes.
5
For the implicit belief that, in combination with awareness, constitutes explicit belief in the approach
of Fagin & Halpern [31], it is also considered unproblematic that the properties of logical omniscience are
validated.
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and actively. Therefore Proposition 6.8 is not taken to represent a severe problem for
a formalisation of (implicit and passive) wishes, whereas it would for a formalisation of
(explicit and active) goals. In the following section it will be shown how the properties
of logical omniscience are avoided for goals.
6.3 Setting goals
As remarked previously, an agent's goals are not primitive but induced by its wishes.
Basically, an agent selects among its (implicit and passive) wishes those that it (explicitly
and actively) aims to full. Given the rationality of agents, these selected wishes should
be both unfullled and implementable: it does not make sense for an agent to try
and full a wish that either already has been fullled or for which fullment is not
a practical possibility. We do not take the latter constraint too stringently, i.e. we
only demand wishes to be individually implementable without requiring a simultaneous
implementability of all chosen wishes. However, if desired, constraints like simultaneous
implementability are easily formulated. The act of selecting is treated as a fully-edged
action by dening the opportunity, ability and result of selecting. Informally, an agent
has the opportunity to select any of its wishes, corresponding to the idea that choices
are only restricted by the elements among which is to be chosen. However, an agent is
capable of selecting only those formulae that are unfullled and implementable, which
can be thought of as it having a built-in aversion against selecting fullled or practically
impossible formulae. The result of a selection will consist of the selected formula being
marked chosen.
The notion of unfullledness is straightforwardly formalised as `not holding', i.e. a
formula ' is unfullled in a state s of some model M if and only if M; s 6j=
C
'. Dening
implementability is a little more elaborate. Roughly speaking, we dene a formula ' to
be implementable for an agent i, denoted by 
i
', if i has the practical possibility to full
' by performing an appropriate sequence of atomic actions
6
.
6.9. Definition. The binary relation j=
C
between a formula in L
C
and a pair M; s con-
sisting of a model M for L
C
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As was pointed out by Maarten de Rijke, dening the implementability operator in this way makes it
a kind of dual master modality (cf. [40, 122]). A formula consisting of a formula ' prexed by the master
modality is true in some state s of a model i ' holds at all states that are reachable by any nite sequence
of transitions from s. Such a formula is false i there is some state s
0
, reachable by some nite sequence
of transitions from s, at which ' does not hold. This indeed makes our implementability modality to be
a dual master modality.
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Having dened unfullledness and implementability, we can now formally introduce
the select action.
6.10. Definition. For M 2M
C
with state s, i 2 A and ' 2 L we dene:
r
C
(i; select')(M; s) =
(
































) if i 6= i
0




(i; s) = C(i; s) [ f'g
c
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The binary relation j=
C
between a formula in L
C
and a pair M; s consisting of a model
M for L
C





', ' 2 C(i; s)
The denition of r
C
for the selection actions indeed provides for a correct model-
transformation.
6.11. Proposition. For all M 2M
C











Besides being correct in that well-dened models are transformed into well-dened
models, our formalisation of the act of selecting is also correct with respect to minimal
change. That is, the change caused by selecting some formula is minimal given that
the formula is to be marked chosen, which implies that our formalisation of selections
does not suer from the frame problem. The following proposition provides a (partial)
formalisation of this property.
6.12. Proposition. For all M 2M
C





(i; select')(M; s) then for all states s
0










 , for all
 2 L.
Proposition 6.12 states that all formulae from L are interpreted identically in a model
M and in the one resulting from selecting some formula in an arbitrary state of M. As a
direct consequence of this proposition we have the following corollary, which states that
the interpretation of wishes and implementability formulae persists under selecting some
formula.
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6.13. Corollary. For all M 2 M
C





(i; select')(M; s) then for all states s
0































Having dened wishes and selections, one might be tempted to straightforwardly de-






'. This denition is however
not adequate to formalise the idea of goals being selected, unfullled, implementable
wishes. The reason for this is that in well-dened models from M
C
no relation is im-
posed between `being selected' and `being unfullled and implementable', i.e. one is not
prevented by Denition 6.4 to come up with a well-dened modelM in which for certain
i and s the set C(i; s) contains formulae ' that are either fullled or not implementable.
We see basically two ways of solving this problem, a semantical and a syntactical one.
Semantically one could restrict the set of well-dened models for L
C
to those in which the
set C(i; s) contains for all agents i and states s only unfullled and implementable for-
mulae, thereby ensuring beforehand that goals are unfullled and implementable when
using the denition suggested above. Syntactically one could dene goals to be only
those selected wishes that are indeed unfullled and implementable. Hence instead of
(semantically) restricting the set of well-dened models for L
C
one (syntactically) ex-
pands the denition of goals. Although both the semantic and the syntactic approach
are equally well applicable, we will restrict ourselves here to pursuing the syntactic one.
Therefore, goals are dened to be those wishes that are unfullled, implementable and
selected.
6.14. Definition. The Goal
i










As mentioned above, the goals of agents, being the explicit and active notions that
they are, are not to validate the properties of logical omniscience as formalised in Def-
inition 6.7. Fortunately, though not surprisingly, this indeed turns out to be the case
when dening goals as in Denition 6.14.
6.15. Proposition. None of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Def-
inition 6.7, with the exception of LO7, is valid for the Goal
i
operator.
The only property of logical omniscience satised by the goal operator, viz. LO7,
formalises the idea that an agent's goals are consistent. This is a highly desirable property
for rational creatures. For although it is quite possible for a rational agent to have
contradictory wishes, it is rather irrational to try and full these simultaneously.
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Besides invalidating the undesired ones among the properties of logical omniscience,
particularly those embodying the side-eect and transference problem, our denition
of goals and selections has some other pleasant and desirable features. The following
proposition formalises some of these features together with some properties characterising
the act of selecting.
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The rst item of Proposition 6.16 states that agents have the opportunity to select
all, and nothing but, their wishes. The second item formalises the idea that every choice
for which an agent has the opportunity results in the selected wish being marked chosen.
In the third item it is stated that whenever an agent is unable to select some formula,
then selecting this formula will not result in it becoming one of its goals. The related
item 4 states that all, and nothing but, practically possible selections result in the chosen
formula being a goal. The fth item provides a strengthening of the invalidation of the
second property of logical omniscience, which embodies the transference problem. It
states that no logically inevitable formula qualies as a goal. Hence whenever a formula
is valid this does not only not necessarily imply that it is a goal but it even necessarily
implies that it is not. The last two items of Proposition 6.16 are related to the avoidance
of the transference problem, and state that goals are neither closed under implications
nor under known implications.
6.4 Formalising commitments
The last part of our formalisation of motivational attitudes concerns the agents' com-
mitments. Commitments to actions represent promises to perform these actions, i.e.
an agent that is committed to an action has promised itself to perform the action. As
mentioned above, commitments may be made to plans for goals, i.e. whenever an agent
is committed it should be to an action that is correct and feasible to bring about at least
one of its goals.
Not only do we formalise this static aspect of made commitments, but we also consider
the dynamic aspect of making and undoing commitments. The act of committing is
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related to, and can be seen as, an elementary implementation of practical reasoning,
the process through which agents decide that they should perform certain actions (their
ought-to-do's) on the basis of their wishes, desires or goals (their ought-to-be's). Ever
since Aristotle, the study of practical reasoning has formed a major constituent of the
research in analytical philosophy [111]. According to Von Wright [134], the essence of
practical reasoning is best captured by the following syllogism:
i intends to make it true that '
i thinks that, unless it does , it will not achieve this
Therefore i intends to do .
The simplied version of practical reasoning that we aim to formalise through the act of
committing can be described by the following syllogism,
i knows that ' is one of its goals
i knows that  is correct and feasible with respect to '
Therefore i has the opportunity to commit itself to 
which corresponds to the idea that commitments may be made to actions that are known
to be correct and feasible to achieve some of the agent's goals.
Commitments are formalised through the Committed operator: Committed
i

denotes that agent i is committed to the action . The act of committing is modelled
by the (special) action commit to : commit to represents the act of committing to
the (regular) action . As mentioned in Section 6.1, commitments, though in general
persistent, should not be maintained when having become useless or impossible, i.e.
agents should have the possibility to undo useless or impossible commitments. This act
of uncommitting is formalised by the uncommit action: uncommit  denotes the act of
undoing the commitment to the action . In the sequel we successively formalise the act
of committing, the commitments that have been made, and the act of uncommitting.
6.4.1 Getting committed
The act of committing, though of a special nature compared to other actions, is treated
as a fully-edged action, i.e. we dene what it means to have the ability or opportu-
nity to commit, and what the result of committing is. To start with the latter notion,
given the relation between the innitive `to commit' and the past participle `commit-
ted', it seems rather obvious that the act of committing should result in the agent being
committed. Determining when an agent has the opportunity to perform a commit to
action is equally obvious, for it is inspired by the syllogism describing our version of
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practical reasoning given above. Hence agent i has the opportunity to perform the ac-
tion commit to if and only if it knows that  is correct and feasible to bring about
one of its goals. This leaves to determine the constituents of the ability of an agent to
commit itself. Our denition of this ability is inspired by the observation that situations
where agents are committed to two (or more) essentially dierent actions are highly
problematic. Since `being committed to ' intuitively corresponds to `having promised
(to oneself) to perform  next', it is unclear how to interpret the case where an agent is
committed to two dierent actions. Should both actions be performed simultaneously?
But what does it mean that actions are performed simultaneously? Are they performed
concurrent, interleaved or in parallel? Or should the actions be performed sequentially?
If so, in which order? And what then if the commitment to perform one action does not
persist under execution of the other action? As an answer to these questions we propose
that situations where agents have multiple commitments are to be avoided. One way
to ensure this is to let an agent have the ability to commit itself only if it is not up to
any previously made commitments, i.e. an agent is capable to commit only if it is not
already committed.
As mentioned previously, an agent's commitments are interpreted by means of the
so-called agenda function. The idea is that this function yields, for a given agent and a
given state, the actions that the agent is committed to. Whenever an agent successfully
commits itself to an action the agent's agenda is updated accordingly. The actual formal
denition capturing this fairly unsophisticated idea is itself rather complicated. The
reason for this lies in various desiderata that commitments and the act of committing
should meet.
The rst of these desiderata is that commitments should be known, i.e. agents should
be aware of the commitments that they have made. To bring about this knowledge
of commitments, epistemic equivalence classes rather than states are considered in an
agenda update. Thus whenever agent i commits itself to action  in some state s of
a model, the agenda of all states s
0
that are epistemically equivalent with s is updated
appropriately.
The second and very important desideratum imposed on commitments is that they
behave compositionally correct, i.e. the commitment to a composite action is linked in a
rational way to commitments to its constituents. It is for example desirable that an agent




fi is also committed to 
1
whenever







and committed to 
2
in the state of aairs that results from executing 
1
.
To ensure the kind of rational behaviour associated with the conditional composition with
known condition, an agent's agenda does not contain syntactical representations of made
commitments, but instead the semantic essence of such a commitment. Consequently,
the act of committing should not result in an update with the actual action that is
162 Chapter 6. How to motivate your agents
committed to, but instead adds the semantic essence of the newly made commitment
to the agenda. This semantic essence, which is a situated notion dependent on an
agent and a state, is given by a `normalised' form of the (unique) nite computation
run of the action for the agent in the state. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this nite
computation run is a sequence of atomic actions and tests which constitutes the halting
execution of an event in a state. A normal form of a basic action  is an action 
0
that
originates from  by removing all brackets occurring in  and re-inserting them starting





























). By considering the (semantic) notion of
normalised nite computation runs rather than the actions themselves, it is ensured that
commitments depend on meaning rather than syntactical shape: if an agent is committed
to an action it is also committed to all actions that are essentially identical. To bring
about rational behaviour of commitments with respect to sequentially composed actions
the actual update does not just concern the epistemic equivalence class of the current
state, but also that of all the states that lay alongside the execution trajectory of the




in the state s of some model,
then the epistemic equivalence class of s is updated with the commitment to 
1
, and the
epistemic equivalence class of the state s
00





is an element of the epistemic equivalence of s is updated with the commitment to 
2
.
Since the actions from Ac are deterministic, for each event built out of these actions
there is at most one nite computation sequence which consists of the semi-atomic actions
that occur in the halting executing of the event. Or phrased dierently, the set of
nite computation runs of a given event do
i
() is either empty or a singleton set. This
property of deterministic actions facilitates the denition of nite computation runs to
a considerable extent: simply dene it to be the unique nite computation sequence
for which execution terminates (compare this to the rather complex denition given in
Chapter 4).
6.17. Definition. Since Ac is closed under the core clauses only, the function CS : Ac!
}(Ac
b












(i; ; s) = f
0




)(M; s) 6= ;g
We will not bother to give a rigid mathematical denition of the normalised function,
which turns basic actions into their normal form. The inherent simplicity of this function
makes it not worthwhile to put an eort into dening it formally. We therefore assume
the normalised function to be given, and do the same for the projection function 
2
,
which is assumed to yield the second element of a pair.
For reasons of convenience we introduce, analogously to the Can-predicate, a so-called
Intend-predicate, which is meant to formalise the intentions of agents. The denition of
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this predicate is based on the idea that agents (loosely) intend to do all the actions that
are correct and feasible with respect to some of their goals. As such, intention provides
the precondition for successful commitment
7
.
6.18. Definition. For  2 Ac
C
; i 2 A and ' 2 L we dene:
Intend
i







Having established the formal prerequisites, we can now present the denitions for-
malising the intuitive description of the act of committing as presented above.
6.19. Definition. For all M 2M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac we dene:
r
C
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; ') for all ' 2 C(i; s)
r
C
(i; commit to)(M; s) = M
0
; s with M
0

































































(i; commit to)(M; s) = 1 i Agenda(i; s) = ;
To make Denition 6.19 come to life, and in particular to shed some light on the rather
abstract and fairly complicated denition of r
C
as it is given above, consider Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 is a pictorial representation of what happens when an agent i makes a
successful commitment to an action  in the leftmost state s of the model represented
in the gure. The small circles represent dierent states of the model, the leftmost arcs,
annotated with R(i), represent elements of i's epistemic accessibility relation, the dotted







represent transitions between states. We assume that the








































) : : :))
In accordance with Denition 6.19, i's commitment to  is carried out by updating the
agenda of i in each state that is an element of an epistemic equivalence class appearing
alongside the execution trajectory of . In terms of Figure 6.1 this comes down to








) : : :), while causing
7
Our paraphrase of Cohen & Levesque's motto `intention is choice plus commitment' [20] could therefore
be stated as `commitments are chosen intentions'.













































Figure 6.1. The act of committing




equivalence classes. Some aspects of Figure 6.1 are
particular worth noticing, the rst of these being the fact that, except for the epistemic
equivalence class surrounding the initial states, all agenda updates are carried out on
the level of epistemic equivalence classes rather than on the level of states. That is, the
agenda of i is extended with one and the same action in all the states of such an epistemic
equivalence class. Moreover, the actual nature of this action is determined and xed in
the equivalence class of the initial state. A last but important point to notice is that
only the agenda of i is modied, and that only in those states that are somehow, i.e. by
a combination of state-transitions and epistemic accessibility relations, connected to the
state in which the commitment is being made. All other elements of the model remain
unchanged.
The latter aspect mentioned above, i.e. the minimality of the change caused by per-
forming a commitment, is partly formalised in Proposition 6.21 given below. Proposi-
tion 6.20 states the correctness of the denition of r
C
as presented above in the sense
that it yields a (unique) well-dened model when applied to a well-dened model.
6.20. Proposition. For all M 2 M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac, if
M
0
; s = r
C






6.21. Proposition. For all M 2 M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac, if
M
0
; s = r
C
(i; commit to)(M; s) then for all states s
0











for all ' 2 L.
Additional properties related to the commit actions are given in 6.4.4.
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6.4.2 Being committed
After the rather elaborate and fairly complicated denition formalising the act of com-
mitting, dening what it means to be committed is a relatively straightforward and easy
job. Basically, agents are committed to all actions whose semantic essence is captured
by the normalised basic action in the appropriate agenda. The only additional aspect
that has to be taken into account when dening the semantics of the Committed op-
erator is that agents should start at the very beginning (a very good place to start),
i.e. whenever an agent's agenda contains a normalised basic action which is not semi-
atomic, then the agent is also committed to actions whose semantic essence is a prex
of this normalised basic action. This constraint is quite an obvious one: how can agents
be faithfully committed to a sequentially composed action if not committed to its rst
constituent? Formally we ensure this behaviour by using the prex relation on basic




operator could then be informally
interpreted as `an agent is committed to those actions of which the semantic essence is
a prex of one of the actions in its agenda'.
6.22. Definition. The binary relation j=
C
between a formula in L
C
and a pair M; s
consisting of a model M for L
C


























An investigation of the properties of the commitment operator is postponed to 6.4.4.
6.4.3 Getting uncommitted
By performing an uncommit action, agents may undo previously made commitments
that turned out to be either useless or impossible. That is, as soon as an agent no longer
knows some commitment to be correct and feasible for at least one of its goals it may
undo this commitment. Just as we did for the commit action, we have to decide upon
the constituents of the result, opportunity and ability for the actions formalising the
act of uncommitting. The result of such an action is obvious: agents should no longer
be committed to  after a successful performance of an uncommit  action
8
. Dening
what it means to have the opportunity and ability to uncommit represents a somewhat
more arbitrarily choice. We have decided to let an agent have the opportunity to undo
8
As was pointed out to me by John Fox, this description of the result of undoing a commitment
comprises a major simplication. For in real life, undoing commitments involves more than just abandoning
future commitments: it is also necessary to (try to) undo all the eects that followed from initially pursuing




nds out after having done 
1
that
its commitment to 
2
should be undone, then it should not only remove 
2
from its agenda but also try
to undo as many of the eects of 
1
as possible.
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any of its commitments, i.e. there is nothing in its circumstances that may prevent an
agent to undo a commitment. Our loyal, diligent agents are however only (morally)





consists of nothing but a formalisation of these intuitive ideas.
6.23. Definition. For all M 2M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac we dene:
r
C







(i; uncommit)(M; s) = M
0
; s with M
0
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; ') for all ' 2 C(i; s)
Our denition of r
C
for the uncommit actions is also twofold correct: not only does
performing an uncommit action provide for a correct model-transformation, but also does
it do so while causing minimal change.
6.24. Proposition. For all M 2 M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac, if
M
0
; s = r
C






6.25. Proposition. For all M 2 M
C
with state s, for all i 2 A and  2 Ac, if
M
0
; s = r
C
(i; uncommit)(M; s) then for all states s
0











for all ' 2 L.
Additional validities characterising the uncommit action are given below.
6.4.4 The statics and dynamics of commitments
Here we characterise the statics and dynamics of commitments by presenting some va-
lidities for j=
C
. For a start we consider a number of validities characterising the dynamics
of commitments.




































































The rst two items of Proposition 6.26 jointly formalise our version of the syllogism of
practical reasoning as described above. In the third item it is stated that being committed
prevents an agent from having the ability to (re)commit. The fourth item states that
the act of committing is ability-destructive with respect to future commit actions, i.e.
by performing a commitment an agent loses its ability to make any other commitments.
Item 5 states that being committed is a necessary and sucient condition for having the
opportunity to uncommit; as mentioned above, agents have the opportunity to undo all
of their commitments. In item 6 it is stated that agents are (morally) unable to undo
commitments to actions that are still known to be correct and feasible to achieve some
goal. In item 7 it is formalised that agents know of their abilities to uncommit to some
action. The last item states that whenever an agent is committed to an action that is
no longer known to be practically possible, it knows that it can undo this impossible
commitment.
The following proposition formalises some of the desiderata for the statics of com-
mitments that turn out to be valid in the class M
C
of models for L
C
.





















































((confirm';); while' do od)
The rst item of Proposition 6.27 states that commitments are known, and the second
and third item formalise the rationality of agents with regard to their commitments to
conditionally composed actions. The last item concerns the unfolding of a while-loop:
if an agent is committed to a while-loop while knowing the condition of the loop to be
true, then the agent is also committed to the then-part of the while-loop.
The attentive reader may have noticed the absence of any validities characterising the
commitments to sequentially composed actions. However, recall that among the desider-
ata we formulated for commitments was one stating that whenever an agent is committed




it is also committed to 
1
(now) and to 
2
in the state of aairs follow-
ing execution of 
1
. This desideratum is for the greater part met by our formalisation.




is also committed to
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implies a commitment to 
2
in the state of aairs resulting from
the execution of 
1




which diers from the one
represented by the circle. In s
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) : : :))). It is however by no means guar-
anteed that i is committed to 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) : : :) after performing 
2
, i.e. M; s
0
does












) : : :)). Despite the fact that
we did not completely meet the demand formulated for commitments to sequentially
composed actions, it turns out that we do so for the action central to a commitment, i.e.
the action that the commitment was originally made to (in Figure 6.1  is central to the
commitment). The second item of Proposition 6.28 formalises this property.


























































. As such this second item
is a weaker variant of the non-validated part of the desideratum for commitments to
sequentially composed actions.
6.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we presented a formalisation of motivational attitudes, the attitudes that
explain why agents act the way they do. This formalisation concerns operators both
on the assertion level, where operators range over propositions, and on the practition
level, where operators range over actions. An important feature of our formalisation
is the attention paid to the acts associated with selecting between wishes and with
(un)committing to actions. Starting from the primitive notion of wishes, we dened
goals to be selected, unfullled, implementable wishes. Commitments may be made to
actions that are known to be correct and feasible with respect to some goal and may be
undone whenever the action to which an agent has committed itself has either become
impossible or useless. Both the act of making, and the act of undoing commitments are
formalised as model-transforming actions in our framework. The actions that an agent
is committed to are recorded in its agenda in such a way that commitments are closed
under prex-taking and under practical identity. On the whole our formalisation is a
rather expressive one, which tries to be faithful to a certain extent to both commonsense
intuition and philosophical insights.
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6.5.1 Possible extensions
The major extension to the framework presented in this chapter concerns a formalisation
of the actual execution of actions. Although the conditional nature of a framework based
on dynamic logic makes it perhaps less suitable for an adequate formalisation of `doing',
one could think of a practition operator indicating which action is actually performed
next. Using this predicate would enhance expressiveness in that it would be possible
to formulate relations between actions that agents are committed to, and actions that
they actually perform. Another way to extend the framework would be by establishing
further relations with deontic notions like obligations and violations. A combination of
the `doing'-predicate with a deontic notion modelling violations or penalties would then
allow one to model that agents should execute the actions that they are committed to
if they want to avoid penalties. Research along these lines was initiated by Dignum &
Van Linder [25, 26].
6.5.2 Bibliographical notes
This chapter is a thoroughly revised version of [86], to which a more elaborate dynamic
component is added and from which some questionable restrictions have been removed.
The formalisation of motivational attitudes has received much attention within the
agent research community. Probably the most inuential account of motivational atti-
tudes is due to Cohen & Levesque [20]. Starting from the primitive notions of implicit
goals and beliefs, Cohen & Levesque dene so-called persistent goals, which are goals
which agents give up only when they think they are either satised or will never be true,
and intentions, both ranging over propositions and over actions. The idea underlying
persistent goals is similar to that underlying our notion of goals. Agents intend to bring
about a proposition if they intend to do some action that brings about the proposition.
An agent intends to do an action if it has the persistent goal to have done the action.
This reduction of intentions to do actions for goals is a rather articial and philosoph-
ically very questionable one: although intentions to actions should be related to goals,
this relation should express that doing the action helps in bringing about some goal and
not that doing the action in itself is a goal. Furthermore the coexistence of goals and
intentions ranging over propositions seems to complicate matters unnecessarily.
Another important formalisation of motivational attitudes is proposed by Rao &
George [109] in their BDI-architecture. Treating desires and intentions as primitive,
Rao & George focus on the process of intention revision rather than the `commitment
acquisition' which is essential to our formalisation. Both desires and intentions in their
framework suer from the problems associated with logical omniscience. To avoid these
problems, Cavedon et al. [18] propose the use of non-normal logics of intention and belief
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in the BDI-architecture, and more in particular Rantala's `impossible worlds' framework
[106]. This `impossible worlds' approach was originally proposed as a way to solve the
problems of logical omniscience for informational attitudes. Hence, whereas we more
or less employ the awareness approach, Cavedon et al. propose yet another technique
developed to solve the problems of logical omniscience. It therefore may come as no
surprise that the properties that Cavedon et al. acquire for intentions are highly similar
to the properties of goals given in Section 6.3.
The last formalisation of motivational attitudes that we would like to mention is
the one proposed by Dignum et al. [27]. In this formalisation, which is inspired by and
based on research on deontic logic as carried out by Dignum et al., notions like decisions,
intentions and commitments are modelled. Of these, decisions and the act of committing
are interpreted as so-called meta-actions, a notion similar to that of model-transformers.
Despite its complexity, which is due to the incorporation of an algebraic semantics of
actions and a trace semantics to model histories, some of the essential ideas underlying
the formalisation of Dignum et al. are not unlike those underlying the formalisation
presented in this chapter.
6.6 Selected proofs
6.8. Proposition. All of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Deni-
tion 6.7, with the exception of LO7, are valid for the W
i
operator.
Proof: Properties LO1 and LO2 state that W
i
is a normal modal operator and are
shown as for any necessity operator. Property LO3 follows directly by combining LO1
and LO2, and LO4 is a direct consequence of LO3. Properties LO5 and LO6 are typical
for necessity operators: for whenever both ' and  hold at a set of designated worlds,
' ^  also holds at all the worlds from that set (LO5), and if ' holds at all worlds from
some set then ' _  does also (LO6). That LO7 is not valid for the W
i
operator is seen
by considering a model M with state s such that no state s
0
exists with (s; s
0
) 2 W(i).






:', for all ' 2 L.
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6.12. Proposition. For all M 2M
C





(i; select')(M; s) then for all states s
0










 , for all
 2 L.
Proof: The `ocial' proof of this proposition proceeds by an induction not unlike the
one used in proving completeness of the logic LCap in Chapter 3. Unocially, this
proposition is obvious since the models M and M
0
as mentioned above agree completely
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on all their elements that are used to interpret formulae from L. The only element
in which they (possibly) dier, i.e. the function C, is not used in the interpretation of
formulae from L.

6.15. Proposition. None of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Def-
inition 6.7, with the exception of LO7, is valid for the Goal
i
operator.
Proof: Properties LO1, LO3, LO4, LO5 and LO6 are most easily seen not to hold for the
goal operator by noting the absence of any closure properties on the set C(i; s), for i 2 A
and s some state. Due to this absence it is perfectly possible that ' and '!  are both





'$  (LO4), that f';  g  C(i; s) and ' ^  62 C(i; s) (LO5), or that ' 2 C(i; s)
while '_ 62 C(i; s) (LO6), for appropriate i 2 A and s a state in some model. Property
LO2 is seen not to hold by observing that j=
C
' implies that ' is fullled always and
everywhere, which means that ' is not a goal. In fact, one can show that whenever ' is
inevitable, i.e. j=
C




' holds (cf. item
5 of Proposition 6.16).
That LO7 holds for goals is a direct consequence of their unfullledness. For in any









:'. Hence LO7 is a valid property for goals.
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Proof: We successively show all items. Let M 2M
C
with state s and ' 2 L be arbitrary.
1. An easy inspection of Denition 6.10 shows that r
C










(select')i>, which was to be shown.
2. If M
0
; s = r
C
(i; select')(M; s), then M
0
is such that C
0

















(select')i>, which suces to conclude item 2.
172 Chapter 6. How to motivate your agents








'. Now by denition, ' 2
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' holds, then M; s j=
C
' for all M 2M
C
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6. This item is easily shown by selecting an appropriate contingency ' and an arbitrary
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7. Item 7 is proved similarly to item 6.
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Proof: We show the second, third, fourth, seventh and eight item; the other ones follow
directly from the respective denitions. Let M 2M
C
with state s, and i 2 A, ;  2 Ac
be arbitrary.




(commit to)i> and let M
0
; s = r
C
(i; commit to)(M; s). We have































))). A close inspection of






























), since  is treated identically in both M and M
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suces to conclude that item 2 holds.
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 then, by Denition 6.22, we have that Agenda(i; s) 6= ;.
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which suces to conclude item 4.

















' for all ' 2 C(i; s).












































uncommit , which suces to conclude that item 7 indeed holds.
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 by Proposition 6.27(1),




























), which suces to conclude item 8.
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((confirm';); while' do od)
Proof: We successively show all items. Let M 2M
C

























































































































































. Then it is indeed the














), which suces to conclude this item.
3. This item is completely analogous to the previous one.
4. From the denition of CR
C
M






(i; while' do od; s) = CR
C
M
(i; (confirm';); while' do od; s). By a simi-








((confirm';); while' do od),
which concludes item 4.
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, which concludes the proof of this item.
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. An inspection of Figure 6.1 learns that for all states s
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Conclusions and future work
And when you feel you're near the end
And what once burned so bright is growing dim
And when you see what's been achieved
Is there a feeling that you've been deceived?
David Gilmour, `Near the End'.
In this brief chapter we globally reect on the picture of agents as it is emerging from this
thesis, and in particular compare this picture with the informal description presented in
Chapter 1. As an example of how the formal machinery developed in the previous chap-
ters could be put to work we present a sketchy specication of an (articial) information
agent. To conclude we summarise the main contributions of this thesis, and indicate
open problems and opportunities for future research.
7.1 What's an agent, anyway?
The agents formalised in this thesis act in the world, and interact with the world and with
other agents, both on a physical and on a mental level. They reason about their own, and
other agents' acts, motives and information. The agents are rational, both with respect
to their information, i.e. knowledge and various kinds of belief, and with respect to their
acts, in particular when these acts are either nondeterministic or non-mundane. They
are autonomous, in that they may themselves decide to adopt goals and to make or undo
certain commitments, and they are social when communicating with other agents. Lastly,
they have the possibility to acquire information through observations, communication or
reasoning by default, and may use this information, for instance to reect on their goals
and commitments.
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7.2 Modelling rational agents
To give the reader an impression as to how the machinery developed in the previous
chapters could be used in the formal specication of articial agents, we present an
example specication of a fairly realistic information agent. This agent is similar to,
and inspired by, the software agents implemented at the MIT Media Lab [88, 89, 90].
The language in which this specication is formulated is a combination of the languages
presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, where it has to be remarked that we take a
somewhat liberal view on this. That is, we for example allow other formulae other than
purely propositional ones to occur as the argument of an informative action, and we
allow wishes to range over more general formulae than the ones considered in Chapter 6.
The modications necessary to semantically account for these changes in the syntax are
| as far as we can see | fairly obvious and straightforwardly implementable.
7.1. Example. Consider an intelligent information agent that is assisting some user with
his/her information management. The agent either observes the informational needs of
the user or is told by the user what these needs consist of. The wishes of the user are the
agent's commands, i.e. if the agent either observes or is told one of the user's wishes then
it knows that this wish becomes one of its own. Starting from the wishes of the user, the
agent infers its goals, and consecutively tries to come to a commitment to an appropriate
action. This commitment is then communicated back to the user who decides whether
the agent indeed has to live up to this commitment.
Now suppose the user wants to know whether some le is present on his/her disk,
but s/he does not have direct access to this data. The agent however knows that it has
the ability to nd out whether this le is present, while it furthermore knows that the
user depends on the agent for information on the presence of this le. In addition, the
agent knows that it is ready to make commitments since it is as of yet not committed
to any action whatsoever. Using the symbol u to represent the user, i to represent the
agent, and f to represent the proposition `the le is present on the disk', this situation
is formally specied by the following four formulae. These formulae, as well as the other
ones appearing in this example, are tagged to indicate their status: formulae tagged with
an `A' are assumptions underlying this specic example, formulae tagged with an `L' are
laws that are universally valid, and formulae tagged with a `C' are logical consequences



























 for all  (A)
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The user on its turn knows that s/he wants to know whether the le is present on
his/her disk while not having any information of this kind at this moment. Furthermore,
the user knows that the agent is willing to accept the user as an authority on any of





















') for all ' (A)
Since the user knows of his/her wish to know whether the le is present on the disk
and furthermore the agent accepts the user as an authority on his/her wishes, the user
now has the opportunity to inform the agent of this wish. Assuming that the agent did
not have any information on the wishes of the user prior to communication it will indeed
accept the user's wish. The following formula, which follows from the validity given in
item 6 of Proposition 5.30 and hence itself would be valid in the new semantics for the








































As a result of being told that the user wants to know whether the le is present,
the agent communicationally believes that it wishes the user to be in the possession of
this information. Using the rst equivalence given in the specication of the agent this
implies that the agent knows that it wishes the user to know whether the le is present







































By assumption, the agent knows that it has the ability to observe whether the le
is present on the user's disk. Since observations are realisable (cf. item 2 of Propo-
sition 5.27) the agent furthermore knows that it has the opportunity to observe the
presence of the le. According to Denition 3.17 this implies that the agent knows that




















The agent knows that if it observed the le to be present, it may successfully transfer
this information to its user, which after all depends on the agent for information of
this kind. Analogously, if the agent observed that the le is not on the disk, it has
the reliable opportunity to tell the user that this is the case. Furthermore, the agent
knows that having observational belief on the presence of the le implies having the
ability to communicate this fact. These properties are formalised in the following four
formulae. The rst two of these formulae follow directly from the validity presented in
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item 6 of Proposition 5.30 and are thus themselves valid. The last two formulae are














































inform (:f; u)) (L)
Assuming that the agent knows that the user does not have any information whatso-
ever on the presence of the le, and using that the agent knows that the user depends on
it for information on the presence of the le on his/her disk, the rst two of the formulae





















Using the equivalence given in item 3 of Proposition 3.5 we can conclude from these
formulae that the agent knows that if it observationally believes whether the le is
present on the disk then performing a conditional composition that either amounts to
telling the user that the le is present on the disk or that it is not, dependent on the
information that the agent itself acquired through observation, will result in the user
communicationally believing whether the le is indeed present. By an analogous line of
reasoning and using the equivalence given in item 4 of Proposition 3.6, it follows that
the agent knows that if it observationally believes that the le is present then it has the


























f then inform (f; u) else inform (:f; u) fi)) (C)
Since the agent knows that an observation on the presence of the le on the user's
disk results in it observationally believing whether this is the case, it also knows that
sequentially composing the observation on the presence of the le with the conditionally
encapsulated communication with the user constitutes a correct and feasible plan to

















(observe f ; ifB
o
i
f then inform (f; u) else inform (:f; u) fi) (C)
 Can
i
(observe f ; ifB
o
i




Let us denote the correct and feasible action that the agent came up with by plan,
i.e. plan , observe f ; ifB
o
i
f then inform (f; u) else inform (:f; u) fi.
Slightly deviating from the original denition of the implementability operator, we
assume that the practical possibility to bring about some proposition suces to conclude
that the proposition is implementable. Basically this comes down to declaring a formula
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to be implementable if the agent has the practical possibility to perform an arbitrary
(sequence of) action(s) | rather than a sequence of atomic actions as demanded in





' for all  and all ' (A/L)
Since the agent (knows that it) has the practical possibility to bring it about that the
user communicationally believes whether the le is present on the disk by performing










The combination of the implementability of the user communicationally believing


















which is a validity in the semantics given in Chapter 6, to conclude that the agent
knows that it is able to select the proposition that the user communicationally believes









Since the agent's wishes are closed under logical consequence (cf. Proposition 6.8),
and communicational beliefs are implied by knowledge (cf. Proposition 5.5), it follows
from the fact that the agent knows that it wishes the user to know whether the le is

















Note that in Chapter 6 we did not consider the wish operator to range over doxastic





from Chapter 6 it is however quite straightforward to let wishes range over
formulae from L
I
, including the doxastic ones.
Using the following formula, which is a validity in the semantics of Chapter 6, it



















Since the agent knows that it has both the opportunity and ability | and hence
the practical possibility | to select this wish, according to item 4 of Proposition 6.16
it follows that the agent knows that it can set the goal of the user communicationally














Assuming that the agent knows of its goals as soon as it has set them, it follows that
the agent knows that it has the goal that the user is informed on the presence of the le
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on the disk. The knowledge of this goal in combination with the agent's knowledge on
its practical possibility to achieve this goal, suces according to the following formula,
which is a combination of the rst two items of Proposition 6.26, to conclude that the



















Since the agent knows of its commitments (cf. item 1 of Proposition 6.27), it may
now inform the user of its commitment to the plan. Assuming that the user is both
ignorant on this fact and willing to accept the information of the agent, this transfer of
information results in the user communicationally believing that the agent is committed.
This is formalised in the following formula, which is a validity in the combined semantics

























Since the agent knows both of its commitment to its plan and of the user's dependence








It is now up to the user whether the agent has to live up to its commitment and
perform its plan.
7.3 Achievements
In this thesis we investigated the use and usability of modal logic as a tool to formalise
rational agents. In doing so, we combined various modal logics, viz. epistemic, doxastic
and dynamic logic, in one formal framework. This combination in itself is already con-
siderably original, but even more so is the incorporation of ability as a rst-class citizen.
The latter allows us to reason with, and about, opportunity and ability as independent
notions, which enhances the expressive power of the framework. Various interesting
notions relating opportunity, ability, result and knowledge are dened in terms of the
framework, which furthermore allows for a formalisation of philosophically interesting
notions, like for example practical possibility. Sound and complete axiomatisations of
two kinds of validity in the class of models of the basic formal system are given, the
most remarkable feature of which is the use of innitary proof rules. The proof that
these axiomatisations are indeed sound and complete is a rather elaborate and fairly
complex one. The rst possible extension of the framework that we considered deals
with nondeterminism of actions. Due to the presence of ability as a primitive, i.e. non-
reducible, notion in our framework the need arises for non-standard formalisations of
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nondeterminism. We presented two novel approaches, which are based on the unrav-
elling of actions, and one which is an adaptation of the one proposed by Peleg in his
Concurrent Propositional Dynamic Logic. The pragmatic, algorithmic character of the
two approaches based on the unravelling of actions clearly shows their origin to be in
computer science. The second extension of the basic framework provided a formalisation
of intelligent information agents, i.e. agents of which the main task is to manage informa-
tion. In dening these agents we presented a novel extension of the usual semantics for
doxastic logic. This extended semantics allows for a classication of beliefs according to
their credibility. To model the information acquisition of agents we introduced special,
so-called informative actions. The semantics of these actions is based on a new paradigm
for Propositional Dynamic Logic. This new paradigm generalises the standard one, in
that actions may cause transformations of models in addition to transitions between
states. Using this more general paradigm we succeeded in modelling informative actions
in such a way that compliance with the AGM postulates for belief change is guaran-
teed. Another novel aspect of our modelling of intelligent information agents concerns
the formalisation of supernormal defaults. We proposed to model these defaults by the
epistemic notion of common possibility. This allows us to formalise defaults in their
entirety within the formal framework, without resorting to additional formal tools. The
last formalisation presented in this thesis concerns the agents' motivational attitudes.
The formalisation as we present it deals with a broad range of motivational attitudes,
both at the level of assertions, where we consider wishes and goals, and at the level of
practitions, where we formalise commitments. In contrast with common practice, we
did not dene goals to be primitive, but in terms of selected wishes. Apart from being
more acceptable from a philosophical and psychological point of view, this allowed us to
avoid all kinds of problems that are well-known to plague formalisations of motivational
attitudes. With regard to the agent's selections and commitments we considered both
a static and a dynamic aspect, the latter of which is formalised using the generalised
paradigm for Propositional Dynamic Logic that we previously introduced.
On the whole, we investigated the boundaries of expressiveness of modal logic when
used to model rational agents. The results that we achieved in trying to extend the
standard account of the various modal logics, viz. the extension of doxastic logic that
allows one to classify beliefs according to credibility and the generalised paradigm for
dynamic logic, combined with the easy adaptation of our framework to one's personal
preferences, clearly shows the exibility of our approach. Given the extensions proposed
in this thesis, we are of the opinion that modal logic can indeed serve as a exible
and expressive yet intelligible formal tool in the analysis and specication of agents and
agency. That is not to say that the road to genuine practical use of the formalism
presented in this thesis might not be long and full of unexpected obstacles.
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7.4 Future research
We foresee several directions in which the research captured in this thesis could proceed.
The most obvious one is to further investigate, and eventually implement, the suggestions
for possible extensions as made throughout this thesis. In addition to this, we feel that
it could be worthwhile and interesting to come up with a rst-order version of the
logical systems presented here. This would on the one hand certainly involve its own
specic problems, on the other hand it would enlarge expressiveness to a considerable
extent. Another area for further research covers the introduction of temporal notions in
the various formal systems. The incorporation of (implicit or explicit) notions of time
and duration would probably be necessary to make the formalisms suitable for practical
applications.
In addition to these extensions at the object-level, there is also a lot of research to be
carried out at a higher level. In the rst instance this high level research concerns the
subjects that we explicitly mentioned not to be covered by this thesis. That is, research
on the (meta-)logical properties of the various formal systems is still to be conducted.
Topics like decidability and complexity have as of yet not been dealt with, and sound
and complete axiomatisations for systems other than the most basic ones are lacking.
On a practical level we foresee two main topics of research. Firstly, in the spirit
of the specication given in Example 7.1 one should try to formally specify and verify
existing (software) agents. Secondly, it could be interesting to look at fragments of the
various systems that could be fed to a theorem prover for automatic verication of formal
specications. An investigation of this kind would probably go hand in hand with the
study of meta-logical properties like decidability and complexity.
It is our hope that the formal systems presented in this thesis will prove to be a fertile
soil for further investigation, both from a theoretical and from a practical perspective.
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Samenvatting
It doesn't have to be so complicated
all of the time.
Banana Yoshimoto, `NP'.
In een zin samengevat gaat dit proefschrift over formele technieken die gebruikt kunnen
worden bij het modelleren van menselijk gedrag. Met behulp van zo'n modellering kan
niet alleen precies gekeken worden waardoor bepaald gedrag veroorzaakt wordt, maar
ook kan gewenst gedrag formeel beschreven worden. Dit formeel beschrijven, of formeel
speciceren, kan belangrijk zijn om het gedrag van entiteiten die geacht worden zich min
of meer menselijk te gedragen precies vast te leggen. Voorbeelden van dit soort entiteiten
zijn robots als Archie (de man van staal), maar ook software die computerprogramma's
een menselijk interface geeft en de levensechte karakters die optreden in een virtual
reality omgeving. Entiteiten die een menselijk gedrag (dienen te) vertonen worden vaak
aangeduid met de Engelse term agent, afkomstig uit het Latijn, hetgeen in essentie
niets meer betekent dan `handelende entiteit'. Aangezien een pakkende Nederlandse
vertaling van deze term ontbreekt (het Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Engels-Nederlands
suggereert `handelend persoon' en het in de Nederlandse vertaling van de titel gebruikte
`actoren' is het ook niet helemaal) zullen we in de rest van deze samenvatting de Engelse
termen `agent' en `agents' gebruiken, waarbij voor het gemak aangenomen wordt dat
agents mannelijk zijn.
De laatste jaren wordt er zeer veel onderzoek gedaan naar agents, zowel op theoretisch
als op praktisch niveau. Ondanks het feit dat er veel mensen bezig zijn met agents (of
misschien juist wel doordat er zoveel mensen mee bezig zijn), bestaat er geen overeen-
stemming over wat nu precies onder een agent verstaan moet worden. Soms wordt een
algorithme beschouwd als een agent, bij object-geori

enteerd programmeren wordt een
object wel eens gezien als een agent, terwijl agents vaak ook gezien worden als robots
die zich als mensen gedragen. In dit proefschrift verstaan we onder een agent iedere
entiteit die de mogelijkheid heeft bepaalde acties uit te voeren, de beschikking heeft over
bepaalde informatie en redenen heeft om zich op een bepaalde manier te gedragen. Vaak
zullen agents ook nog rationeel zijn in hun gedragingen, tot op zekere hoogte autonoom
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zijn, en in staat zijn informatie te verwerven en die te gebruiken om hun gedrag aan te
passen. De modellering van dit soort agents vormt het onderwerp van dit proefschrift.
Zoals reeds eerder opgemerkt zijn modelleertechnieken op tenminste twee manieren
nuttig en bruikbaar. Enerzijds kunnen ze gebruikt worden om geconstateerd gedrag te
analyseren, anderzijds zijn ze te gebruiken om gewenst gedrag vast te leggen. Beide
aspecten zijn belangrijk bij de toepassing van formele technieken voor agents. Zo zijn er
gevallen bekend waar met behulp van formele technieken de oorzaak is opgespoord die er
voor zorgde dat bepaalde software agents zich afwijkend en ongewenst gedroegen. Daar-
naast worden agents vaak toegepast in omgevingen waar het noodzakelijk is zekerheid
omtrent hun gedrag te verkrijgen. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn toepassingen van agents in
systemen die luchtverkeersleiders assisteren. Het gebruik van formele technieken in de
specicatie van deze agents kan zorgen voor absolute zekerheid omtrent hun gedrag in
alle mogelijke omstandigheden.
De formele systemen die in dit proefschrift gebruikt worden zijn gebaseerd op mo-
dale logica's. Oorspronkelijk zijn deze logica's door Leibniz voorgesteld om lososche
begrippen als `noodzakelijkheid' en `mogelijkheid' te representeren. Met name na de
introductie van de mogelijke-werelden semantiek door Kripke worden modale logica's
gebruikt om een breed scala van begrippen, zowel uit de losoe als uit de informa-
tica, te modelleren. In dit proefschrift worden bestaande modale logica's op een nieuwe
wijze gecombineerd, en worden daarnaast verscheidene uitbreidingen van deze logica's
voorgesteld.
In hoofdstuk 3 deni

eren we het eerste, meest eenvoudige, formele systeem. In dit
systeem is het mogelijk de kennis en vaardigheden van agents te modelleren, de resultaten
van de acties die ze mogelijk uitvoeren, en het al dan niet hebben van de gelegenheid om
een actie uit te voeren. Hierbij zien we kennis als ware informatie, die verder zo is dat een
agent zich zowel bewust is van de dingen die hij weet als van de dingen die hij niet weet.
Als een agent bijvoorbeeld weet dat 174306 even is maar niet weet of het deelbaar is door
417, dan is 174306 niet alleen inderdaad even maar weet de agent ook dat hij dit weet
terwijl hij ook weet dat hij niet weet of het deelbaar is door 417. Alles wat veroorzaakt
wordt door het uitvoeren van een actie wordt beschouwd als een deel van het resultaat
van die actie. Het is bijvoorbeeld zo dat een resultaat van het verbranden van een brief
is dat er rook ontstaat, maar ook dat er papier omgezet wordt in as. De combinatie van
vaardigheid en gelegenheid bepaalt welke acties voor een agent praktisch (on)mogelijk
zijn. De vaardigheden van een agent bepalen welke acties binnen zijn capaciteiten liggen;
of de agent de gelegenheid heeft om die acties ook uit te voeren is afhankelijk van externe
omstandigheden. Een voorbeeld dat het verschil en het verband tussen vaardigheid en
gelegenheid duidelijk maakt betreft een leeuw in een dierentuin. Deze leeuw heeft zeer
waarschijnlijk wel de vaardigheid een zebra te verscheuren, maar zal (zo is te hopen voor
de zebra) niet de gelegenheid daarvoor krijgen. Om kennis, vaardigheden, gelegenheden
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en resultaten te modelleren, combineren we epistemische logica, de modale logica van
kennis, met dynamische logica, de modale logica van actie, waaraan een extra component
toegevoegd is welke de vaardigheden van agents representeert.
In hoofdstuk 4 breiden we het basissysteem zo uit dat het mogelijk wordt acties te
modelleren waarvan voor uitvoering nog niet vaststaat waar ze precies uit zullen bestaan.
Dit soort acties wordt niet-deterministisch genoemd. Een standaard voorbeeld van een
niet-deterministische actie is `post de brief of verbrand hem'. Als alleen maar bekend
is dat een agent deze actie gaat uitvoeren is nog niet duidelijk of de brief gepost of
verbrand gaat worden. Hierbij is het van belang waardoor bepaald wordt hoe een niet-
deterministische actie uitgevoerd dient te worden, en met name of de agent die de actie
uitvoert enige invloed op deze keuze uit kan oefenen. In hoofdstuk 4 onderscheiden
we twee soorten niet-deterministische acties die verschillen met betrekking tot degene
die de keuze maakt: in het ene geval wordt de keuze door de agent gemaakt, in het
andere geval wordt de keuze toegeschreven aan een externe omgeving waarop de agent
geen invloed heeft. Voor een software interface agent zou deze externe omgeving een
gebruiker kunnen zijn: het is mogelijk dat bepaalde acties die de agent dient uit te
voeren vanuit het oogpunt van de agent niet-deterministisch zijn, waarbij de keuze bij
de gebruiker ligt. Het blijkt dat standaard benaderingen die voorgesteld zijn voor het
representeren van niet-determinisme niet bruikbaar zijn voor onze doeleinden; als gevolg
hiervan zijn de benaderingen die wij voorstellen dan ook niet erg standaard.
In hoofdstuk 5 beschouwen we agents die zich bezighouden met allerlei aspecten
van informatie en informatie-beheer. Deze agents kunnen bijvoorbeeld de elektronische
post van een gebruiker beheren, of hem/haar begeleiden bij zoektochten op het internet.
De informatie-beherende agents die wij beschouwen, beschikken naast kennis nog over
zwakkere vormen van informatie. Ook hebben ze de mogelijkheid bepaalde acties uit te
voeren die gericht zijn op het verwerven of overdragen van informatie. Zo kunnen de
agents informatie verwerven door observaties en door het voor waar aannemen van be-
paalde waarschijnlijke | maar net niet helemaal zekere | beweringen. Beweringen van
dit soort worden defaults genoemd. Het bekendste voorbeeld van een default gaat over
de vogel Tweety. Zolang er niets meer over Tweety bekend is dan dat het een vogel is, kan
bij default aangenomen worden dat Tweety vliegt. Nieuwe informatie, bijvoorbeeld dat
Tweety een pingu

n is, of een gebraden eend, kan ervoor zorgen dat de default-conclusie
dat Tweety vliegt weer ingetrokken moet worden. Via communicatie kan informatie
overgedragen worden aan andere agents. De betrouwbaarheid van informatie hangt af
van de manier waarop die verkregen wordt. In het algemeen is het zo dat informatie
afkomstig uit observaties als het meest betrouwbaar beschouwd wordt, dat informatie
verkregen uit communicatie iets minder betrouwbaar is, en dat het aannemen bij default
tot de minst betrouwbare informatie leidt. In een agent die zijn gebruiker begeleidt bij
zoektochten op het internet zijn veel van deze aspecten van informatie-beheer zichtbaar.
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Deze agent observeert het gedrag van de gebruiker, vult dat eventueel aan met informatie
die verkregen is via communicatie met andere agents of is aangenomen bij default, en
doet aan de hand daarvan bepaalde suggesties aan de gebruiker die hij begeleidt. Zo
zou hij bij default kunnen concluderen dat een bepaald bericht op het internet, waarvan
het bestaan hem door een andere agent is medegedeeld, interessant is voor de gebruiker,
omdat de agent eerder geconstateerd heeft dat de gebruiker in het algemeen interesse
heeft voor berichten van dit soort. Mocht de agent nu expliciet te horen krijgen dat de
gebruiker niet ge

nteresseerd is, dan zal hij zijn default-conclusie intrekken. Er zijn twee
opmerkelijke aspecten zichtbaar in onze modellering van informatie-beherende agents.
Het eerste aspect betreft een uitbreiding van de standaard mogelijke-werelden seman-
tiek die ons toestaat gradaties in de betrouwbaarheid van informatie te onderscheiden.
Daarnaast stellen we een uitbreiding voor van de standaard interpretatie van acties zo-
als die gebruikt wordt in dynamische logica, de modale logica van actie. In onze meer
algemene interpretatie kunnen we op elegante wijze de acties modelleren die observaties,
communicatie en het maken van default-aannamen representeren.
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een modellering van de drijfveren of motieven van agents. Deze
drijfveren maken duidelijk wat een agent beweegt om zich op een bepaalde manier te
gedragen. In het algemeen stellen wij dat agents gedreven zijn om hun onvervulde wensen
te vervullen, waarbij een wens een of ander primitief verlangen is. Aanhangers van
Aristoteles kunnen bij dit primitief verlangen denken aan het najagen van kennis, terwijl
die van Freud waarschijnlijk het Lust-prinzip voor ogen zal staan. Omdat agents rationeel
zijn, zullen ze zich niet zonder meer tot doel stellen ieder onvervulde wens te vervullen
maar zich beperken tot die onvervulde wensen die in principe vervulbaar zijn. Als een
agent zich eenmaal een doel gesteld heeft, kan hij besluiten zich tot het ondernemen van
een bepaalde actie te committeren, dat wil zeggen dat de agent met zichzelf afspreekt,
of aan zichzelf belooft, dat hij de actie uit zal gaan voeren. Voorwaarde hierbij is dat de
agent weet dat uitvoering van deze actie inderdaad tot vervulling van zijn doel zal leiden.
Afspraken tot het ondernemen van bepaalde acties worden genoteerd in de agenda van
de agent. Op ieder moment is een agent aan zichzelf verplicht de acties uit te voeren
die in zijn agenda staan. Als nu op een bepaald moment een agent tot de ontdekking
komt dat een actie waartoe hij zich gecommitteerd heeft niet langer meer uitvoerbaar is
of geen enkel doel meer dient, kan de agent besluiten zijn aan zichzelf gedane belofte tot
uitvoering van de actie te verbreken. Als gevolg hiervan worden eventueel nog resterende
afspraken die op deze belofte betrekking hebben uit de agenda van de agent verwijderd.
In het laatste hoofdstuk vatten we de bijdragen van dit proefschrift nog eens kort
samen, geven we een voorbeeld van een specicatie van een software agent, en beschouwen
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A hand held over a candle in angst fuelled bravado
a carbon trail scores a moist stretched palm
Trapped in the indecision of another ne menu
and you sit there and ask me to tell you the story so far
This is the story so far
Shuing your memories dealing your doodles in margins
you scrawl out your poems across a beermat or two
and when you declare the point of grave creation
They turn round and ask you to tell them the story so far
This is the story so far
And you listen with a tear in you eye
to their hopes and betrayals and your only reply
is Slainte Mhath
Marillion, `Slainte Mhath'.
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